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ABSTRACT
A POLICY FRAMED ANALYSIS OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH IN
U.S. UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
by William Ker Ferguson
May 2014
At least as far back as the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 there has been
an ongoing desire on the part of politicians, policy-makers and the public in the U.S., to
obtain greater economic returns on the federal investment in publicly funded university
research. Today among policy-makers there is an apparent belief that a capital shortage
in the mid-stages of technological development is the rate-limiting factor, preventing the
maximum flow of university inventive knowledge from entering the marketplace. The
consequence is a Valley of Death demise for the vast majority of university inventions.
In order to mitigate the problem, changes to federal granting policies are placing
increased emphasis on funding more applied and translational research than basic
fundamental science. Given the foregoing direction of policy, the study set out to
confirm the current understanding of the Valley of Death on the part of policy-makers
and relate this understanding to the historical evidence.
Consistent with present-day political pronouncements, the study findings verify
an overwhelming belief that a shortfall of applied research funding is the root cause of
the Valley of Death. Policy-makers believe this shortfall constrains the development of
basic research into commercializable products. However, the study also found that this
perception is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. The study reveals a gap between
these sectors but the gap is independent of the stage of technological development. A
ii

funding difference extends the entire length of the research and innovation spectrum,
suggesting other factors are responsible for the adoption of university inventions,
bringing into question the direction and likely efficacy of current policy initiatives.
The findings lend credence to the less cited cause of the Valley of Death, namely
a Darwinian Sea of survival of the economically fittest technologies (Auerswald &
Branscomb, 2003). The actual stage of development of a university invention will
determine the extent of investment funding necessary for its continued development, but
economic factors will determine if further investment in its development is warranted. A
death does exist for many inventions, but it is the result of natural market causes and not
a funding shortfall, per se.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, the value of academic research to society is being measured by the
translation of its results into marketable products and services (Obama, 2011). Central to
these translational efforts is the university technology-transfer process, which has been
the subject of growing academic and public interest in the U.S. since the time of the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and today remains a focal point of policy attention (Graff,
Heiman, & Zilberman, 2002). This interest is no better exemplified than when the White
House issued a request for information (RFI) to identify ways to increase the economic
impact of the federal investment in university research (RFI, 2010). The White House
requested information on current best practices in the field and sought suggestions to help
expedite the movement of technologies out of the laboratory and into the market.
Evidence to date indicates the vast majority of university inventions fail to achieve
economic success, and this phenomenon has been dubbed the Valley of Death
(Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). This metaphorical valley represents the graveyard for
new technologies where they perish in an attempt to move along their development
pathway from an initial idea to the end-market in the form of new products, processes,
and services.
The White House RFI was an initiative to gather input on the issues of the Valley
of Death and to develop a consensus strategy to mitigate its effects. It is generally
accepted in the public policy literature that perceptions and coalitions of shared beliefs
form the impetus of policy-making (Sabatier, 1991; Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2011).
As such, the RFI provided a mechanism to crystallize shared beliefs and to help form a
coalition for future policy direction on the Valley of Death. Unfortunately, a review of
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the literature reveals little published empirical work to lend credence to any anecdotal
evidence, which could be proffered from the responses to the RFI. To help support the
attainment of national goals for the effective translation and market adoption of
university inventions, further research is needed on the nature and cause(s) of the Valley
of Death. Contribution to these aims underpinned the motivation for the study.
Background
President Obama’s Administration’s attention to the economic potential of
academic research is most laudable. However, recognition of the importance of basic
scientific research and its role as a driver of technology-based economic development in
the U.S. is not new, neither is the desire for politicians and policymakers to seek ways to
enhance its effectiveness (cf. Abramovitz, 1956; Arrow, 1962b; Bush, 1945). A deeper
recognition of the merits of basic scientific research to society began to emerge in the
United States toward the end of the Second World War. Vannevar Bush, Director of the
Office of Scientific Research and Development at the time, presented a report to the
President on a program for postwar scientific research (Bush, 1945). As a prefacing
comment to the published report, President Roosevelt remarked “the Office of Scientific
Research and Development represents a unique experiment of team-work and
cooperation in coordinating scientific research and applying existing scientific knowledge
to the solution of the technical problems paramount in war” (Bush, 1945, p. vii).
Roosevelt further speculated that the structure employed and the lessons learned could be
effectively utilized in times of peace, and toward that end, he expressed the following:
The information, the techniques and the research experience developed by the
thousands of scientists in the universities and in private industry, should be used
in the days of peace ahead for the improvement of the national health, the creation
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of new enterprises bringing new jobs, and the betterment of the national standard
of living. (taken from the copy of a letter from President Roosevelt, reproduced
in the preface to Bush, 1945, p. vii)
The net result of Roosevelt’s belief was the development of a national policy position on
the utilization of scientific knowledge for the public good, and that principle has formed
an essential component of U.S. administrative and economic policy for almost seventy
years.
Concurrent with the policy position espoused by Roosevelt, the economic
thought-leaders of the day were re-formulating classical and neo-classical economic
theory. Innovation, over and above labor and capital, was becoming recognized as the
primary impetus of economic growth (cf. Arrow, 1962b; Bush, 1945; Schumpeter, 1939;
Solow, 1956). Consequently, the U.S. policymaking principles of fostering basic science
as a potential driver of innovation and economic development directly paralleled
emerging academic thinking. Formal federal commitment to the application of science
from that time has been evidenced by such follow-on measures as the creation of the
National Science Foundation in 1950, the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the
Small Business Innovation Act 1982, the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, the
Technology Transfer Act of 1986, the Advanced Technology Program under the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Technology Innovation Program
under the America Competes Act of 2007, and has most recently revised patent
legislation under the America Invents Act of 2011.
Within the public policy realm of university technology transfer, the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980 has been touted as having a key influence on the rate of growth of
technology transfer activity (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2004). Similar to the
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motivation for the recent White House RFI, the original purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act
was to address a perceived failure in the transfer of public sector research results to the
private sector. Unlike today where the failure to translate research results is now
believed to stem from an applied research funding shortfall, in 1980 the consensus belief
for the failure was a lack of granting agency consistency with respect to ownership and
transferability of intellectual property rights ("Bayh-Dole," 1980). The resulting
legislation vested universities with ownership rights to inventions emanating from federal
research funding, plus the ability to license those rights to industry.
By many accounts the Bayh-Dole Act has been considered a success and as stated
in the Congressional Research Service’s recent report to Congress, “the Bayh-Dole Act
appears to have met its expressed goals of using the patent system to promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally-supported research ... and to promote
collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities” (Schacht, 2012, p. 8). In one of the earliest reviews of the legislation, the
General Accounting Office found agreement among university administrators and small
business representatives, stating that the Bayh-Dole Act had “a significant impact on their
research and innovation efforts” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1987, p. 3). The
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), the professional body for
universities and other research-related organizations engaged in technology transfer, also
cites “one need only review the data we’ve gathered over the past twenty years to know
that the Bayh-Dole Act is working. Innovative technologies no longer sit in university
labs benefiting no one” (AUTM, 2010, p. 3). The organization boasts that, as a result of
university innovations, products that benefit the public enter the market every day and
new companies are formed each year, “putting Americans to work and bolstering local
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economies” (AUTM, 2010, p. 3). In addition, AUTM notes 38,473 active technology
licenses exist between its members and industry, producing approximately $2 billion
annually in licensing revenue for universities (AUTM, 2011).
What both AUTM and the noted reports to Congress fail to highlight is the
approximate 300,000 invention disclosures received by TTOs since the enactment of
Bayh-Dole that have failed to make it to market (AUTM, 2011). Utilizing AUTM’s
numbers represents a potential multiplier effect of approximately 9 times what has been
commercialized to date, or an estimated $18 billion annually in additional royalty income
to universities. Since universities only receive royalty licensing income as a small
percentage of the final product sales by a licensee company, averaging 3% (Stevens &
Phil, 2003), the potential economic opportunity cost of the failure of inventions to be
commercialized translates to $600 billion annually.
The foregoing estimate of the potential economic scale of the issue not only
provides a logical rationale for the level of public interest but also underscores the
concern that the commercialization process should be as effective as possible. This
concern is evidenced not only by the previously mentioned RFI, but also by calls from
other engaged parties such as the Kauffman Foundation. They have argued “although
there is general consensus … that the Act [Bayh-Dole] has accelerated the
commercialization of university-developed inventions … there is reason for believing
that the pace and amount of commercialization is sub-optimal” (Litan & Mitchell, 2009,
p. 1). The calls for improvement immediately prompt additional questions, not the least
of which is to increase the emphasis of academic R&D as a strategic vehicle for
economic development rather than economic development being a by-product of
university R&D, which are two radically different objectives. This re-focus represents a
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fundamental shift in academic purpose that many academicians question and fear (Lee,
1996).
From a political standpoint, the 2012 presidential race between Obama and
Romney served to provide recent insight into current perceptions on the matter of
university research commercialization. On the one hand, Obama stated he would seek to
increase the federal commitment for basic research, which is consistent with his
previously stated positions, including the time when he noted in a National Academy
speech, “it was basic research … that would one day lead to solar panels … the CAT scan
… GPS satellites” (Obama, 2009, p. 4). Contrastingly, Romney recognized the value of
basic research but would have focused federal research policy on developmental
programs (versus basic research) to form a platform for future private sector
commercialization (Obama & Romney, 2012). Romney did not suggest how new
underlying basic research would emerge as a feeder for follow-on development. In this
regard, Obama’s position appears more nuanced than Romney’s does, given Obama
follows accepted academic thinking and provides an acknowledgement of the
understanding that basic research forms a foundation for invention, which is an input for
economic innovation (Maclaurin, 1953). Despite differences in political positions, a
common underlying belief was demonstrated by both politicians, namely a need to
enhance the technology transfer process.
Prima facie academic evidence for the belief that the research currently taking
place on U.S. university campuses may lay the foundation for future economic growth
and societal well-being is further demonstrated by the peer-reviewed journal, Economic
Development Quarterly. This journal focused its entire February 2013 edition to the
matter of university technology transfer and its impact on economic development. The
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potential of basic university research is also captured in the following statements
contained in the Federal Register, “The Federal government supports university-based
research for a variety of reasons. Expanding the frontiers of human knowledge is a
worthy objective in its own right. Basic research that is not motivated by any particular
application can have a transformative impact” (RFI, 2010, p. 14476). However, at the
opposite end of this ideological position is the reality politicians and policymakers face,
namely the accountability associated with spending taxpayers’ dollars. This dilemma is
evidenced by an ensuing statement contained in the same RFI cited above, “The
Administration is interested in working with all stakeholders (including universities,
companies, federal research labs, entrepreneurs, investors, and non-profits) to identify
ways in which we can increase the economic impact of federal investment in university
R&D” (RFI, 2010, p. 14476). In a similar vein, recent academic attention has focused on
the efficiency and effectiveness of transferring the results of publicly funded basic
research to the private sector (cf. Graff et al., 2002; Litan & Mitchell, 2009; Niosi,
Treurnicht, & Samarasekera, 2008). The dichotomy between the level of federal
investment in R&D activity and the perceived economic returns frames the current
political and policy environment surrounding university technology transfer.
A desire exists to utilize university technology transfer as an embedded and
fundamental element of an innovation-driven, national economic development strategy
(Obama & Romney, 2012; RFI, 2010). The current mechanisms of university technology
transfer have predominately grown from patenting and licensing activity being
undertaken as a specific consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act and have become an
embedded component of American university infrastructure (Graff et al., 2002; Mowery
et al., 2004). Although a technology transfer process is in place to support the translation
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of research results, the most efficient and/or effective structure for that process remains a
question (RFI, 2010). Given the indication of the extent of potential economic benefit
available should more inventions be able to complete the process of commercialization
(Economic Development Quarterly, February 2013), a full comprehension of this issue is
warranted. Deeper understanding, in turn, will yield appropriate, fact-based models to
lend credence to the belief systems to guide the policy process (Sabatier & JenkinsSmith, 1993). In the pages that follow, including the conceptual and theoretical
frameworks in this chapter and the literature review in Chapter II, additional perspective
has been provided on university technology transfer and the Valley of Death, which are
framed within the U.S. federal policy context.
Conceptual and Theoretical Underpinnings to the Study
To better understand the technology transfer environment and the positioning of
university commercialization activity relative to academic research and industrial
innovation, a conceptual framework outlining this interaction is provided in Figure 1.
The conceptual framework locates federal R&D grant funding as input into the
production of new knowledge. The subsequent dissemination and adoption of this new
knowledge yields societal returns in such forms as improved education, health and
welfare, etc. The theoretical basis underpinning this component of the conceptual
framework is founded in human capital development theory, the essence of which is the
creation, dissemination, and application of knowledge for individual, organizational, and
societal benefit (cf. Becker, 1964, 2002; Kern, 2009; Leslie & Brinkman, 1988; Mincer,
1984).

9

Figure 1. Conceptual framework for the generation and dissemination of academic
knowledge and how policy on the granting process are shaped from perceptions and
beliefs surrounding the outcomes.
From time to time, outputs of the university, knowledge production-function may
take the specialized form of an invention. Knowledge in the form of inventions becomes
input to the university, technology transfer process, which falls under the purview and
management of university technology-transfer offices (TTOs). The flow of inventive
knowledge reaches TTOs in the form of invention disclosures from the institution’s
researchers. Essentially, the TTOs endeavor to have inventions incorporated into the
industrial innovation process through contractual arrangements with the private sector to
produce mutual economic benefit (Graff et al., 2002). Transfers to the private sector
have the potential for broader societal effect through their influence on innovation and
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technology based economic development. Current understanding of the impact of this
component of the conceptual framework and the secondary knowledge flow it generates
has its foundation in the precepts of endogenous economic growth and economic
development theory (cf. Aghion, Howitt, & García-Peñalosa, 1998; Arrow, 1962a, 1970;
Brzustowski, 2006; David, 1975; Denison, 1962; Duesenberry, 1956; Freeman, 1990;
Romer, 1994; Schmookler, 1966; Schumpeter, 1939). For the reader unfamiliar with
university technology transfer operating procedures, Appendix A provides a detailed
description of the technology transfer process and the historical performance measures
associated with TTOs.
Unfortunately, not all of the knowledge emanating from TTOs finds its way to
market, and the great majority of university inventions fail to be commercialized, ending
up in the Valley of Death prior to reaching industry (AUTM, 2011; Ford, Koutsky, &
Spiwak, 2007). Today, the apparent consensus of thought among politicians, academics,
and policy-makers is that an applied-research funding shortfall constrains basic university
research from translating into further commercial development (cf. Auerswald &
Branscomb, 2003; Frank et al., 1996; H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998; Katehi, 2010;
Markham, 2002; Moran, 2007; Murphy & Edwards, 2003, Wessner 2005; Williams,
2004; Wylie, 2011). The foundation for this prevailing belief is drawn from the notion
that the focus of university research is primarily conducted at the basic end of the
research spectrum, whereas industry’s research focus is at the developmental end. A
funding gap in the middle stage (i.e., applied research) creates a disconnection, which is
manifested as the Valley of Death.
From the conceptual framework in Figure 1, both the positive outcomes (Societal
Benefits) and negative outcomes (Valley of Death) that result from the academic research
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enterprise create perceptions and beliefs surrounding the effectiveness of the process in
the minds of politicians, policy-makers and the public. Importantly, perceptions and
beliefs frame the design and implementation of public policy (Sabatier, 1991; Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). As a growing body of empirical
literature has demonstrated (cf. Bedsworth, Lowenthal, & Kastenberg, 2004; Bridgman &
Barry, 2002; McBeth, Shanahan, Hathaway, Tigert, & Sampson, 2010), policy narratives
are the key mechanism for influencing the perceptions and beliefs that eventually direct
policy-making. Governing policies need to be congruent with the desired outcomes in
order to achieve objectives; therefore, the perceptions and beliefs surrounding the Valley
of Death need to be fully informed to effectively direct policy and address the Valley’s
root cause.
Statement of the Problem
In an attempt to respond to calls for greater economic returns and to mitigate the
Valley of Death phenomenon, politicians, policymakers, and program directors for the
U.S. national research granting councils are implementing strategic changes to federal
grant programming. Changes are reflected in such initiatives as iEdison, which was
introduced to track patenting and commercialization activity associated with inventions
resulting from federal research grants (NIH, 2013a). In addition, an amendment to NSF’s
grant terms and conditions requires universities to publicly report their transfer of
technology and the commercialization of research results emanating from NSF grants
(NSF, 2013c). Furthermore, both the NIH and the NSF granting councils have amended
their application forms to include specific references to potential patentability and a
principal investigator’s history of patent citations (NSF, 2013d). From a more political
standpoint Lamar Smith, Chair of the House of Representatives’ Science, Space and
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Technology Committee, drafted a bill that according to ScienceInsider, “in effect, would
replace peer review at … NSF with a set of funding criteria chosen by Congress … it
would also set in motion a process to determine whether the same criteria should be
adopted by every other federal science agency” (Mervis, 2013, para. 1). The proposed
congressional criteria, among other things, would require the research to advance national
prosperity. The use of such criteria is an overt move to place funding priority on research
that holds the potential for more economically driven outcomes over ‘disinterested’
fundamental scientific research. A political and philosophical change is emerging from
previous policy positions, whereby it has been stated that “many government managers,
especially those in the core funding agencies, are as concerned about building up
scientific and technical capacity as much as producing discrete impacts from particular
projects” (Bozeman, 2000, p. 649). Shifts in policy of this nature can hold broader
significance in the realm of human capital development, since too great an emphasis on
the applied or developmental aspect of academic research and its commercialization
might actually slow down the social rate of innovation (Feller, 1990).
Notwithstanding the current moves by politicians and policymakers, studies thus
far on the Valley of Death have only provided figurative representations of this
phenomenon, with little empirical basis. Based on the literature review, no confirming
evidence isolating the actual historical location of the Valley of Death along the R&D
spectrum has been identified (i.e., the applied research phase), nor has any attempt been
made to quantify the amount of the perceived funding shortfall. Since no fact-based
work has been observed, it is unclear to what extent the policy changes targeting the
Valley of Death are necessary, or beneficial, and if they are focused at the appropriate
point in the process. Not only is there the potential misapplication of resources and

13
efforts, but changes may also result in the unintended consequence of affecting the rate of
broader human capital growth and societal innovation.
In summary, a problem exists in that the commercial application of university
research is considered sub-optimal and, as a result, changes in grant funding criteria are
being implemented to ameliorate the situation. However, to confound the issue, policy
changes are being initiated based on limited empirical evidence. While the ultimate
effect is yet unknown, the direction of this particular change has been previously
hypothesized to hold broader negative societal implications (Feller, 1990). Given the
potential impact of proposed policy changes, both positive and negative, an accurate
assessment of the basis of the Valley of Death phenomenon needs to be ascertained.
Purpose of the Study
Knowing the current policy direction and the lack of underlying empirical
foundation for any proposed changes, the purpose of the study is to develop data that
would help inform policy-makers on the phenomenon of the Valley of Death. This was
accomplished by first confirming the current perception and shared beliefs held among
policy-makers with respect to the perceived cause of the Valley of Death. Secondly, was
the development of a more accurate account of the Valley of Death based on the
historical record. A comparison of the data generated provides the consistency of
presently shared beliefs with historical evidence. More specifically the research
objectives were structured as follows:
Research Objective 1 – determine the frequency of use of the term Valley of
Death by policy-makers in the context of innovation and technology development;

14
Research Objective 2 – determine the frequency of use and the referenced
position of the term ‘funding shortfall’ when policy-makers describe the Valley of Death
in innovation and technology development;
Research Objective 3 – determine the pattern of use over time by policy-makers
of the term Valley of Death in the context of innovation and technology development;
Research Objective 4 – determine the historical research spending patterns by
category of research for the university and industrial sectors.
Limitations
With respect to research objectives 1, 2, and 3, Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, and
Vetter (2000) suggest content analysis be used when the communicative content is of
greatest importance. In performing content analysis on a text, the data must be subject to
strict categorical definitions and procedures and not demonstrate any observer
dependency (Krippendorff, 2012). The key limitation of this method is that it simply
describes what is there, but may not reveal the underlying motives for the observed
pattern, that is, the 'what' but not the 'why' (Titscher et al., 2000). Content analysis is also
limited by the use of relevant material, which in this case will be contained to the
Congressional Record. As a formal public record, the method of speech and delivery of
the message by the speaker may be influenced and thereby potentially skew the content
(Krippendorff, 2012).
In order to determine the construct of the Valley of Death (Research Objective 4),
data was sourced from the historical record contained in the NSF’s database of National
Patterns of R&D Resources (NSF, 2011). To the extent that these records were
incomplete, contained errors, or had altered their collection methodology and/or
descriptions of data over time, the conclusions drawn from the analysis are limited. In
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addition, the NSF’s classification of R&D spending data under the terms of basic, applied
and developmental research formed the structure of the database and therefore limited the
presentation of the Valley of Death phenomenon. The lack of more detailed data is the
key point made by Godin (2006) with respect to describing the overall nature and
limitations on the use of the linear model of innovation, which itself forms a key
assumption of this study. The foregoing limitations lead to potential construct validity as
well as potential threats to external validity. These threats are further discussed in
Chapter V.
Delimitations
Delimitations are those characteristics selected by a researcher to define the
boundaries of a study. One key delimiting factor of the study was the use of the
Congressional Record as the source of information for policy narratives related to the
meaning and perception of the Valley of Death. Use of wider textual sources could
provide richer meaning to the term; however, focus on the Congressional Record ensured
the sources of the information and the targeted listening audiences were direct influencers
on the policy process.
A second delimiting factor was the confinement of the study to U.S. university
research funded from federal sources. In its broadest sense, the Valley of Death covers
the development of all research-based technologies. Given that almost 30% of the U.S.
annual federal research budget goes to universities and colleges and as this sector has
represented the largest single sector for federal R&D spending since 2002 (NSF, 2011),
U.S. universities and colleges formed the primary and logical focus for the study on the
Valley of Death consequence of technology transfer. However, as a result non-U.S.
players were excluded as were other publicly funded sources of research. Examples of

16
these other areas include State or foundation funded research, federal labs, research
hospitals, government agencies, and federally funded (private sector managed) proof of
concept centers. Additionally, attention was solely on university-generated inventions
and not those inventions created within industry, which could also receive federal
funding support (i.e., Small Business Investment Research grants) and which may too,
fail to reach market. Restrictions on the interpretation of the findings caused by the
delimitations of the study are more fully addressed in the discussion of the results in
Chapter V.
Assumptions
There are two main assumptions associated with the research objectives of the
study. First, Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Narrative Policy Framework
(NPF) are considered to form the underlying structure to the general policy-making
process, but the application of these frameworks to the issue of technology transfer and
the commercialization of university research has not yet been examined. The process
surrounding federal research grant policy was assumed to be consistent with the other
federal policy-making processes, which have formed the precepts for these frameworks
and hence, the applicability of these models to the study.
A second assumption underpinning the study is the use of the linear model of
innovation to provide the theoretical structure that governs the relationship among basic,
applied, and developmental research. This model holds that these three categories of
research are sequential and together form a developmental continuum from lab to market
(Godin, 2006). The linear model of innovation frames the graphical plane (i.e., the xaxis) on which the “Valley of Death” is historically depicted.
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Summary
The conceptual and theoretical precepts related to university technology transfer
demonstrate how innovation emerges from the inventive process and how inventions are
derived from the development of new knowledge. The relationship of knowledge and
invention to end-market products or services are juxtaposed at opposite ends of an
innovation process spectrum (reflective of the linear model of innovation). Such
juxtaposition sets up the potential for discontinuity (i.e., Valley of Death) along this
innovation continuum, especially if various actors are operating at different points within
this spectrum.
In an age of increasing global competition, the ability to innovate is seen as the
basis for continued economic growth (Friedman, 2007; Romer, 1994). Innovative
capability is the capacity to generate and apply new knowledge and is a function of the
level of human capital development achieved (Mincer, 1984). In the United States, a
substantial amount of federal dollars is expended on university R&D to expand the
human capital base and create new knowledge (NSF, 2011), providing the potential for
enhanced economic competitiveness and growth. However, much of the inventive
activity emerging from university labs is lost along the development pathway to market
and ends up in a proverbial Valley of Death (Ford et al., 2007). The consensus belief
cited for this failure is a lack of funding in the applied research stage of development
(Beard, Ford, Koutsky, & Spiwak, 2009). In response, federal policy is evolving and
since policy-making is a function of shared beliefs and perceptions (Sabatier, 1991), the
first objective of this study confirmed the current meaning and common use of the term
Valley of Death by policy-makers and legislators. This is followed by an empirically
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based model of the Valley of Death, demonstrating how the current perception/belief
aligns with the historical evidence.
The remaining chapters of this study include a review of the relevant literature, a
detailed explanation of the research methods employed, the results, and a discussion of
the findings. The study closes with recommendations for additional research, with
particular emphasis on areas that may assist in informing future policy direction.

19
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The argument has been presented that the theoretical framework for this study can
be described as an interdisciplinary examination residing at the intersection of human
capital development theory and endogenous growth theory. The generation,
dissemination, and application of new knowledge in the form of inventions, a human
capital development matter (cf. Becker, 1964, 2002; Kern, 2009; Leslie & Brinkman,
1988; Mincer, 1984), creates a foundational input to innovation driven economic
development, an endogenous growth matter (cf. Aghion et al., 1998; Arrow, 1962b, 1970;
Freeman, 1990; Romer, 1994; Schmookler, 1966; Schumpeter, 1939). From this
perspective, the failure to commercialize university inventions essentially reflects the
direct consequence of the market not fully adopting all new knowledge emanating from
TTOs. An applied research-funding shortfall is attributed as the cause of the problem,
and current federal policy direction is shifting the focus of available grant funding in an
attempt to address the issue (Ford et al., 2007). This literature review is structured to
focus on the foregoing interrelationships and circumstances and will follow the logical
flow of the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1 herein.
The literature on the interrelationship between human capital development and
endogenous economic growth leads to the industrial innovation process, which is
specifically manifested in the linear model of innovation (Godin, 2006). The linear
model forms the underlying pathway for the commercialization of new inventions, and an
investigation of its principles reveals how inventions translate into the final products and
services that eventually make their way to the marketplace. The evolving role of the
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university in this process is reviewed to provide perspective for the basis of the current
practice of university technology transfer. The substance of this prefacing examination
establishes an overall perspective for the circumstances surrounding the Valley of Death,
which then forms a specific section of the literature review. The Valley of Death
component addresses the extent of the current comprehension of this phenomenon,
including how it has been defined as well as its currently known delimiting parameters.
The recognition of the existence of the Valley of Death in relation to the accepted role of
the federal government in R&D and technology transfer is explored in the final section of
the literature review. This approach to the literature review provides a full and
appropriate foundation for the research objectives of the study.
Human Capital, Invention, and Industrial Innovation
Most of the literature and growth in understanding the relationship of innovation
to the economy originated from the founding works of the renowned economist,
Schumpeter (1939). As summarized by Nelson “virtually all contemporary general
accounts of the capitalist engine are based on Schumpeter” (Nelson, 1990, p. 193). One
early study that led directly from Schumpeter’s initial principles on innovation was
conducted by the historian and economist, Maclaurin (1953). He analyzed the sequence
from invention – to innovation – to economic growth. Within his work, he laid the
framework that related: (1) the propensity to develop pure science; (2) the propensity to
invent; (3) the propensity to innovate; (4) the propensity to finance innovation and; (5)
the propensity to accept innovation (Maclaurin, 1953). Maclaurin’s chain of events
demonstrated an evolution in the understanding associated with the overall process of
innovation and important to universities, he added the elements of pure science into the
mix as a pre-curser to invention. Today, it is generally accepted that basic science
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provides a natural starting point for the industrial innovation process (Godin, 2006) and
the industrial innovation process is commonly referenced alongside the concept of ‘the
linear model of innovation’. According to Godin (2006), the linear model contends that
innovation starts with basic research, moves through applied research, then development,
and ends with production and diffusion in the marketplace.
The exact origin of the linear model does not appear to have ever been
documented (Godin, 2006). Instead, the model appears to have been generally taken for
granted, but according to many, it initiated from Bush’s work, Science: The Endless
Frontier (for examples of this attribution refer to: Freeman, 1996; Hounshell, 1996;
Irvine & Martin, 1984; Mirowski & Sent, 2002; Mowery, 1997; Stokes, 1997). However,
Bush like Schumpeter, only discussed linkages between science (i.e., basic research) and
socioeconomic progress. They did not provide details on the mechanism whereby
science translates into either social or economic benefit through some sequential linear or
other linked process (Godin, 2006).
Godin traced the history of the model and concluded that it developed in various
overlapping stages. He argues that the linear model of innovation was not a spontaneous
invention arising from the mind of one individual, that is to say Vannevar Bush; instead,
it evolved over time in three notable phases:
1.

The first phase was during the period from the beginning of the twentieth

century to the end of the Second World War (i.e., during the times of Bush and
Schumpeter), and it was predominately concerned with the first two terms in the model
namely, basic and applied research. This period was characterized by the ideals of pure
science and its adoption into new technologies.
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2.

The second phase lasted from 1934 to 1960 and added a third term to the

equation, namely development. This created the standard three-stage model of
innovation: Basic research → Applied research → Developmental Research. Analytical
as well as statistical gathering methodologies were cited as being responsible for driving
this period of evolution of the model.
3.

The third phase, starting in the 1950s extended the development end of the

model to non–R&D activities of production and diffusion as is exemplified the work of
Maclaurin (1953).
Godin demonstrated how the evolution of the linear model of innovation also
reflected the successive entry of three separate academic disciplines into the field. First
were natural scientists (academic and industrial); they espoused that basic research is the
source for applied research and technology. Second were researchers from business
schools; they studied the industrial management of research and the development of
technology. Third were the economists; they advanced the understanding of innovation
and the economy. The three groups of academicians, with their differing perspectives,
were advocating on three different fronts, respectively: (a) public support for basic
university research; (b) the importance of technological development to the firm and; (c)
the impact of research on economic growth and societal benefit.
The linear model of innovation has survived despite criticisms of its simplicity
such as “the linear model is insufficient as a descriptor of the industrial innovation
process. Everyone knows that the linear model of innovation is dead ... It was a model
that, however flattering it may have been to the scientist and the academic, was
economically naive and simplistic in the extreme” (Rosenberg, 1994, p. 1). More than
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just being dead, it has been postulated by Edgerton who states, “it [the linear model of
innovation] never existed” (Edgerton, 2004, p. 8).
According to Godin, the model’s longevity is fundamentally rooted in the use of
available statistics. By collecting official data on research as defined by three key
components (i.e., basic, applied, developmental), presenting, and discussing one after the
other within a sequential framework the federal government has crystallized the model.
The survival of the linear model indicates both how the use of statistics supports concepts
and how their absence limits adoption of other analytical models. Godin (2006) states
“rival models, because of their lack of statistical foundations, could not become
substitutes easily” (p. 641). Refinements to the linear model, which may be fully
justified and advocated by Rosenberg and Edgerton, will not occur until refinements to
the data are obtained.
Invention, the Basis of Innovation
As noted above, the linear model of innovation initiates with new knowledge and
invention (Godin, 2006; Maclaurin, 1953), but the question of how and why invention
takes place remained a question. This was separately studied by Usher, whose findings
led to definition of invention as the emergence of new things, which require an act of
insight going beyond the normal exercise of technical or professional skill (Usher, 1954).
Additional work within the field suggests that required acts of insight can be precipitated
by social needs (Bijker, 1995), they respond to economic opportunities, perceived risk,
and factor price changes (David, 1975; Dosi, 1998; Freeman, 1990; Rosenberg, 1982),
they emerge from the accretion of both cultural and scientific knowledge (Mokyr, 2002),
and they can be catalyzed by the exchange of information within networks of colleagues
(Aitken, 1985; Lane & Maxfield, 1997).
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What distills from the foregoing collage of scholars is the commonality that
novelty and inventiveness stem from increased awareness and a growing knowledge base.
The standard academic modus operandi of constantly researching to add to the body of
knowledge therefore forms an ideal foundation for inventiveness. The role of U.S.
universities’ contribution to the process of innovation is reviewed in the following
section.
U.S. Universities and Technology Transfer
The American land-grant university system emerged with distinctive structural
characteristics that differentiated them from their European counterparts (Kerr, 1963).
The Morrill Act of 1862 was founded on the commitment that American universities
should serve their citizens (Kerr, 1963). Under the Morrill Act, the purpose of education
shifted away from classical studies to more applied studies to prepare students for roles
after graduation (Kerr, 1963). As a result, universities in the United States have been
making positive contributions to the nation’s economic and social wellbeing throughout
their history (Mowery et al., 2004).
Major research universities generate a huge economic footprint (Lugar &
Goldstein, 1997). In many locales, universities are the largest employer, and several have
total expenditures that put them at the level of some of the largest corporations in the
nation. However, as important as this economic activity may be from a regional
development standpoint, it is recognized that a greater contribution stems from the
university’s basic mission of generating and disseminating knowledge (Leslie &
Brinkman, 1988; Mansfield, 1991). As noted in Chapter I, many groups are seeking to
utilize university expertise in a more expeditious fashion for greater and immediate
economic effect. Their objective is being specifically pursued through the direct
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application and commercial exploitation of university intellectual property for economic
growth through the process of technology transfer.
Although American universities have been committed to technology transfer since
inception (Mowery et al., 2004), the post-war era has witnessed the occurrence of three
distinct modern evolutionary phases of technology transfer (Geiger, 1992, 2004; Godin,
2006). The first phase of technology transfer evolution occurred between universities
and the defense establishment. Academic scientists were financially supported to
conduct research, develop and maintain expertise in key areas, and ultimately to produce
solutions that were demanded by the military. These tasks were accomplished through
directed processes rather than market relationships. Although close relationships
sometimes developed between supporting agencies, university scientists, and the
companies that manufactured the final products, markets played virtually no part in
coordinating the university’s role (Geiger, 1992, 2004).
The second major phase of modern university technology transfer evolution grew
from advances in medical research and similar to the first phase, the federal government
was also the patron, specifically the NIH (Geiger, 1992, 2004). The ultimate objective of
the NIH’s substantial investment in basic biomedical research was to cure disease and
improve the human health condition. Prior to 1980, this activity largely involved nonmarket relationships among government, industry, and academe. Any interaction with
universities primarily focused in clinical research, which concerned diagnosis,
identification of therapeutic targets, and refinements of treatment, not the invention of
products. From a market perspective, medical and pharmaceutical firms typically looked
to university scientists to help perfect, not invent, their products (Geiger, 1992, 2004).
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The third aspect of the modern technology transfer evolution has moved
universities in a fundamental way into the marketplace and has occurred predominately
since 1980 (i.e., the time of the Bayh-Dole Act). This phase has been dubbed “civilian
technology transfer” by Geiger (1992, p. 9). Because of civilian technology transfer,
both the purpose and modus operandi is now quite different. Universities actively seek to
sell research services to industry, market intellectual property, and launch and nurture
new companies, sometimes with their own venture capital funds (Geiger, 2004). Tassey
(2001) further describes the change in the fundamental character of the products and
services being developed for civilian technology transfer. He notes a movement from
public to private goods over the course of a technology’s development, and the end
product reflects a combination of both public and private goods. Tassey observed that
while “basic science is widely recognized as close to a pure public good … technology is
a mixed good, containing both private and public elements” (Tassey, 2001, p. 37).
Moreover, the public/private mix adjusts as technologies become more developed. The
slow development into a viable product is a process of creating private value but they
contain public resources as their foundation. The argument behind the public support of
private gain from public dollars is derived from the notion that broader public benefit will
eventually accrue in terms of present and future economic spin-off activity (Tassey,
2008).
Today the research and technology development enterprise has merged activities
that previously occupied opposite ends of the development spectrum and involved
different actors (Mowery et al., 2004). A result has been a stimulation of investment in
certain areas of university basic science and engineering; however, the economic
relevance of those fields has simultaneously brought a greater emphasis on
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commercialization of that science (Tassey, 2001). The new reality for universities is that
these endeavors are no longer differentiated components at opposite ends of the
spectrum, but part of a complex, unified endeavor. A philosophical dichotomy arises
given the private nature of the end-products versus the public source of funding used to
develop those products (Tassey, 2001, 2008). This suggests that the mission of U.S.
universities to provide public service via public goods (Kerr, 1963) has morphed. In the
original model, no one was precluded from using the knowledge at hand. In the current
model, private property rights emerge; there is an operational focus on the generation and
transfer of public goods for the benefit of private actors (Tassey, 2008). This is
manifested by the emergence of university TTOs seeking and licensing patent rights,
mostly on an exclusive basis (Mowery et al., 2004).
Modern Patterns of Technology Transfer
According to Abramson, Encarnacao, Reid and Schnmoch, “the principal
contribution of universities to the technical needs of industry is human capital, consisting
of well-educated, skilled graduates” (Abramson, Encarnacao, Reid, & Schnmoch, 1997,
p. 11). This quote emerged from a bi-national panel on technology transfer systems in
the United States and Germany. The bi-national panel also distinguished between direct
and indirect forms of technology transfer by noting “direct technology transfer is linked
to specific technologies or ideas and to more visible channels such as contract or
cooperative research projects … indirect technology transfer concerns the exchange of
knowledge through such channels as informal meetings, publications or workshops”
(Abramson et al., 1997, p. 3).
The relative importance of the various forms of technology transfer and the
dissemination of university knowledge to industry, including the direct and indirect forms
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mentioned above, was examined by Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2002). They surveyed
managers of R&D units of manufacturers located in the U.S. The survey sample was
randomly drawn from private labs listed in public directories and entailed a sample size
of 3,240 labs. The authors received 1,478 responses, yielding a gross response rate of
46%. Among the questions posed, the authors asked industry to what extent they relied
on various forms of information exchange with universities. Their results have been
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Relative Importance of Source Mechanism of Technology Transfer to Industry
Source Mechanism

Percentage of survey respondents rating source as
“moderately” or “very important”

Publications and reports
Informal interaction
Meetings and conferences
Consulting
Contract research
Recent hires
Cooperative R&D
Patents
Licenses
Personnel exchange

41.2
35.6
35.1
31.8
20.9
19.6
17.9
17.5
9.5
5.8

Source: Adapted from Cohen et al. (2002).

As revealed in Table 1, the relative positioning of patents and licensing (i.e.,
direct technology transfer) as industry’s source of new knowledge was eighth and ninth
in a list of ten. The patents and licenses categories reflect the mechanism of technology
transfer employed by university TTOs and are a direct representation of ‘inventions’ in
the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter I.
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Cohen et al.’s (2002) findings reveal a direct contradiction to the basic arguments
of policy makers and other original proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act. The Bayh-Dole
legislation had been advocated based on the position that technology transfer was failing
due to weaknesses in intellectual property rights and in order to create more effective
transfer and application of university research; specific ownership control and
mechanisms for the transfer of patenting rights were required. The policy-makers
position is specifically captured in the preamble to the Act: “It is the policy and objective
of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising
from federally supported research or development” ("Bayh-Dole," 1980, § 200). Cohen
et al. (2002) have demonstrated the original argument for the Bayh-Dole Act was
misaligned with the facts, which reinforces the relevance of the research objectives of this
study.
The actual growth and prevalence of TTOs is relatively new (i.e., since 1980), and
it appears that the Bayh-Dole Act is the precipitating event for this occurrence. In Figure
2, there is a noticeable transition point in the growth of university technology transfer as
evidenced by the change in the slope of the graph in and around 1980.

30

Bayh-Dole Enactment

Figure 2. The proportion of Carnegie Research Universities employing greater than .5
full-time equivalent, technology-transfer personnel. Graph adapted from Mowery et al.
(2004, p. 48) with permission, copyright Stanford University Press.

While TTOs emerged from the Bayh-Dole, it is unclear if Bayh-Dole has yielded
the desired effect on the underlying patenting activity of universities it was designed to
enhance. Evidence suggests, “That the growth in university patenting predates BayhDole” (Mowery et al., 2004, p. 48). Figure 3 plots the number of university patents
applications per dollar of R&D expenditure over time and a positive growing trend
(dashed line) is visually apparent commencing around 1971, approximately ten years
prior to the enactment of Bayh-Dole in December of 1980. This already-present growth
pattern tends to negate the reported level of success otherwise credited to the Bayh-Dole
legislation. According to Mowery et al., this prior trend in patent applications can be
attributed to a combination of factors that includes timing of substantial advances into the
biomedical sciences contemporaneously with changes in the legal treatment on life forms
by the U.S. Patent Office (Mowery et al., 2004).
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Bayh-Dole Enactment

Figure 3. University Patenting Activity per R&D Dollar. Patent activity is represented
by the number of non-provisional patent applications filed in a given year, whereas R&D
represents research expenditures for the calendar year prior to the patent. Graph adapted
from Mowery et al. (2004, p. 49) with permission, copyright Stanford University Press.
Operating Mandate and Funding of TTOs
According to Abrams, Leung, and Stevens (2009), “when university presidents
speak publicly on the commercialization of technologies, they focus more on the public’s
right to see a return on the investment of their tax dollars in research grants via the
availability of new products and services [as per the objectives of Bayh-Dole], rather than
on the financial return that they might hope to see” (p. 4). For example, during an
address by Dr. Coleman President of the University of Michigan at the 2005 Annual
Meeting of AUTM she stated, “you heard me correctly. It is not about the money ....
Revenue generation is NOT the ultimate goal. It is simply the means by which we can
increase the transfer of new knowledge into the business sector” (Abrams et al., 2009, p.
4).
Abrams et al. found that the above statements by Dr. Coleman, in fact, reflected
the general case. Abrams et al.’s (2009) work consisted of a survey of the directors of
U.S. TTOs. They obtained 340 names of directors from AUTM and received a 48.5%
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response rate to a directed survey. Of the survey responses, 112 of the respondents
replied to every question. From their analysis they concluded “that although a small
number of academic institutions have reaped very large rewards from their technology
transfer activities … these rewards appear to be a consequence of programs driven by
broader objectives” (Abrams et al., 2009, p. 2).
Synopsis of the U.S. University System of Technology Transfer
What has been gleaned from this component of the literature review is the
understanding that from the beginning, U.S. universities have taken an application driven
approach to their mission, and as a result, technology transfer has existed throughout their
history (Mowery et al., 2004). In the past, the technology transfer process has taken
many forms in order to effectively disseminate the new knowledge being generated on
campus. Historically, this knowledge has been able to be exploited as a public good to
create economic and societal benefit (Kerr, 1963). Today, TTOs represent a new
manifestation of that dissemination process, focused specifically on the application (i.e.,
private licensing) of new knowledge contained in the form of inventions and patents.
The difference being that this knowledge, in the form of patents, is not a public good, and
it is being applied through selective licensing arrangements for commercial exploitation
and private gain (Tassey, 2001). At the highest policy levels the rationale for this activity
(which is also contained in the preamble to the Bayh-Dole Act), is the notion that this
private process does provide benefit to society at large through the provision of goods
and services that would otherwise not be readily available, most notably advances in the
life sciences (AUTM, 2011; "Bayh-Dole," 1980; Schacht, 2012). The eventual public
benefit from private goods argument, plus the potential economic development impact
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has motivated policy-makers to attempt to mitigate the Valley of Death (RFI, 2010). A
review, specific to our current understanding of the Valley of Death, follows.
The Valley of Death
The objective of this component of the literature review is to detail the evolution
of the Valley of Death metaphor leading to its current connotations. A valley, by
definition, is a hollow or expanse of low ground, which forms a connecting point between
two formations. In the context of university technology transfer, it is the apparent
expanse between the academic knowledge enterprise formation on one side and the
industrial innovation enterprise formation on the other side. Metaphorically, the Valley
of Death reflects the final resting place for those university inventions that do not
successfully crossover from academe to the market. The use of the term Valley of Death
related to technology transfer is a relatively recent occurrence. By way of example, a
Google Scholar search of the terms: invention, innovation, technology transfer and
Valley of Death produced ten references for articles and books written prior to the year
2000. None of these ten references included the search term Valley of Death in their
titles.
History of the Metaphor
Among the earliest and most cited references of the term, Valley of Death, is the
report of United States House of Representatives, entitled “Unlocking Our Future:
Toward a New National Science Policy” (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998). The Vice
Chairman of this Committee and the individual who oversaw the content of the report,
Vernon Ehlers, has been given much of the credit for the widespread adoption of this
metaphor, including attribution for the conceptual depiction of the Valley of Death
contained in Figure 4 (Wessner, 2005). While Figure 4 does not formally appear within
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the Committee report, Wessner states Ehlers used this depiction as a visual aid to explain
the circumstances of the report: “Vernon Ehlers, one of the few scientists in the U.S.
Congress, described the situation [Valley of Death] with the striking image shown in
[Figure 4 below]” (Wessner, 2005, p. 9). Of particular note in Figure 4 is the concept of
the need for capital to bridge new research ideas and product innovation.

Figure 4. Image of the Valley of Death, attributed to V. Ehlers. Adapted from “Driving
innovations across the valley of death” by C.W. Wessner, 2005, p. 10. Copyright 2005
by Industrial Research Institute, Inc., with permission.
Within the 1998 report’s examination of the roles for government and the private
sector, a concept described as a research gap emerged. Specifically this concept was
described as follows: “Today’s technology-driven company must bridge the research gap
between basic science and product development if it wants to remain on the cutting edge
of the industry” (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998, p. 39). The research gap is a mid-level or
applied research gap and is typically necessary to develop basic research results into an
emerging technology, leading into a marketable product (Vest, 1996). Contained in the
report, and consistent with the linear model of innovation are the distinctions among
basic research, applied research, and developmental research. The Committee on Science
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recognized the limited resources of the federal government and accordingly reaffirmed
government’s need to remain focused on its “irreplaceable role in funding basic research”
(H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998, p. 40).
In the Committee’s report (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998), not only was the research
gap recognized and defined, but it was also stated that it was expanding, “This gap, which
has always existed but is becoming wider and deeper, has been referred to as the Valley
of Death” (p. 40). The explanation given for this expansion was a function of the limited
level of federal resources on the one hand, thereby containing federal R&D funding to the
front end of the development spectrum and market forces driving industry toward more
short term, rapid payback periods on the other hand, thereby forcing industry to focus at
the opposite end of the development spectrum (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998). Within the
report, the use of the term Valley of Death is attributed to others, but no other specific
source reference was cited.
The actual origin of the term, Valley of Death, as applied to the innovation
process appears to have initially emerged from an even earlier report prepared by
Mohawk Research Corporation for the Department of Energy and Argonne National Labs
(Lux & Rorke, 1991). In contrast to the purpose of the Committee on Science report (i.e.,
policy driven), the Mohawk report was to serve as a primer on the innovation process,
and it examined considerations to be made when taking a product from the concept state
to market entry. The key difference between the two reports is the Committee on Science
is discussing moving basic research (i.e., research that is not considered to have any
identified end use or product in mind) through applied research and then into product
development, whereas Mohawk is discussing taking a product idea (i.e., something
already at the forefront of the developmental stage) to final market readiness. Restated,
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the Committee’s gap commences in the applied research stage, and Mohawk’s gap
commences in the developmental research stage. The Mohawk version of the Valley of
Death is, by their calculation, the summation of the negative cash flow encompassing the
period from the start of product development through to the point of profitability derived
from market sales. The imagery used by Mohawk for their Valley of Death is depicted in
Figure 5:

Figure 5. Mohawk Research Corporation’s Image of the Valley of Death. Adapted from
"From Invention to Innovation: Commercialization of New Technology by Independent
and Small Business Investors,” (Lux & Rorke, 1991, p. 19). Copyright 1991 by Mohawk
Research Corporation, with permission.
Emerging since the time of the Mohawk and Ehlers’s depictions is a further
evolution of the industrial sector Valley of Death. This version was presented by
Markham (2002), and it has been reproduced in Figure 6. He describes the Valley of
Death as follows:
Most companies have the resources, personnel and organizational structure for
technology development. These components are present on the left side of the
valley. Similarly most companies possess the resources for such
commercialization activities as marketing, sales, promotion, production and
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distribution, which appear on the right side of the valley. The Valley of Death
between discovery and commercialization thus represents a lack of structure,
resources and expertise. (Markham, 2002, p. 31)

Figure 6. Markham’s Image of the Valley of Death. Adapted from " Moving
technologies from lab to market” (Markham, 2002, p. 32). Copyright 2002, Industrial
Research Institute Inc., with permission.
Markham’s (2002) image of the Valley of Death is a depiction of his
interpretation of gaps in structure, resources and expertise and he defined the position of
the Valley of Death as the “decision space between existing research resources and
commercialization resources” (p. 32). Since Markham focused his research on industrial
behavior, his depiction also reflects product development occurring solely within the
private sector innovation process. Accordingly, his construct of the Valley of Death
describes a shortfall of private sector resources.
A further evolution and variation of the Markham drawing has been observed, but
it does not yet appear to be contained within the academic literature. It has made several
appearances at various general conferences and popular addresses on the subject of
innovation and technology transfer (e.g., University Economic Development Association
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Annual Summit, Indianapolis, 2011; Association of University Technology Managers,
Eastern Annual Meeting, Baltimore, 2011; Gulf Coast Patent Association Annual
Meeting, Mobile, 2011; I-Ten Wired Annual Summit, Pensacola, 2010; BIO International
Convention 2010, Chicago, IL; Gulf Coast Technology Council, Spring Meeting, Mobile,
2009, etc.). A sample of this evolved version of the Valley of Death is captured in Figure
7. This depiction was retrieved from the web site of the Chancellor of the University of
California - Davis Campus, Dr. Linda Katehi. It formed part of her presentation on
technology transfer at the BIO International Convention in Chicago (Katehi, 2010).

Figure 7. Katehi’s Image of the Valley of Death. Adapted from "The role of
universities, biotechnology companies and technology transfer in the innovation
economy”, (Katehi, 2010, slide 7); figure entitled “The Continuum of Innovation”, used
with permission.
Dr. Katehi’s image maps the level of resources required for development against
the level of technological development achieved. It starts with the earliest stage of
development (basic research) being conducted in the public domain and the end stage of
development (a commercialized product) being generated by companies in the private
sector. The Valley of Death portrayed in Dr. Katehi’s image is a clear illustration of the
different roles and the relative differences in the focus of the resources employed by two
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potential complementary but separate groups in the overall innovation process. Of
further note is the use of the word continuum, which Dr. Katehi used in the title of her
image, suggesting she sees university basic research inexorably linked to the innovation
process.
The most recent variation of the Valley of Death to emerge is an image portrayed
by the NSF, refer to Figure 8 (NSF, 2013a).

Figure 8. National Science Foundation’s Ditch of Death. Depiction of the relative
positioning of the Ditch of Death versus the Valley of Death (NSF, 2013a, slide 22).
Public government document, no copyright.
Consistent with prior images, the level of research resources employed is mapped
against the stage of development. However, it also overlays the relative positioning of
different actors involved in the process and indicates where the various federal programs
come into play to assist in the discovery and commercialization process. In addition to
this information, the NSF also adds an irregularity to the university/federal research side
of the Valley. They have formed a “Ditch of Death” (NSF, 2013a, slide 22) which they
have identified as a further and highly specific funding shortfall in the technology
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development process. According to the NSF, this Ditch represents a gap in assessing the
commercial feasibility of technology concepts that are in the earliest stages of
development.
The Current Consensus of the Valley of Death as a Funding Shortfall
Supporting Ehlers’s original notion of a lack of capital in technology development
(refer Figure 4), there has been an ongoing consensus in the literature the Valley of Death
is the consequence of a shortfall in the availability of capital resources in the mid-stage of
product development. This consensus is captured in an early and comprehensive
description of the Valley of Death by Frank et al. (1996):
The “valley of death” is a concept used to refer to the situation in which a
technology … fails to reach the market because of an inability to advance from
the technology's demonstration phase through the commercialization phase. The
valley of death occurs when the developer of a particular technology has
successfully demonstrated the efficacy of the technology but is unable to obtain
financing [emphasis added] for the scale-up and manufacturing process. At this
point, the government considers the technology too “applied” to continue to
provide funding, since the government's role is to fund more basic research, yet
the private sector does not want to invest capital because the technology has not
yet been implemented. (p. 61)
Similar styled definitions of the Valley of Death have been made in subsequent works as
exemplified as follows:
“ A dearth of sources of funding …”, (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003, p.
232).
“The cash flow valley of death …” (Murphy & Edwards, 2003, p. 3).
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“The ‘Valley of Death’ is the name given to the gap between the great plains
of research funding and the orange groves of manufacturing ...” (Williams, 2004,
p. 23).
“The early-stage capital gap, often called the valley of death …” (Wessner,
2005, p. 9).
“The technology transfer gap has always been with us but in drug discovery
it has widened to form a valley of death …” (Moran, 2007, p. 266).
“A ‘funding gap’ or ‘Valley of Death’ exists …” (Beard et al., 2009)
“The ‘Valley of Death’, a term used to refer to ideas that are interesting but
too early stage to attract commercial investment … ” (Wylie, 2011, p. 1169).
The consistent theme throughout the foregoing cited works is a lack of funding is
a contributing, if not, the cause of the Valley of Death. This lack of funding has not been
quantified by any of these authors nor have they referenced any other source that
quantifies the funding shortfall. Additionally, the researchers provide only a generalized
descriptive notion of where the funding shortfall occurs, somewhere between the end of
solving a basic research issue and the point where industry is interested in taking on
further development of the product.
Advancing the Funding Shortfall Model
The work of Auerswald and Branscomb (2003), entitled “Valleys of death and
Darwinian seas: Financing the invention to innovation transition in the United States”
broadened the understanding of the Valley of Death. The title still suggests funding
issues as the basis of the Valley of Death, but the addition of a new metaphor provides
deeper understanding:
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The imagery of the Valley of Death … suggests a barren territory when, in reality,
between the stable shores of the S&T [science and technology] enterprise and the
business and finance enterprise is a sea of life and death of business and technical
ideas, of ‘big fish’ and ‘little fish’ contending, with survival going to the creative,
the agile, the persistent. Thus, we propose an alternative image the ‘Darwinian
Sea.’ (pp. 229-230)
The metaphor of the Darwinian Sea describes an environment where survival goes to the
most economically fit technologies.
Auerswald and Branscomb (2003) state “whether or not efficient markets exist on
Wall Street may be an open question. However, efficient markets do not exist for
allocating risk capital to early stage technology ventures” (p. 231). This statement
provides the key distinction between this and other works citing funding shortfalls as the
precipitating factor of the Valley of Death. The authors further explore the funding
shortfall by presenting viewpoints from either side of the Valley. On the one side, there
is the perspective of the private sector (the demand side), which is distinguished from the
perspective of the academic knowledge enterprise (the supply side). In the case of the
supply side, the funding shortfall stems from policies focusing on funding basic research
with a lack of applied research grant opportunities. On the demand side, industry seeks
out capital investment through market-based mechanisms to develop early stage
technologies and as a result the funding shortfall as a capital market issue. The authors
suggest that too much risk/uncertainty surrounds investment in early stage technologies,
which directly affects the supply and cost of capital for those technologies. To market
suppliers of capital, the risk-adjusted rates of return on these early stage technologies are
too low when compared to other investment opportunities (Weston & Brigham, 1975).
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Building on the work of Auerswald and Branscomb (2003), Beard et al. (2009)
utilized mathematical modeling to predict the occurrence of the Valley of Death. Starting
from the standard premise of the Valley as a shortfall in funding in the mid-stages of
development, the authors provided a mathematically derived, theoretical explanation for
the shortfall. The study concluded the Valley of Death stems from an overinvestment in
non-economic research at the very early stages of technology development and the Valley
of Death should not be an unexpected consequence. (Beard et al., 2009). In essence, the
Valley of Death remains a funding issue and to remove it one must either (1) substitute
more economically driven basic research, assuming that could even be determined in
advance, and/or (2) fund more intermediate research. Although these conclusions may
appear self-evident, the value of this study is provided as confirmation of Auerswald and
Branscomb’s findings that early stage technologies are in an economic competition with
other potentially economically feasible projects and that the fallout (i.e., the Valley of
Death) is a result of economic forces and natural market mechanisms choosing which
technologies to pursue.
Despite findings for market-based economic factors as the cause of the Valley of
Death, Beard et al. recommend public policy intervention, namely increased government
financial support for intermediate (applied) stage projects (Beard et al., 2009). This
conclusion prefaces the need for a review of past and currently evolving federal policy
aspects of the Valley of Death, which is provided in the following section.
Federal Policy Perspectives and the Valley of Death
The 1998 Committee on Science’s report confirmed the position of the federal
government with respect to the Valley of Death. Namely, it constitutes a gap between
basic and more applied research, and beyond the realm of basic research, the federal
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government has little interest, aptitude or even mandate to pursue (excluding such
notables as national defense and healthcare). By inference, the Valley of Death is a
private sector concern. The Committee on Science (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998)
specifically elaborated on this matter as follows:
The Mid-level research has customarily been performed, and should continue to
be done, in the private sector. The fruits of this research are proprietary; the
company is the primary or even sole beneficiary of any new technologies. At the
same time, the company must also bear the risk that the research project will not
yield any profitable results. (p. 39)
The past federal policy position is consistent with the basic precepts of the U.S.
market driven economy; market rewards go to those that take market risks. Therefore,
any further market-oriented development of research outputs must responsibly rest within
the purview of the private sector (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998).
In addition, the Committee on Science (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998) noted that the
Valley of Death phenomenon was being exacerbated as a result of industry’s short-term
focus on profitability and its desire for a rapid return on investment. It observed, “The
deployment of industry scientists on research … for which there are expected near-term
payoffs suggests that these scientists will … not be encouraged to take part in longerterm, more exploratory research” (p. 39). Former Undersecretary for the Department of
Commerce, Good, made similar observations when she previously testified at a federal
hearing on the Department of Commerce’s technology grant programs, “Now, in this
environment, what we find is that the competitive pressures of the global marketplace
have forced our American firms to move their R&D into shorter-term product and
process improvements” (Good, 1997, p. 5). Good (1997) went on to state, “and what we
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are in the process of seeing is an innovation gap [emphasis added] and it is developing
between the fundamental research that is done primarily at the university level … and the
shorter-term development activities of U.S. corporations” (p. 5).
Good’s comments and the Committee on Science report were issued
approximately seventeen years ago, but these comments remain just as relevant today.
According to the Global Competitiveness Report for 2011-2012, the global market place
is considered to become only more and more competitive with innovation as the key
driver of success. The United States is currently ranked 20th in the world in measures of
its companies’ competitiveness in international markets (World Economic Forum, 2011).
This is a dropping of one ranking position from the prior report and a fall from 12th
position in 2008. Despite a strategy of capturing “closest to market” innovations, U.S.
companies are falling behind their world counterparts.
A Shifting Policy Viewpoint Regarding Government’s Role
The historical policy position adopted by federal policymakers and legislators is
that the research gap/innovation gap/Valley of Death is a market driven phenomenon.
The gap is perceived not only to continue, but it is also estimated to widen. As a result,
the White House issued the 2010 RFI, referenced earlier in this document, to identify
ways in which to move technologies more effectively out of the lab and into the
marketplace. Within the RFI, suggestions were specifically being sought regarding what
changes in public policy and research funding should the Obama Administration consider
that would promote commercialization of university research (RFI, 2010, p. 14477). The
White House has taken the position that a research-funding gap exists and has
acknowledged, through the RFI, financing that gap through federal programming would
constitute a change in policy. In this regard, the following sub-section reviews aspects of
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the literature on the policy-making process to provide perspective on the actions of the
current administration and to help frame the observed movement in current federal policy
direction.
The Policy-Making Process
In the past, researchers have presented models consisting of various sequential
and iterative stages to explain the policy-making processes. As early as 1936, Harold
Lasswell articulated the concept of ‘stages heuristic’ to describe the process (Lasswell,
1936). In his model, these stages included identifying policy problems, formulating
policy proposals, legitimizing public policy, implementing public policy, and evaluating
public policy. After the evaluation stage and assuming a change in outcomes is desired,
the process repeats itself. Refinements of the staged process model have taken place
since Lasswell; however to date, all staged approaches have been criticized for being
insufficient and specifically do little to explain the drivers of policy change (DiNitto,
2011). Staged models are mostly regarded as simply representing a process flow, but
they have been influential in conceptualizing how people look at policy in general
(Nakamura, 1987).
Specific to policy change in the policy process, political scientists had perceived it
as the outcome of strategic power struggles among political groups (Easton, 1965;
Truman, 1951; Wilson, 1973). Political groups hold different values and interests and
bring different resources to bear on existing regimes to effect change. However, in 1974
Heclo concluded that such tactics could only account for a portion of experienced
changes. Heclo determined that policy change was a product of large scale social,
economic, and political changes as well as the strategic interaction of people within a
policy community, involving both competition for power and efforts to develop more
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knowledgeable means of addressing the policy problem (Heclo, 1974). It was found that
government programming is primarily driven through policy analyses, which set out to
ascertain causal theories regarding the problem being addressed (cf. Berman, 1978;
Majone, 1980; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981, 1983; Wildavsky & Tenenbaum, 1981). As
a result, much of policy change is currently understood to be disputes over the validity of
causal theories and the appropriateness of the underlying data supporting the need for
change.
Policy change theory further evolved in the late 1980s, when Sabatier argued that
“policy change is best seen as fluctuations in the dominant belief system (i.e., those
incorporated into public policy) within a given policy subsystem over time” (Sabatier,
1988, p. 158). This premise forms the basis of Sabatier’s ACF. In the context of everchanging information and events, ACF empirically seeks to explain the dynamic
processes of policy learning and policy change through policy subsystems and the
formulation/re-formulation of coalitions that occupy those subsystems based on common
beliefs (Sabatier, 1988). ACF now appears to be the most dominant method of analysis
of policy-making by scholars around the world (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009).
Recent work emerging from the literature, and complementary to ACF, is a class
of study known as NPF. NPF utilizes the role of narrative elements as a mechanism to
explain ACF’s policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions, shared beliefs, and public opinion
(Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2011). NPF centrally locates the role of policy narratives
in ACF. As a developing framework, NPF is informed by theories from a number of
disciplines and academic fields (cf. Riker, 1986; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993;
Schattschneider, 1960; Stone, 2002) and produces a model that not only accurately
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captures and describes policy narratives, but also helps assess the influence of policy
narratives on public opinion and policy outcomes (Shanahan et al., 2011).
According to Shanahan et al. (2011), narrative elements can be classed as
variables to serve as quantitative measures providing a means of assessment. Proponents
of NPF contend it better illuminates facets of the policy process (McBeth, Shanahan,
Arnell, & Hathaway, 2007). The basis by which stakeholders ascribe meaning to a
situation can be best captured through an empirical investigation of the stories that the
policy sub-systems strategically deploy and Shanahan et al. (2011) state, “stakeholders
use words, images, and symbols to strategically craft policy narratives … to produce a
winning coalition” (p. 536). Therefore, the inclusion of policy narratives as causal
variables in the policy change process is both valid and necessary (Shanahan et al., 2011).
Summary
The literature reveals that the success rate of TTO activity is falling short of
expectations, and the failure of TTOs to transfer most inventions to industry is reflected
in a phenomenon characterized as the Valley of Death. The Valley of Death metaphor
provides an intuitive conceptualization of university inventions falling short of the
market. It can be concluded that the majority of work finds that there is a funding
shortfall in the mid-stages of the development cycle, causing the premature death of
many inventions. This funding gap is a product of both the current government grant
structure and the operation of private sector capital markets, and if the funding gap were
to be filled, then far more university inventions would find their way to market. The
literature review finds the work to date falls short of any quantified assessment of the
funding shortfall, or confirmation where this shortfall may be located along the
innovation sequence.
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Further evidence from the literature suggests that, commencing with the BayhDole Act itself, past policy positions on technology transfer have been misinformed. In
addition, the shared beliefs that currently exist and which are now driving policy change,
appear to have limited empirical foundation and as such may hold similar, potential
misconceptions of the true underlying nature of the problem. Without appropriate
underpinning analysis, current policy direction may be counterproductive. Through the
literature review, key gaps in the knowledge base have been identified which validate the
need for the research objectives of the study.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
As evidenced in Chapter II, the academic consensus is that the Valley of Death is
precipitated from a funding gap in the mid-stages of the R&D process (cf. Auerswald &
Branscomb, 2003; Frank et al., 1996; H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998; Murphy & Edwards,
2003). This funding gap is intuitively understandable since the focus of university
research (i.e., approximately 80% of federally funded R&D) occurs at the basic research
end of the innovation spectrum, whereas industry’s focus (i.e., approximately 80% of
industrial R&D spending) is at the developmental end (NSF, 2011). The comparative
polarization of research activity by each sector, coupled with a relative lack of
overlapping funding in the middle produces the gap known as the Valley of Death. A
concern with the current state of understanding is that beyond a basic description and an
easily conceptualized notion, little empirical evidence supports the accepted position of a
funding shortfall interrupting the mid-stages of development and being the precipitating
cause of the Valley of Death. Compounding the current situation, evolving federal policy
direction on research grant funding appears to be promulgated based on this basic causal
belief.
Knowing that policy decision making is founded on the application of shared
beliefs (Sabatier, 1991), driven by policy narratives (Shanahan et al., 2011), it is
important to understand how these underlying aspects of the policy process may apply to
current policy direction with respect to the Valley of Death. Consistent with ACF and
NPF principles, the prevailing policy narrative needs to be congruent with the empirical
evidence if effective policy is sought. Research, by generating new knowledge, plays a
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role in shaping shared beliefs and coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) and provides
credibility to the policy narrative (Shanahan et al., 2011). Recognizing these
relationships, the study objectives first confirm the shared beliefs currently motivating
policy direction and then derive an empirical model of the Valley of Death to determine
if its actual characteristics are congruent with those shared beliefs. The understanding to
be gleaned from these objectives will either confirm or help re-inform U.S. federal policy
on the funding and commercialization of university research.
Given the variations in research objectives, the study methodology incorporates a
mixed-method approach. Research objective 1 requires a qualitative review of the
content of the Congressional Record to capture the relevant data for the desired frequency
analysis (quantitative) on the concept of the Valley of Death in the innovation sequence.
The data retrieved is further qualitatively refined under research objective two and
subjected to quantitative assessment to ascertain the meaning being attributed to the
Valley of Death. Research objective 3 is accomplished strictly through quantitative
analysis of the data obtained under research objective one. Research objective 4 is also
examined under a strictly quantitative lens, although applied to a different data set than
research objectives 1, 2, and 3. The data analysis procedures employed under each of the
research objectives is explained in greater detail in the following section.
Data Analysis Procedures
Research Objectives 1, 2, and 3 – Narrative Policy Framework and the Valley of Death
The first three research objectives are investigated by analyzing data obtained
through a deductive, structured content analysis. This analysis determines the contextual
meanings (qualitative) and frequency of use (quantitative) of the term Valley of Death in
the text-based records associated with the federal legislators and policy-makers
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responsible for directing policy. For this purpose, the U.S. Congressional Record from
the 102nd Congress (1991) through to the current session, 113th Congress, forms the
source of data for examination (Library of Congress, 1995) because this covers the period
when the Valley of Death came into usage. The relevant passages in the Congressional
Record are extracted as individual text units for the analysis.
It is known that a great deal of negotiation and deal-making occurs prior to
Congress’ full-body debates on an issue, and many argue that roll call votes (Schroedel &
Jordan, 1998) or personal interviews (Dodson et al., 1995) may provide better insight into
politicos’ true beliefs. But, the best way to assess the beliefs of the state’s politicians and
policy-makers is through their prepared speeches (Schafer, 2000). Hancock (2004)
supports this stance as she notes, “a member’s remarks furnish not only his or her stance
(pro or anti) on proposed legislation, but the arguments and ideological justifications for
their positions. It is in these justifications that the unacknowledged social meaning of
public identity lurks” (p. 89). According to Hancock, public identity is a social cognition
formed from “the product of thinking about things, forming object-specific impressions
and communicating about them with other people” (Hancock, 2004, p. 89). From this
point of view, the Congressional Record forms a logical and legitimate source to
ascertain the true beliefs surrounding the concept of the Valley of Death.
The content analysis started with partitioning the use of the term, Valley of Death,
into two mutually exclusive categories (1) ‘Innovation and Technology Transfer’ and (2)
‘All Other Contexts’ (e.g., prayer). Once isolated in this fashion, the Innovation and
Technology Transfer category is then further subdivided according to its contextual
meaning, with all statements that relate to a ‘funding issue’ grouped together. By
determining the frequency of the use of funding issues as a sub-category and comparing
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to the frequency of other uses of the term, the overall prevailing shared belief of the
Valley of Death is identified. Further sub-categorization to account for the location of
the Valley of Death along the innovation spectrum helps to additionally frame the
understanding of the term. This methodology also provides a ranked measure of all
definitions of the term, relative to each other.
Use of content analysis is well founded in the literature and according to Titscher
et al. (2000), content analysis is "the longest established method of text analysis among
the set of empirical methods of social investigation" (p. 55). While its approach
originally focused on methods that targeted clearly quantifiable aspects of text content
(e.g., absolute and relative frequencies of words per text), the concept was extended to
include all those procedures which operate with categories and similarly seeks to quantify
those categories by means of a frequency analysis (Titscher et al., 2000). This
methodology has been previously employed in studies ranging from an analysis of debate
in the U.S Senate (Lehnen, 1967) to changing definitions in social issues (Cook &
Skogan, 1984) to social movements (Polletta, 1998) to poverty (Hancock, 2004). While
many examples of content analysis exist, each of the foregoing references was cited
because their content analysis was specifically drawn from the U.S. Congressional
Record as was conducted herein. In addition, Jones and McBeth (2010), specifically
propose content analysis of the Congressional Record for the study of policy narratives to
determine public opinion on policy matters.
Elo and Kyngas (2008) state there are two types of content analysis, inductive and
deductive. Inductive content analysis is used when there is little perceived knowledge
about the phenomenon under study. Deductive content analysis is used when the
structure of the analysis is founded on existing knowledge and the purpose of the study is
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theory testing. In this case, deductive content analysis forms the methodology proposed,
since the subject matter has been previously defined and knowledge already exists
regarding the perceived cause of the Valley of Death. Deductive content analysis is
operationalized through a coding process (Babbie, 2001) where raw data is transformed
into a standardized form. This transformation consists of reducing texts into a matrix and
analyzing that matrix quantitatively. The researcher produces such a matrix by applying
a set of codes to a set of qualitative data (Ryan & Bernard, 2000). The object matter of
content analysis can be any kind of recorded communication, namely transcripts of
interviews/discourses, protocols of observation, video tapes, and written documents in
general (Kohlbacher, 2005). The analysis may also take the form of either a structured or
an unconstrained format. When using a structured matrix of analysis, only the aspects
from the data that fit the categorization framework and dimensions are employed (Elo &
Kyngas, 2008).
This study’s content analysis of the Congressional Record was initiated utilizing
the Library of Congress’ on-line text search engine to identify individual instances of the
use of the term Valley of Death. The complete content of each edition of the
Congressional Record containing the term was retrieved through the web site
http://beta.congress.gov. These source documents form the raw data input for analysis
using the content analysis software NVivo (NVivo, 2013). Within NVivo, the captured
editions were categorized based on the contextual use of the term. Instances where
Valley of Death was affiliated with innovation and technological development formed a
category for further analysis, while all other uses were discarded. Classification in this
manner limited the analysis to the appropriate context for the study.
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The mechanism used for further analysis of the relevant documents followed the
methodology employed by Hancock in her study of poverty in America (Hancock, 2004).
She examined the Congressional Record as source input to create what she called the
public identity of poverty. To gather appropriate content for her analysis she established
certain ‘dimensions’ which are descriptors that are considered to be commonly associated
with poverty. For example, her dimensions included such terms as: don’t work, lazy,
cross-generation dependency, single-parent family, drug users, teen mothers, etc. A
search of the Congressional Record under these dimensions provided the starting content
for her detailed data analysis. In parallel fashion, research objectives 1 and 2 of this
study are designed to confirm the public identity of the term Valley of Death. To isolate
the relevant content from the Congressional Record and address research objective 1, the
following dimensions were established as the criteria for the Valley of Death related to
innovation and technology development: research, development, R&D (in case
abbreviations were used in the text), innovation and technology. The actual roots of these
words were used in the search of the text to allow for variations in usage. For example,
‘innovat’ was used to generate results from such words as innovate(s), innovating,
innovative, innovation, etc. These dimensions were chosen from the descriptions in the
literature review based on the fundamental understanding of the Valley of Death related
to the linear model of innovation. All passages containing instances of the term Valley of
Death associated with one or more of the dimensions noted above were identified and
captured to produce the content considered appropriate not only for research objective 1,
but also for further analysis under research objectives 2 and 3.
With respect to research objective 2, the instances of the selected text content
were more deeply scrutinized to determine if they were statements supporting other
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factors used to describe the Valley of Death such as a funding issue or not and/or if a
position along the innovation spectrum was mentioned for its location. The dimensions
used to specify funding issues were set as a group of synonyms around availability of
capital, specifically – funding, financing, money, capital, investment, loans, credit and
grants. The dimensions established to examine for the location of the Valley of Death
were commercialization, ideas, applied research, products, between, bridge, and market.
The terms for the position dimension were drawn from a generalized statement of
understanding of the literature, whereby additional resources are required to
commercialize ideas into market products and bridge the applied research gap between
basic and developmental research. As with research objective 1, the roots of the words
forming the dimensions for research objective 2 were used as the search terms to isolate
the relevant text. If one or more of the supporting dimensions were located within the
text under examination, then that text was selected as fulfilling the criteria to describe
that particular factor. The selected text units supporting a factor were then quantitatively
assessed against all text units obtained under research objective 1 to determine the
relative importance of that factor vis-à-vis all other discussion.
Under research objective 3, the findings for use of the term Valley of Death, in
the context of innovation and technology development (i.e., the pertinent findings of
research objective 1), were then aggregated by year of occurrence and relative frequency
of use calculated.
Research Objective 4 - Empirical Basis of the Valley of Death
The methodology employed for this research objective utilized a post facto, nonexperimental approach (Sprinthall, 2006) to determine the historical R&D spending
patterns by the university and industrial sectors. This research objective primarily relied
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on the use of descriptive statistics of each of the categories of R&D spending over the
period of 1998 through 2011 to generate the model. Referencing the various figures
provided in Chapter II, the Valley of Death has been typically illustrated on a twodimensional graphical plane such that the abscissa reflects the technological stage of
development, or phase of research, while some measure of R&D resources expended is
presented on the ordinate axis. On this plane, figurative renderings of the R&D spending
patterns for both universities and industry have been depicted as separate s-shaped curves
(mirroring the sides of hills), and the apparent horizontal gap between these curves has
been dubbed the Valley of Death (Katehi, 2010; Markham, 2002; NSF, 2013a). By
utilizing these standard depictions as the base model and by applying both the academic
and industrial sectors’ actual past R&D spending patterns, a first-hand quantification of
the underlying structure of the Valley of Death phenomenon is produced. To provide the
reader with clearer understanding of the standard R&D spending model and the one used
in this study, a visual portrayal of its general underlying structure is illustrated in the twodimensional graphical plane in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. The standard graphical plane used to depict the Valley of Death for the
comparisons of patterns of R&D spending between the university and industrial sectors.
From Figure 9, the three categories of research are seen to sequentially align and
build on each other along the x-axis, reflective of the linear model of innovation. As laid
out in Chapter II and according to Godin (2006), the linear model contends that
innovation starts with basic research, moves through applied research and then to
developmental research, ending up with production and market diffusion. Prior to any
research spending the stage of development is considered as solely an idea depicted as
point X0 at the origin of the x-axis in Figure 9. After proceeding through the various
R&D phases, and once all the stages of development are concluded, the technology is
ready for production and market distribution depicted as point X1 at the extreme right of
the x-axis in Figure 9.
The y-axis of the graph represents the measure of R&D spending. As shown in
Figure 9, it is typically the percentage amount of the total spending in each category of
research by sector (Katehi, 2010; Markham, 2002; NSF, 2013a). By utilizing the
historical mean amount of annual spending within each category of research and
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calculating its percentage relative to sector total spending, the data presents the overall
historical spending pattern for both the university and industrial sectors. Each sector
results were individually calculated and presented and a trend line was attached to the
results. Next, the percentage results for each sector category were superimposed on each
other, and when constructed in this fashion, the x-y plane and accompanying trend lines
provided the necessary vehicle to depict the historical patterns of spending for both the
university and industrial sectors, in a manner consistent with prior published renderings.
Advancing from the initial depiction, which provided an empirically based
rendition of the currently accepted model of the Valley of Death, a second level of
analysis was conducted by utilizing absolute dollar spending levels. The y-axis was
amended to represent the actual dollar-spending amount by category, instead of relative
percentage spending by category. In this way, all individual categories of research
spending, within and across sectors, were equally scaled and directly compared to each
other. Continuing from this second level of graphical analysis, the model was further
adjusted to reflect the level of university R&D spending associated with the inventions
that it produces. The information to conduct this further modification was obtained from
estimates of the number of inventions (AUTM, 2011) and the average federal grant
associated with those inventions (NIH, 2013b; NSF, 2013b). This refinement is a further
logical extrapolation of the model, since only research associated university inventions is
relevant to the Valley of Death. The research inventions disclosed to TTOs are what
must subsequently traverse the Valley of Death to be adopted by industry. This
subsequent adjustment and rendition provided a direct comparison between the university
invention enterprise and the industrial innovation enterprise and hence a true final
perspective of the Valley of Death.
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Population and Sample
Recognizing the differing styles of analysis and sources of data for the study
objectives, the discussion of the population and sample has been sub-divided. In this
regard, research objectives 1, 2, and 3 have been combined and will be discussed
separately from the discussion of research objective 4:
Research Objectives 1 through 3
The population for these research objectives consists of all policy narratives of
federal legislators and policy-makers engaged in advocating for or against policy on the
Valley of Death related to innovation and technological development. The sample used
to represent narratives for this population was obtained from the Congressional Record
during the period covering the 102nd Congress (1991) through the 113th Congress (2013).
Research Objective 4
Under this research objective, a comparison of R&D spending patterns between
two statistically, mutually exclusive sub-populations was analyzed over the period
between 1998 and 2011. The first sub-population is represented by U.S. based research
universities, whereas the second sub-population consists of U.S. private sector
corporations conducting R&D within the U.S. The university sub-population sample
consisted of a census survey of the entire universe of U.S. research universities,
performing R&D in excess of $150,000 per year (N=912). The historical data have been
collected by the NSF from each accredited institution in this sub-population and are
available on line at the NSF website (NSF, 2011).
With respect to the second sub-population, namely U.S. corporations conducting
domestic R&D, the NSF estimates the total population count of this group to be
2,090,181 (NSF, 2011). More formally, the corporate sub-population is defined as all
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for-profit, nonfarm companies that are publicly or privately held, have five or more
domestic employees, perform or fund R&D, or engage in innovative activities in the
United States. The NSF produces a countrywide profile of R&D spending for the
corporate sub-population through annual survey instruments. For example, 43,002
companies were sampled by the NSF in 2011 with 40,300 companies incorporated in the
final data evaluation. Reasons for the initial elimination of certain companies from the
sample reflect mergers, acquisitions, and instances where companies have gone out of
business in the interim. Of the companies included in the final data evaluation, 73.1%
were considered to have met the full criteria for a complete response to the 2011 survey.
The final sample (n) of 29,459 fully valid responses measured against the overall
population estimate represents 1.5% of the total estimated population.
Data Collection and Variables for the Study
Data Collection - Research Objectives 1 through 3
For these research objectives, data was sourced through a structured content
analysis of the Congressional Record for the period covering the 102nd Congress (1991)
through the 113th Congress (2013). Using this time period serves two purposes, first it
covers the period from the initial use of the phrase Valley of Death in an innovation
context (Lux & Rorke, 1991), and secondly, it is fully accessible and retrievable
electronically through the web site portal Thomas.gov. All data are categorical.
Thomas.gov is a service of the Library of Congress that was launched in 1995 to
make federal legislative information freely available to the public. Included among the
data available is the Congressional Record (Library of Congress, 1995). The
Congressional Record is a verbatim account of the floor proceedings of the House and
Senate that contains documents collectively known as the Extensions of Remarks. The
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Extensions of Remarks include additional legislative statements not actually delivered on
the House floor, plus other extraneous material such as texts of speeches delivered
outside Congress, letters from and tributes to constituents, and newspaper or magazine
articles. Similar extraneous material from Senators is inserted in the Additional
Statements section of the Senate part of the record. The Congressional Record therefore
provided a highly relevant source to extract details of the discussion and narratives about
the Valley of Death within the political and policy-making environment.
Data Collection - Research Objective 4
The data utilized for this component of the study consists of ordinal and interval
data drawn from three independent third-party sources: the NSF, NIH and AUTM. These
sources represent two federal agencies and an industrial source, respectively. The NSF
data provided the initial information for the analysis used to determine the fundamental
historical patterns of R&D spending for each sector (ordinal). The NIH and AUTM data
enabled a refinement to the results to represent a more accurate estimate of the amount of
R&D associated with university inventions related to technology transfer (interval).
Details of each data source follow.
The NSF dataset. The data were derived from annual surveys conducted by the
NSF, initially through its Division of Science Resources Statistics and now through its
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics. Specifically, the data were drawn
from the reports contained in National Patterns of R&D Resources, detailing R&D
performance and funding in the United States. The NSF's statistics on R&D expenditure
levels have been recorded annually since 1953 and have been categorized by: (1) R&D
performers (i.e., business sector, federal government, federally funded research and
development centers, universities/colleges, and other nonprofit organizations); (2)
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sources of R&D funding (i.e., business sector, federal government, nonfederal
government, universities/colleges, and other nonprofit organizations); (3) the character of
work performed, that being the category of research undertaken (i.e., basic, applied, and
developmental research) and; (4) the monetary basis (i.e., recording of the expenditures
in both current dollars and constant inflation-adjusted dollars). The raw data extracted
from the NSF reports and utilized in this study have been reproduced and tabulated in
Appendixes B and C herein.
Data covering the industrial sector are reported on a calendar-year basis to NSF
and are used directly in the national pattern totals. The data for universities and colleges
are collected on the institution’s fiscal-year basis and then converted to a calendar year by
NSF prior to publication. In 1998 and later years, the university R&D figures were
adjusted to eliminate double counting of funds passed through from one academic
institution to another. For university/college R&D, the character-of-work estimates were
also revised for 1998 and later years. According to the NSF, the revised procedure along
with respondent data corrections yielded an increase of approximately five percentage
points in the share of academic R&D identified as basic research. Similarly, the
character-of-work estimates (i.e., basic, applied, and development research) for the
industrial sector were revised for 1998 and later years. These changes resulted in a net
decrease in the proportion of business R&D classified as basic research. In view of the
changes to survey methodology, and unless otherwise suitably adjusted, the basic
research data for 1998 and later years are not explicitly comparable with data for 1997
and earlier years (NSF, 2011). Given the changes in survey methodology, research
objective 4 solely utilized the data for the period 1998 through 2011 to provide the most
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recent structure of the Valley of Death and yield the most reliable comparison between
sectors and categories.
The AUTM dataset. AUTM data were drawn from annual surveys of its members
who report on the level of their respective institution’s activities. The membership in the
U.S. responding to the 2011 survey represented 160 research universities that conducted
95% of all federally funded research granted in that year (AUTM, 2011). From the
AUTM surveys, the data on the total number of invention disclosures, in conjunction
with the NIH and NSF average grant data sets (see below), formed the basis for
estimating the total amount of federal R&D funding attributed to university inventions.
This provided a method for defining the level of university R&D spending relevant to the
commercialization process. All raw data captured from the surveys and utilized in the
analysis are compiled in Appendix D.
The NIH dataset. Additional data to further refine the pattern of R&D spending
for universities was drawn from the NIH Research Portfolio On-line Reporting Tools
(NIH, 2013b). This public, on-line, searchable database provides information on
historical grant awards by the NIH. The data obtained from this database represents the
total number of NIH grants and the total dollar amount of those grants awarded to all USbased, higher education institutions over the period of 1998 through 2011, inflation
adjusted to 2005 dollars. The data gleaned from the online database has also been
incorporated in Appendix D.
NSF individual grant dataset. This additional data, when used in conjunction
with the NIH dataset discussed above, further helped refine the pattern of R&D spending
for universities. It was drawn from the NSF web-based Budget Internet Information
System (NSF, 2013b). This public, on-line, searchable database provided information on
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historical grant awards by the NSF. The data obtained from this database represents the
total number of NSF grants and the total dollar amount of those grants awarded to all USbased, higher education institutions over the period 1998 through 2011, inflation adjusted
to 2005 constant dollar levels. The data gleaned from the on-line database has also
incorporated in Appendix D.
Variables - Research Objectives 1 through 3
The variables under examination consisted of researcher-designed categories to
accumulate counts of contextually defined terms as they were found within the official
archived text of the Congressional Record. The primary division of categories was
between the uses of the term Valley of Death in the context of innovation versus all other
use of the term. All descriptions of the Valley of Death in the context of innovation were
then divided into sub-categories. For example, a description of the Valley of Death (in
the context of innovation) as a funding shortfall was placed in one sub-category, whereas
the description of the Valley of Death as something other than a funding shortfall was
placed in a separate category. Likewise, additional categorization related to the position
of the Valley of Death along the innovation spectrum was sub-categorized whenever
possible. The amount of sub-categories was originally established as open-ended to
account for all potential descriptions. All variables are categorical (Sprinthall, 2006).
Variables - Research Objective 4
The variables under this research objective represent two sub-population
groupings representing the university and industrial sectors. Within each sector is a subdivision of the data into the classifications of basic, applied, and developmental research.
The values for basic, applied, and developmental research represent the amount of annual
spending in that category for each sector, recorded in both percentage of sector total and
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in absolute dollar terms. In addition, a further sub-grouping within the university sector
was established for R&D spending related solely to invention disclosures. This
categorized structure yielded fifteen separate variables utilized in analyzing the Valley of
Death. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the variables for both the industrial and university
sectors, respectively.
The dollar amounts of research in the university sector reflected only the federally
funded portion of research at U.S. universities. In the industrial sector, the variables
represented domestic U.S. corporations conducting R&D, but the value of the R&D
included only private sector sources of funding. Thus, the resulting comparison among
variables was between federally funded, university knowledge generating research and
purely economically motivated research. All other sources of grants to the university and
industrial sectors were removed to narrowly focus the interaction of these two sectors and
therefore provide the best estimator of the Valley of Death in university technology
transfer.
Table 2
Schedule of Industrial Sector R&D Spending Variables1,2
Character of Spending

Definition

Basic %

The average annual percentage of total industrial research spent
on basic research.

Applied %

The average annual percentage of total industrial research spent
on applied research.

Developmental %

The average annual percentage of total industrial research spent
on developmental research.
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Table 2 (continued).
Character of
Spending

Definition

Basic $

The average annual dollar amount of total industrial research
spent on basic research.

Applied $

The average annual dollar amount of total industrial research
spent on applied research.

Developmental $

The average annual dollar amount of total industrial research
spent on developmental research.

1. Averages taken over the period 1998 through 2011
2. Dollar amounts are in inflation adjusted, constant 2005 terms

Table 3
Schedule of University Sector R&D Spending Variables1,2
Character of Spending

Definition

Basic %

The average annual percentage of total university research spent
on basic research.

Applied %

The average annual percentage of total university research spent
on applied research.

Developmental %

The average annual percentage of total university research spent
on developmental research.

Basic $

The average annual dollar amount of total university research
spent on basic research.
The average annual dollar amount of total university research
spent on applied research.

Applied $
Developmental $

The average annual dollar amount of total university research
spent on developmental research.
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Table 3 (continued).
Character of Spending

Definition

Basic Invention $

The average annual dollar amount of total university research
spent on basic research related to invention disclosures.

Applied Invention $

The average annual dollar amount of total university research
spent on applied research related to invention disclosures.
The average annual dollar amount of total university research
spent on developmental research related to invention
disclosures.

Developmental
Invention $

1. Averages taken over the period 1998 through 2011
2. Dollar amounts are in inflation adjusted, constant 2005 terms

While the data was originally collected annually on a current dollar value basis, it
has been recorded by the NSF on both a current and constant dollar basis. The actual
statistical analysis used in the study relied solely on the constant dollar values. The
rationale for this approach stems from the fact that basic research is antecedent to applied
research and applied research is antecedent to developmental research (Godin, 2006).
The use of constant dollar terms lessened potential variability in the analysis brought on
by inflation-induced effects on the spending over time, given the noted temporal
sequence of the research. Constant dollars were calculated utilizing 2005 as the base
year, and changes in the U.S. annual consumer price index acted as the adjustment factor
(NSF, 2011).
The survey instruments utilized by the NSF to tabulate the data for each of the
academic and industrial sectors contained slightly different governing definitions for the
categories of basic and applied research. Differences were designed to help respondents
more accurately categorize their research activity. The definitions contained in each of
the survey instruments and any differences are summarized below (NSF, 2007):
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Basic research. Within the federal, university, and nonprofit sectors, basic
research is defined as research directed toward increases in knowledge or understanding
of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without specific
application toward processes or products in mind. For the industry sector, basic research
projects are defined by original investigations for the advancement of scientific
knowledge, which do not have specific commercial objectives, although they may be in
fields of present or potential interest to the reporting company.
Applied research. Within the federal, university, and nonprofit sectors, applied
research is defined as research directed toward gaining knowledge or understanding
necessary for determining the means by which a recognized and specific need may be
met. The applied research definition for the industry sector includes research projects
which represent investigations directed to discovery of new scientific knowledge and
have specific commercial objectives with respect to either products or processes.
Development Research. The survey definition of development research for both
sectors is the systematic use of the knowledge or understanding gained from research
directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods,
including design and development of prototypes and processes. It excludes quality
control, routine product testing, and production. This definition is consistent throughout
the various survey instruments employed.
Summary
The failure of most university inventions to achieve commercial success is
captured by the metaphor Valley of Death, which holds certain connotations and beliefs
in the mind’s eye of policy-makers. Policy-making is directed by a coalition of shared
beliefs (Sabatier, 1988), and given the changing direction of federal policy with respect to
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university research grants, the study objectives were designed to firstly confirm policymakers’ current shared beliefs concerning the Valley of Death. Secondly, an empirical
assessment of the Valley of Death was compared to the prevailing shared belief to
determine if there was any disconnection between historical evidence defining the Valley
of Death and the perception of policy-makers. The population under investigation
consisted of federal policy-makers (research objectives 1, 2, and 3) and universities and
industries that had engaged in R&D activity (research objective 4). All data used in the
study was obtained from third party archival records and was employed in a mixedmethod basis of analysis. The results of the analysis are presented in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter presents the results of this study. The research objectives were
designed to determine if the accepted beliefs held by policy-makers surrounding the
cause of the Valley of Death differ from the historical evidence. The research focused on
the Congressional Record as the source of data to ascertain the prevailing perceptions of
policy-makers with respect to the nature and cause of the Valley of Death. To
authenticate these perceptions, past R&D spending patterns of university and industry
were examined to provide an empirically based model of the Valley of Death, which has
otherwise not yet been portrayed in the literature. Together these research objectives
demonstrate the congruence of federal policy beliefs and the proposed methods of
addressing the Valley of Death with the historical evidence on the matter.
Findings
Research Objective 1
Research objective 1 was established to determine the frequency of use of the
term Valley of Death by policy-makers in the context of innovation and technology
development. The search engine provided by Thomas.gov was used to identify each
issue of the Congressional Record that contained the phrase. The results revealed 118
instances of the term being used over the period January 1, 1991 through November 30,
2013. The term appeared in 73 individual issues of the Congressional Record, uttered by
92 different speakers. Distillation of these results to obtain the use of the phrase in the
context of innovation and technology development was achieved by filtering all records
by the dimensions established for this contextual use of the term, namely research,
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development, R&D, innovation and technology. Specific to this context, it was revealed
that 58 speakers utilized the phrase 79 times in 41 editions of the Congressional Record.
The coding results for each dimension, cross-referenced to each text unit, are provided in
Appendix E, along with the observed number of appearances in each passage for each
dimension. A summary schedule of the number of occurrences of each dimension and its
relative percentage are presented in Table 4. Note that the total number occurrences of
the selected dimensions (235) exceeds the number of text units examined (118),
indicating an average of 2.0 dimensions per text unit.
Table 4
Summary of Occurrences of the Dimensions Established to Capture
Innovation in Relation to the Valley of Death in the Congressional Record1
Dimension

Number of
Occurrences

% Frequency of Occurrence

Research
Development
R&D
Innovation
Technology

78
48
9
26
74

33.2%
20.4%
3.8%
11.1%
31.5%

Total

235

100.0%

1. Period covering January 1991 through November 2013

A manual check of the results was undertaken by reviewing all selected
occurrences of the phrase to confirm that the content did relate to the Valley of Death in
innovation. The manual check confirmed that no inappropriate selections had been
included with the results. In a similar fashion, all unselected occurrences were
individually reviewed for correctness. In this regard, it was determined that five uses of
the phrase had been inappropriately excluded from the sample. The five instances were
found in the Congressional Records for May 6, 2009 (one instance), May 12, 2010 (one
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instance) and February 2, 2011 (three instances), and they were manually added to the
sample for further consideration and analysis, increasing the overall total of valid
instances to 84 (refer to Table 5). The examination of these additional records revealed
that they each referred to funding the innovation Valley of Death without having
incorporated any of the dimension terms included in the narrative. It was also noted that
no new single term could have been added to the list of dimensions to capture these text
units on the first pass. The full chronological list of all instances of the term emerging
from the Congressional Record is provided in Appendix F. The list also identifies each
use of the term in the context of innovation and technology development as well as the
other contexts related to the use of the Valley of Death. The details of the findings
contained in Appendix F are summarized in Table 5 below:
Table 5
Summary of Occurrences of the Term Valley of Death in the Congressional Record1
Contextual Category

Number of
Occurrences

% Frequency of Occurrence

84
16
12
2
4

71.2%
13.5%
10.2%
1.7%
3.4%

118

100.0%

Innovation/Technology
Military Tribute
Military Action
Congressional Procedures
Other
Total

1. Period covering January 1991 through November 2013

From Table 5, out of all instances of the observed use of the term Valley of Death,
the connection to innovation and technology development occurs 71.2% of the time (i.e.,
84 out of 118 times). Other uses of the phrase were mostly in reference to descriptions of
military events, prayer, and self-deprecating characterizations of Congress. All of the
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relevant references to the Valley of Death (i.e., in an innovative context), along with the
surrounding narratives gleaned from the Congressional Record, were captured and
formed the sample text units for further review and analysis under research objectives 2
and 3. All captured text units have been reproduced in Appendix G,
Research Objective 2
Research objective 2 was established to ascertain the frequency of use of a
funding shortfall in the middle stages of development when policy-makers describe the
Valley of Death in technology development. By determining the frequency of the
association of a funding shortfall with the term Valley of Death, and its associated
location, this research objective provides a basis for explaining the prevailing belief on
the part of policy-makers. The relative frequency of use of a funding shortfall against
other descriptors provides a weighting of this belief against other potential causes. For
the analysis, each of the 84 instances of the use of the term Valley of Death identified in
research objective 1 (refer to Appendix G) was examined and the surrounding content
analyzed, first with respect to the dimensions established for funding (i.e., funding,
financing, money, capital, investment, loans, credit, and grants) and second, the
dimensions for location (i.e., commercialization, ideas, applied research, products,
between, bridge, and market). The coding results of each funding dimension are
provided in Appendix H, whereas the coding results for each location dimension are
provided in Appendix I. The observed number of appearances of each dimension in each
text unit and the corresponding count of Valley of Death occurrences are also contained
in Appendices H and I.
Table 6 summarizes the number of occurrences and frequency of appearance
related to each funding dimension within the 84 text units selected. Note that the total
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number of occurrences of the funding dimensions (102) exceeds the number of text units
(84), indicating an average of 1.2 dimensions per text unit.
Table 6
Summary of Occurrences of the Dimensions Established to Identify a Funding Shortfall
Associated with the Valley of Death
Dimension
Funding
Financing
Capital
Money
Investment
Loans/Credit/Grants
Total

Number of
Occurrences

% Frequency of Occurrence

31
6
34
8
15
8

30.4%
5.9%
33.3%
7.8%
14.7%
7.8%

102

100.0%

Next, the 84 text units from the Congressional Record were reviewed against the
dimensions related to the location of the Valley of Death. Table 7 summarizes the
number of occurrences and frequency of appearance of each dimension. In this case,
there was an average of 1.7 dimensions incorporated within each text unit.
Table 7
Summary of Occurrences of the Dimensions Established to Locate the Position of the
Valley of Death 1
Dimension
Commercialization
Ideas
Applied Research
Products
Between/Bridge
Market
Total
1.

Number of
Occurrences

% Frequency of Occurrence

34
3
30
23
35
21

23.3%
2.0%
20.5%
15.8%
24.0%
14.4%

146

100.0%

From the Congressional Record, period covering January 1991 through November 2013
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The dimensions associating the Valley of Death and funding yielded a total of 61
out of 84 text units where instances of the two were linked in open discussion (refer to
Table 8, lines one and two). In essence, financial parameters were tied to the concept of
the Valley of Death 72.6% of the time. An example of the use of the term Valley of
Death by politicians within the Congressional Record, which reflects these financial
parameters was provided by Representative WU: “One of the biggest stumbling blocks to
innovation is the technology so called Valley of Death the gap between angel funding and
measurable venture capital, the lack of adequate private venture capital for early stage,
high-risk, high-reward technology development” (Wu, 2007, p. H4453).
The dimensions associating the Valley of Death and a location yielded 64 out of
84 text units where instances of the two were linked in open discussion (refer to Table 8,
lines one and three). The concept of the Valley of Death in the innovation process was
associated with the middle stages of development 76.1% of the time. A sample of a text
unit that contains the use of the Valley of Death in the location context is provided by
Senator Smith (2005): “However, many times innovative research becomes victim of the
Valley of Death by failing to advance from the research labs to application in commercial
products and services” (p. S11745).
Cross-tabulating the results for both the funding and location factors, it was
revealed that in 48 (line one of Table 8) of the 61 funding instances (lines one and two of
Table 8), the funding shortfall was specifically identified as being in the mid-stages of the
development cycle, between the outputs of basic research and final commercialization.
An example of this use of the term was provided by Senator Morella (2001) when she
stated, “the program seeks to provide a critical bridge for the funding gap from
innovation to the marketplace of pre-competitive, emerging technologies. ATP
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[Advanced Technology Program] seeks to smooth the transition from invention to
commercialization, the so-called valley of death” (p. E1378).
Beyond a funding shortfall, 23.8% of the time (refer to Table 8, lines three and
four) the Valley of Death was associated with market factors as its influencing cause
(e.g., risk, market readiness, limited demand, etc.). These market development effects are
exemplified in comments by Senator Lieberman (2008):
Lastly, the Accelerating Cures Act of 2008 uniquely adds resources to guide
researchers through the Valley of Death, a stage in biomedical development
between research and commercialization where the success of an initiative is
dependent on feasibility and profitability that can only be established by a market
that, by definition, has not yet developed. (p. S3894)
In 75.0% of these cases, the Valley of Death was still identified as being a break in the
development cycle of new technologies, situated between basic research and market
commercialization.
Among all characterizations of the Valley of Death, it can be stated that a break in
the development cycle between basic research and commercialization identified the
location of the Valley of Death 76.1% of the time (refer to Table 8, lines one and three).
A further example in the Congressional Record that demonstrates this belief was
provided when Senator Bingamam (2008) stated, “this is the part of the development
cycle of a new technology when the technology has been demonstrated at a lab or pilot
scale and is ready to be demonstrated at a commercial scale” (p. S6444).
No other locations to identify the position of the Valley of Death were mentioned
in the text units (i.e., basic research). Finally, 3.6% of the time the Valley of Death was
mentioned without reference to either its cause or location in the development cycle. A
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summary of occurrences for all of the various characterizations of the Valley of Death in
an innovation and technological development context are provided in Table 8.
Table 8
Summary of the Characterizations of the Term Valley of Death in the Congressional
Record1
Contextual Characterization

Number of
Occurrences

% Frequency of
Occurrence

(1) Funding shortfall, mid-stages of development
(2) Funding shortfall, unspecified location
(3) Market factors, mid-stages of development
(4) Market factors, unspecified location
(5) Unspecific factors

48
13
16
4
3

57.1%
15.5%
19.0%
4.8%
3.6%

Total

84

100.0%

1. Period covering January 1991 through November 2013

Research Objective 3
Research Objective 3 was established to determine the pattern of use over time by
policy-makers of the term Valley of Death in the context of innovation and technology
development. Based on analysis of the text units extracted from the Congressional
Record directly related to innovation, the pattern of use of this phrase has been seen to
cycle over time. Typically the use of the phrase has shown greater frequency in years
where certain legislation is up for reauthorization (e.g., Advanced Technology Program
2005, SBIR-STTR 2009 and 2011, Cures Acceleration Network Act 2009, IRS Tax
Credits 2011, Department of Defense Authorization Act 2011, etc.). In the case of the
Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs’
(SBIR-STTR) re-authorization legislation, the discussion centered on the need for this
programming to help mitigate the Valley of Death and advance the use of new
technology. Interestingly, the most recent policy narratives supporting this program were
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in contrast to the original stated purpose of the legislation, which was to engage small
business in creating innovative solutions to technological issues faced by government
agencies ("Small Business Innovation Development Act," 1982). Although slightly
outside the scope of this study, this change in policy narrative is a prime demonstration of
the precepts of NPF and ACF. The policy narratives are now focusing on the SBIR
program as an economic development tool, which is framing a new perception and belief
for the need for the program. Evidently, sufficient coalition took place around this new
belief that the legislation was reauthorized.
Table 9 provides details of the annual occurrence and relative frequency of use of
the term over the study period.
Table 9
Pattern of use of the Term Valley of Death in the Congressional Record over Time1
Number of
Occurrences

% Frequency of
Occurrence

1991-2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0
5
0
0
4
13
7
8
5
16
7
14
2
3

0.0%
6.0%
0.0%
0.0%
4.8%
15.5%
8.3%
9.5%
6.0%
19.0%
8.3%
16.7%
2.4%
3.6%

Total

84

100.0%

Year

1. Period covering January 1991 through November 2013

Key Legislative Considerations

Advanced Technology Prog.

Advanced Technology Prog.
Advanced Technology Prog.
BARDA
TIP
Accelerating Cures Act
SBIR reauthorization
America Competes reauth.
SBIR, DoD reauth.
USDA biomass R&D
JOBS Act
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Research Objective 4
Research objective 4 was established to determine the historical research spending
patterns, by category of research, for the university and industrial sectors. Table 10
provides the detail of the descriptive statistics that were calculated from the NSF survey
data contained in Appendixes B and C. The table starts with the university sector and
indicates the mean amount of annual research spending for each research category.
Included in the table is the range of spending over the 14-year period being investigated
and the standard deviation for each category. The final column in the table indicates the
percentage breakdown of research spending among the categories of research for that
sector. For example, 75.8% of the university sector’s total, mean annual spending over
the period took place in the basic research category. The percentage spending itemized
within each sector will add to 100%. Similar statistics are provided for the industrial
sector, as well as the statistics for the two sectors’ combined spending. As expected, the
results revealed that the percentage spending in the university sector approximated the
mirror image of the percentage spending in industrial sector.
Table 10
Descriptive statistics for annual R&D spending, by sector and research category, over
the period 1998-2011, constant 2005 dollars (millions)
Sector/Category
of Research
University
Basic Research
Applied Research
Developmental Research

Mean

20,107
5,234
1,180

Minimum Maximum

13,964
2,642
637

22,788
9,048
2,463

Standard
Deviation

3,246
1,866
575

% of Sector Total

75.8
19.7
4.5
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Table 10 (continued).
Sector/Category
of Research

Mean

Minimum Maximum

Standard
Deviation

% of Sector Total

Industry
Basic Research
Applied Research
Developmental Research

8,558
38,141
159,577

5,673
28,289
129,328

13,483
45,775
185,998

2,601
5,188
15,510

4.1
18.5
77.4

Combined
Basic Research
Applied Research
Developmental Research

28,665
43,375
160,757

19,637
32,688
130,467

35,824
50,998
186,813

5,101
5,094
15,650

12.3
18.6
69.1

A graph of the percentage results by research category from Table 10 for both the
university and industrial sectors, including the trend line linking the research categories
within each sector are produced in Figures 10 and 11. By then superimposing these plots
on top of each other (constructed on the same scale) an empirically derived rendition of
the standard image of the Valley of Death is produced (refer to Figure 12).
In the combined graph (Figure 12), the dotted-line columns depict the spending
for the university sector, and the solid-line columns represent the industrial sector. The
dashed trend lines for each sector provide the outline to the shape of the Valley of Death,
which is presented as the horizontal gap between the trend lines within the applied
research category. This result provides direct confirmation of the generalized depictions
of the Valley of Death contained in the literature (refer to Chapter II). The shape and
symmetry of the graph are exactly as anticipated.

82

Figure 10. Historical university sector R&D relative percentage spending patterns, by
category of research.

Figure 11. Historical industrial sector R&D relative percentage spending patterns, by
category of research.
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Valley of Death

Figure 12. The empirically derived shape of the standard depiction of the Valley of
Death, based upon sector historical percentage R&D spending patterns.
As can be gleaned from Table 10, the total average annual spending by
universities has been only a fraction of the total average annual spending by industry over
the period, namely 12.9% ($26.5B versus $206.3B). To incorporate the difference
between the two sectors and appropriately depict this contrast, an adjustment to the
structure of the graph to reflect the level of absolute spending by each sector is necessary.
Drawing from the rendition in Figure 12, Figure 13 provides an amended depiction of the
Valley of Death where the mean annual dollar spending is used for the y-axis, instead of
relative percentage spending used in Figure 12. From the revised depiction, what
becomes immediately apparent is how the industrial sector overwhelms the university
sector because of the difference in absolute spending. The other interesting element to
note is the shift in the point of intersection of the trend lines. The new depiction indicates
the Valley of Death is now much flatter and lower than first envisioned. It has also
shifted toward the origin, which suggests the Valley of Death originates much earlier in
the innovation process than the currently perceived mid-stages of development.
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Figure 13. The empirically derived shape of the Valley of Death based upon historical
actual average annual R&D dollar spending patterns.
In addition to the adjustment for the absolute level of dollar spending between
sectors, it is further noted that the university spending total represents the average annual
spending from all federal grants received. Many grants, particularly those in the social
sciences or arts, are likely to yield little commercially viable or patentable knowledge and
as such, should be excluded from any calculation related to the Valley of Death. In this
regard, there has been an average of 14,798 invention disclosures per year throughout the
period of 1998-2011 (AUTM, 2011), and at an average grant of $397,102, (based on the
grant award amounts of the National Institutes of Health and the NSF, in constant 2005
dollars, during the same period), the total amount of federal grants generating university
invention disclosures was estimated at $5.96 billion annually, representing 22.9% of all
federal university research grants. Accordingly, the university sector-spending pattern
was further adjusted downward to reflect only the R&D spending concerned with
invention disclosures. The method of adjustment assumed the same percentage split of
spending across the categories of research as indicated in the historical pattern of
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spending revealed in Table 10. The resulting adjusted descriptive statistics for estimates
of university invention related research spending are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Descriptive statistics for annual estimated R&D dollar spending attributed to university invention
disclosures, by research category, over the period 1998-2011, constant 2005 dollars (millions)
Category
of Research
Basic Research
Applied Research
Developmental Research

Mean
4,519
1,176
265

Minimum Maximum
2,500
651
147

6,246
1,626
367

Standard
Deviation
1,270
331
75

% of Total
75.8
19.7
4.5

The statistics in Table 11 provide the basis for the final rendition of the Valley of Death,
which solely depicts university invention generating research against industrial R&D
expenditures. Figure 14 reflects these results:

Figure 14. The empirically derived shape of the Valley of Death based upon historical
actual annual R&D dollar spending patterns and limited to university invention
generating R&D.
The use of the calculations in Table 11 provides the most accurate rendition of the
Valley of Death, since only university inventions are considered by industry for
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commercialization. Figure 14 was scaled to observe the entire spending patterns of both
sectors, and it reveals a separation between the two trend lines, commencing in the basic
research phase of development and continuing throughout the entire development
spectrum. For greater clarity on this separation, the y-axis scale was further adjusted and
Figure 15 provides an expanded view indicating the clear separation in spending from the
initial position of the trend lines.

Figure 15. Exploded view of the shape of the Valley of Death in its early stages based
upon historical actual annual R&D dollar spending patterns and limited to university
invention generating R&D.
From Figures 14 and 15, it is clear that the level of university research spending
related to inventions is a small fraction of the R&D activity of industry. The comparison
of the trend lines that have been used to historically frame the Valley of Death never
intersect. Over the period investigated, they have been independent of each other along
the spectrum of development, and the currently conceptualized horizontal gap in the
applied stage of development is not evident. Instead, a vertical gap between the two
sectors is now manifest and extends across all research categories.
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Summary
This chapter presented the results for the research objectives established for this
study. Broadly, the purpose of the study was to provide empirical evidence to help
inform federal policy-making, which is currently focused at mitigating the effects of the
Valley of Death in university technology transfer. This purpose was addressed by first
determining the shared belief held by policy-makers with respect to the cause of the
Valley of Death. The results indicated an overwhelming majority of policy-makers
believed that the Valley of Death was a funding issue associated in the middle stages of
product development – falling between the results of basic research and final market
readiness. Secondly, the historical patterns of R&D spending in the university and
industrial sectors were derived to provide an empirically based depiction of the Valley of
Death. These results showed that when one considers the absolute dollar levels of R&D
grant funding associated with the development of university inventions then the historical
model becomes inadequate to describe the Valley of Death phenomenon. The separation
between industry and academe is not a function of the stage of development as believed.
By providing data on current shared beliefs, juxtaposed against the actual historical
account of the Valley of Death, the appropriateness of federal policy direction can be
gauged. The results indicate a disconnection between current causal beliefs and the
historical evidence. These findings are more fully discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
Restatement of Purpose
The purpose of this study was to expand the current body of knowledge related to
the Valley of Death in university technology transfer. The prevailing belief surrounding
the cause of the Valley of Death is initiating changes to the system of federal research
grants to universities; however, to date there has been limited empirical work to support
the causal perceptions related to this phenomenon. By investigating the beliefs held by
policy-makers on the Valley of Death and by comparing those beliefs to the historical
record, appropriate perspective is provided on the direction of current policy-making.
The Basis for this Investigation, Revisited
In a globalized knowledge economy, countries today are more compelled than
ever to have their domestic industries be at the forefront of innovation and technological
development to drive growth and sustain economic competitiveness (Florida, 2004;
Porter, 1990). Consequently, finding ways to effectively increase the rate of
development of new technologies will enhance national wellbeing (Obama, 2011). The
U.S. federal government invests heavily in university research, and capitalizing on that
research for both societal and economic benefit is a mandate of that funding (National
Research Council, 2007). Today, much of the direct economic benefit from university
research is considered unrealized due to its failure to be fully exploited, with greater than
90% of all university inventions failing to be adopted by industry (AUTM, 2011). The
prevailing understanding is the Valley of Death is an impediment to progress and
therefore, mitigation of its effects is important to national economic objectives (RFI,
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2010). In order to help contribute to the national policymaking debate on the Valley of
Death, this study has advanced the body of knowledge and our understanding of the field.
Results of the Study
What the study revealed is that 72.6% of the time when the term Valley of Death
is expressed by politicians and policy-makers, in the context of innovation and
technology development, it is associated with a funding gap. In 78.7% of such
descriptions, the funding needs are specified as being a necessary to support additional
development work for new technologies as they move from discovery to
commercialization. Not surprisingly, the use of the term is more frequent during periods
of debate on reauthorization of certain federal programming related to technological
development, for example the SBIR program.
Other than a capital shortage, additional references to the innovative Valley of
Death cite general market factors 23.8% of the time to describe the difficulty in
transitioning technologies from the lab to the market. Again, in 75% of such descriptions
the market limiting factors are described as disrupting the process of development at the
mid-stages of development. In 3.6% of all references, the Valley of Death is cited
without specification as to its cause or location. None of these unspecified references has
been made since December 2006, which indicates policy-makers may be more informed
and/or more deliberate in their attempts to contextually frame their point of view on the
issue.
In contrast to the beliefs noted above and based on the actual levels of R&D
spending associated with university inventions, the study has shown the Valley of Death
is not confined to a funding gap within a defined scope of development activity. The
historical patterns of R&D spending, and hence the technology development curves for

90
university and industry, have been independent of each other along the entire length of
the innovation spectrum. Because the difference in funding between the two sectors
extends across all stages of development, factors other than stage of development must
have driven university inventions across the Valley of Death. This result actually
supports the prior findings of Auerswald and Branscomb (2003), that the Valley of Death
is more of a Darwinian Sea of economic survival than a Death Valley drought of funding.
Under the Auerswald and Branscomb model, the Valley of Death is actually a
manifestation of the level of market demand by industry for the inventions. The market
demand is driven by the availability of information about the invention (Auerswald &
Branscomb, 2003), and hence, the perceived economic return that an investment in the
technology would yield to investors (Weston & Brigham, 1975). More formally, the
level of market demand is a function of “asymmetries of information” (Auerswald &
Branscomb, 2003, p. 227) and the risk-adjusted, “expected rate of return” (Weston &
Brigham, 1975, p. 324) that is then associated with the potential investment. The
remainder of this chapter discusses the findings, the limitations of the study,
recommendations for policy or practice, and suggestions for future research in the field.
Discussion of Findings
The key finding of the study is the incongruence between the prevailing belief for
the cause of the Valley of Death and the historical evidence that indicates the Valley of
Death goes beyond a simple funding shortfall. Current beliefs are rooted in the notion of
a funding gap, located in the middle stages of product development, as having limited
further development of new technologies. The idea of an applied research funding
shortfall originated in the minds of policy-makers in the mid-nineteen nineties through
the work of the Committee of Science (H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998) and has prevailed
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ever since (please refer to Figure 1, Chapter II, herein). The research spending shortfall
is attributed to the fact the percentage ratio of R&D spending (rounded) among the three
phases of research in the university sector is 76 (basic) to 20 (applied) to 4
(developmental), and the same percentage ratio of spending in the industrial sector is
4:19:77 (refer to final column of Table 10, Chapter IV). The unbalanced weighting of
percentage effort at either end of the research spectrum by both sectors relative to the
middle phase, established the case for an applied research-funding shortfall.
The study has shown that the ratio of historical spending patterns among the
phases of research for the combined R&D effort of the university and industrial sectors is
12:19:69, and of that, the university sector represents only 11.4% of this total (refer to
Table 10, Chapter IV). On a combined basis, the evidence indicates there is no unbalance
in the middle phase of research, only growth from one phase to the next. This growth
pattern is to be expected given the foundation of the linear model of innovation, which
provides the understanding that basic research may lead to many technologies and which
in turn, may spawn the development of a variety of products, each requiring substantial
development prior to adoption in the market (Godin, 2006). Furthermore, when one
accounts for federal funding solely attributed to invention disclosures at universities, the
amount of this research relative to combined university and industry R&D spending is
reduced to only 2.8%, and the overall ratio of spending among the phases of R&D
becomes 6:19:75. Again, there is no unbalance in the middle stage of research, only
growth in spending from one phase to the next. Since the allocation of funds by industry
to each phase of research is an economically driven business decision based on potential
future returns, it is concluded that the choice of a capital investment in university
inventions by industry is grounded in an economic evaluation against other available
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investment options, as per the prior findings of Auerswald and Branscomb (2003). The
Valley of Death is therefore more accurately characterized as the result of an allocation of
investment funding, not a shortage of development funding. The Valley of Death as it is
conceived by policy-makers is incorrect. A Valley of Death exists for university
inventions, but it is simply the final resting place for inventions that fail to satisfy the
economic criteria of industry. It is not something to be bridged with additional
developmental resources. The lack of development funding for early stage technologies
is an indicator of their perceived economic viability and not the fundamental cause of an
interruption in their technological development.
The appropriately scaled graphical representations of historical spending on
university inventions and industry innovation reveal the true gap in the patterns of R&D
spending between the two sectors (refer to Figures 14 and 15, Chapter IV). In contrast to
current beliefs and previous depictions, there has been a vertical gap in the level of R&D
resources employed, not a horizontal gap in the level of development. This vertical gap
is present throughout each phase of research and is precipitated by an economic
allocation of resources. Therefore, in order to develop a truer representation of the
Valley of Death, one that is in keeping with the findings of the study, an amendment to
the parameters of the existing graphical plane is required. Instead of R&D resources
plotted against stage of development, the y-axis becomes the market demand for
university inventions as measured by the expected risk-adjusted rate of return on the
invention. The x-axis becomes the universe of all available university inventions, and the
cumulative distribution function of those expected returns for all those inventions
becomes the plotted figure. Along the y-axis, there is a threshold level for the expected
rate of return that an invention must be attained in order for the invention to be acceptable
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to industry. Achievement of this threshold enables the invention to rise out of the Valley
of Death. When plotted, the area bounded by the cumulative distribution function at and
above the threshold level of return represents the proportion of those university
inventions that satisfy the economic criteria for adoption by industry. Figure 16 provides
a generalized depiction of this interpretation of the Valley of Death. The economically
feasible range of inventions is depicted by the shaded region. The Valley of Death is the
area below the threshold rate of return.

Threshold Rate of
Return

RiskAdjusted,
Expected
Rate of
Return

Valley of Death
Cumulative Distribution Function for
the Risk-Adjusted, Expected Rate of
Return on University Inventions

Inventions

Figure 16. Revised view of the shape of the Valley of Death based upon expected market
returns from investments in university inventions.
Note that this revised model also provides a method to conceptually capture the
work of Auerswald and Branscomb (2003). Their premise for the level of market
efficiency associated with university inventions can be theoretically measured under this
model by directly comparing the number of feasible inventions adopted by industry (i.e.,
the number of university inventions actually licensed to industry) to the total number of
economically feasible inventions (i.e., the shaded area under the curve in Figure 16).
This ratio provides a percentage measure of the market efficiency.
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Under the proffered interpretation of the Valley of Death, in order to have more
inventions adopted by industry two options are available for future policy consideration,
(1) the shape of the cumulative distribution curve will have to be altered and/or (2) the
threshold rate of return will need to be reduced. This first option is the target of current
policy. Essentially, by amending the nature of the style of university research to more
application driven R&D, federal policy-makers are estimating that the curve’s shape will
be altered and a greater proportion of the distribution function will lie above the threshold
rate. With respect to the second option, since the threshold rate represents the riskadjusted expected rate of return in the marketplace, the threshold level itself cannot be
directly influenced, but in the case of individual inventions, the threshold rate can be
directly affected by either increasing the rate of return and/or reducing the risk. The
return component is a function of a firm’s potential profitability against the level of
investment necessary in the invention. The risk component is a function of the variability
surrounding the expected returns. By positively influencing any of the factors driving
these risk/return elements, the number of inventions that fall above or below the threshold
rate can be adjusted.
It is clear that under this model, policy directed at either amending the wholesale
shape of the distribution function by altering the character of the research (i.e., the
direction of current policy) or positively influencing the expected rate of return on
individual inventions, should be able to generate the desired result of enabling more
university inventions to transfer to industry. This assumes continuity in the underlying
distribution, however, any discontinuity in the distribution function would not necessarily
preclude policies targeted at either approach from working. A deeper understanding of
the true shape of the curve would be required to determine the most effective policy
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design in those circumstances. It is this researcher’s opinion that policy directly targeted
at influencing the level of the expected rates of return on individual inventions, vis-à-vis
changing the character of university research, would be more effective. The primary
rationale behind this position is that this policy approach simply and directly targets the
parameters governing industry decision-making; it does not substitute different research
outcomes as the product available to industry. Secondly, there is no basis to assume that
any change in the profile of university research outcomes would yield more economically
feasible inventions, since the choice of the research subject matter is driven by academic
interests and not market opportunities. In fact, if changes to the profile of university
research were to produce more economically feasible outcomes, then university research
would logically be becoming a substitute for private sector R&D. Studies to date indicate
a complementary balance between university and private sector R&D (Diamond, 1998).
If more substitutive behavior were to occur, then this shift would not only affect the
academic enterprise (Lee, 1996) but, it may also affect the overall rate of societal growth
(Feller, 1990).
One of the assumptions of the study was the applicability of ACF and NPF as
effective mechanisms for policy change with respect to the issue of technology transfer
and the commercialization of university research. Fundamental to the ACF process is its
contention that policy change is not simply the result of competition among various
interested parties in which financial resources and institutional control rules the day, but
where ‘policy-oriented learning’ within and between coalitions is an important aspect of
policy change. Policy-oriented learning is a change in thought or intentions resulting
from experience and/or new information, which is then employed to achieve one’s policy
objectives. Alongside policy-oriented learning is the notion of different structural levels
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for personal beliefs. First, are deep core beliefs, which are a person’s ontological
principles and which are highly resistant to change. Next, are policy core beliefs, which
are basic normative, ‘party-line’ commitments. Then, follow an individual’s causal
perceptions with respect to a particular policy issue. At any particular time, a coalition
adopts one or more strategies to prompt policy-oriented learning in an effort to influence
causal perceptions to change oppositional beliefs and realize its own policy objectives.
The strategies for policy-oriented learning are usually targeted at lower level
belief aspects such as causal perceptions, which can be influenced by exogenous
circumstances (e.g., changes in rules, budgets, personnel, information, etc.). In the
circumstances of the Valley of Death, the current change in policy direction is neither a
deep core nor a policy core change, but the result of a lower level influence – its causal
perception. This is evidenced by the unchanging, bi-partisan policy core belief from the
time of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 to today, namely the need for greater translation of
university research. Today the difference is the change in the causal perception between
then (i.e., confounding intellectual property rights) and now (i.e., an applied research
funding gap). What is flawed within this ongoing process is the lack of a comprehensive
understanding of cause and the resulting effect of the proposed change. The findings of
the study suggest that new policy-oriented learning will need to take place on two levels.
On one level, present causal perceptions are currently incorrect; however, amending these
perceptions will not be as difficult as the additional, potentially needed higher-level
learning with respect to policy core beliefs that define the purpose of university research.
Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are more conducive to
policy-oriented learning across belief systems (e.g., causal perceptions on the Valley of
Death) than those in which data and theory are generally qualitative (e.g., the purpose of
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university research). Assuming stakeholders comprehend impacts of the suggested
revisions to university research, coalitions will need to be formed based on supporting
knowledge and strategies developed to debate and expose the social externality issues
surrounding the proposed policy.
Threats to Validity and Limitations of the Study
The study objectives can be divided into two categories, assessment of current
beliefs and empirical spending evidence. The approach to each of these categories
entailed the use of third party data, which brings with it certain cautions due to construct
and external threats. With respect to the objectives related to assessment of current
beliefs, the evidence was drawn from the Congressional Record. While this source
provides a verbatim account of Congressional statements as a public record, it may
influence the statements being made, which is a threat to external validity due to
interaction of the causal relationship with the setting (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
In addition, the Congressional Record represents only one source for the data needed to
generate inferences, which is a threat to construct validity from mono-operation bias
(Shadish et al., 2002). Although these threats cannot be overlooked, the overwhelming
consistency of the use of the term Valley of Death by policy-makers and its uniformity
with use in the academic literature suggest the findings on the current belief system is
accurate and pervasive.
With respect to the objectives related to the historical patterns of R&D spending,
the main limitation of the study reflects the availability of appropriate data to directly
relate the level of research spending to the stage of product development achieved. This
limitation necessitated the application of the data in each phase of research as discrete
ordinal categories building on each other, rather than as a single continuum as proposed
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under the linear model of innovation. Hence, the trend lines that were derived to describe
the structure of the R&D patterns of spending and therefore the Valley of Death are not
the true technology development functions of either industry or academe, but a
generalized interpretation of their appearance. More refined data within and across the
phases of R&D would enable the actual research spending and technology development
functions to be ascertained, and the true shape of the Valley of Death established.
Notwithstanding the data limitation, the absolute dollar spending patterns of the two
sectors provide sufficient evidence that these sectors have not intersected with each other
in any phase of development over the study period. Any new information related to the
amount/pattern of basic university research that produces inventions would have to be
double the historical experience in order to affect the findings and suggest independence
has not existed between the sector spending patterns. The minimal extent of the
limitations on the findings does not impinge on the conclusion that the existing
explanation for the Valley of Death is an inappropriate description for this phenomenon.
Recommendations for Policy and Practice
In considering recommendations for future federal policy, it is assumed that
politicians, policy-makers, and the public will continue to seek to mitigate the economic
consequences of the Valley of Death but do not want to do so at the expense of societal
growth and overall human capital development. Under this assumption, it is
recommended that instead of amending the entire federal university granting system from
its originally intended purpose, proposed policy should be more targeted. The granting
system designed for knowledge creation and disinterested scientific research should
remain intact, with the requests for funding and the outputs of research being evaluated
on academic merit. Thus, the rate of overall human capital development will not be
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adversely affected. New knowledge emanating from the research being undertaken that
appears commercially translational and shows economic promise should be the subject of
separate grant programs and different evaluation criteria. Policies that push early stage
university research further along its development pathway, without considering industrial
acceptability of the technology, are ignoring market factors. If basic research is the forte
of universities and satisfying market demand is the forte of industry then policies focused
at the intersection of these two would be most appropriate – not a wholesale amendment
to one end of the process (i.e., the university granting system). The design of policies
affecting an entire process that could otherwise be better targeted to a limited subset of
activity within the process, and without regard to other potential consequences, can be
likened to using a sledgehammer on a tack.
Evidence has shown that the U.S. federal government has historically taken the
position that applied and developmental research should be under the purview of the
private sectors, with federal focus strictly on basic research, except in certain cases of
national defense and healthcare (Bush, 1945; H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, 1998). In the U.S.,
government support for private sector R&D efforts meets with political difficulty, having
been characterized as corporate welfare (Bozeman, Crow, & Tucker, 1999). Given the
political history and the prevailing belief of the cause of the Valley of Death, policymakers would appear to have had little alternative up to this point, other than addressing
the Valley of Death via the university granting process. However, since it is not
universities that have their hand on the pulse of the market, any future programming will
require direct engagement with industry to be most effective. Precedents do exist for
U.S. government intervention where markets are not efficient, usually where provision of
services are uneconomic (e.g., rural utilities) or where excess profits can accrue (e.g.,
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monopolies). In the case of the Valley of Death, the argument exists for market
inefficiency that requires federal intervention to capture lost economic opportunity from
publicly funded research. The policy narratives should be designed so as not to
characterize policy as a subsidy to industry but as a mechanism to ensure the maximum
amount of return is obtained from past and on-going federal investment in university
R&D. The understanding of market threshold rates of return provides the basis for
appropriate policy-oriented learning on the matter.
As a suggested approach, future policy should directly address market demand
factors for university technologies. By implementing a program that can simultaneously
influence both sides of the Valley of Death, the relevant stakeholders can be drawn
together. Essentially, policy should be fashioned to help facilitate universities in the
dissemination of their research findings without loss of intellectual property rights and
help support industry through risk mitigating programs, enabling greater adoption of
early stage technologies. This policy approach may well require additional investment in
applied development, but this would not be development for development’s sake. It is
funding, which will lower ultimate development costs, that will yield additional evidence
of profitability and firm-up market competitiveness of the invention. The new
information generated will determine the extent of commercial feasibility and hence
potential economic return to industry. The effect is to de-risk the invention in the eyes of
industry. This effectively causes upward movement on the expected rate of return above
the threshold level and hence increased attractiveness to industry.
Illustrations of where such joint policies exist may be found in other jurisdictions.
For example, the Canadian national scientific granting council, the Natural Sciences and
Engineering Research Council (NSERC), has among its programming a Collaborative
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Research and Development Grant (CRDG). CRDGs support well-defined projects
undertaken by university researchers in conjunction with private-sector partners. The
industrial partner and the federal agency share direct project costs. Projects can be at any
point in the R&D spectrum, and the industrial partner must contribute to the direct project
costs in an amount equal to or greater than the amount requested from NSERC. The
industrial partner’s cash contribution must be at least half of the NSERC request, while
the balance can be provided as in-kind contributions. The key difference between this
program and any in the U.S. is the projects are initiated by industry and hence already
have a market driven focus. By targeting such a program to involve U.S. university
inventions, industry has the potential to cut development costs in half, thereby enhancing
economic feasibility. Adoption of university expertise, strategic alignment of inventors
with commercial partners, additional capital resources, and a clearly identified path to
market for university inventions would be the result.
A further example of government – industry collaboration in applied technology
development recently emerged when the European Commission announced in July 2013
that the European Union (EU) and European industry would jointly invest more than €22
billion over the next seven years in innovation. The program entails an €8 billion
investment from the Commission’s existing innovation program, Horizon 2020, €10
billion from industry and a further €4 billion from EU Member States. Funds are to be
invested in five areas of Public-Private Partnerships, called Joint Technology Initiatives
in the fields of innovative medicines, clean energy, clean air transport, bio-based
industries, and electronics. In support of the program the President of the European
Commission stated, "the EU must remain a leader in strategic global technology sectors
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that provide high quality jobs. This innovation investment package combines public and
private funding to do just that " (Barroso, 2013, para. 2).
In similar fashion to the Canadian and European situations, the proposed policy
recommendations would leverage the resources and capabilities of the public, academic,
and private sectors for national benefit and growth.
Recommendations for Future Research
Given the revised understanding of the Valley of Death as indicated by the
findings, this study suggests additional research takes place on three fronts: (1) seeks to
determine the distribution of spending within the stages of development for both the
academic and industrial sectors; (2) investigate the impact of a movement in the focus of
university grants to more applied areas of research and; (3) analyses the risk/return
factors associated with the threshold rate of return underpinning the market demand for
university inventions. Additional research recommendation (1) will enable the derivation
of a continuous production function for the linear model of innovation and thereby
further refine the findings of the study. Additional research recommendation (2) will act
as a predictor of any change in the demand for university inventions by industry and will
enable a more accurate depiction of the generalized cumulative distribution curve of
expected rates of return on university inventions. As well, this additional research will
provide a confirmation of R&D spending behavior by industry, that is, whether or not
more applied university research will act as a complement or a substitute for industrial
R&D and thereby identify potential economic consequences of universities taking on
more applied research. This will serve to provide additional quantitative data to support
policy-oriented learning regarding the purpose and effectiveness of university research.
Additional research recommendation (3) will provide a deeper understanding of the
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underlying parameters surrounding market acceptance of university inventions and will
help provide a framework for market based policy strategies to positively influence the
adoption of university inventions.
Conclusion
The study has altered the perception Valley of Death in the mind’s eye of this
researcher and has provided evidence about how its basis differs from the way it is
perceived by policy-makers. A Valley of Death exists for university inventions, but it is
the final resting place for inventions that fail to satisfy the economic criteria of industry.
It is not something to be simply bridged with additional development resources. The lack
of development funding for early stage technologies is an indicator of their estimated
economic potential and not the fundamental cause of an interruption in their
technological development. The failure of the transfer of university inventions to the
industrial sector is therefore more accurately characterized as the product of an economic
allocation of private sector investment funding, not a gap in available research funding.
Because the study found that the causal perception of the Valley of Death is not
consistent with the historical evidence, the foundation of current policy direction is
brought into question. Today the consensus policy strategy is to shift the emphasis from
basic research to more applied programming in the hopes of making more university
research economically attractive. The problem with this approach is that it fails to
consider any other ramifications associated with the policy change. Referring back to the
conceptual framework in Chapter I (Figure 1) and the discussion of the theoretical
precepts underpinning its structure, it was observed that the dissemination of new
university knowledge has both economic development as well as human capital
development implications. To increase the emphasis of academic R&D outputs as a
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strategic vehicle for economic development over its historical and primary human capital
development mission is a fundamental change in governing philosophy. This policy
direction places the production of commercializable knowledge, solely with economic
benefit, ahead of the generation of disinterested scientific knowledge that potentially
contains greater and broader societal benefit. Not only does this focus have ramifications
on the mission and internal operation of universities, but without a holistic appreciation
of the situation, such a narrowly constructed policy direction can create negative
externalities that could go well beyond any stand-alone, desired economic benefits. The
fear expressed by many academicians in the 1990s (Lee, 1996) about this academic
evolution should now be a center point of discussion, but it is not even being mentioned
let alone debated in the current policy narratives surrounding the advocacy for change.
Although the study set out to advance our understanding of the Valley of Death, it
has added specific focus to the literature by offering empirical support to the prior work
of Auerswald and Branscomb (2003) and their concept of survival of the fittest
technologies in a Darwinian Sea of economic competition. In addition and perhaps most
importantly, it has created a case for university technology transfer to be studied more
deeply as an interdisciplinary issue. In this regard, there needs to be particular emphasis
on the human capital development implications of proposed policy change. Rather than
policy being driven by narrow objectives based on an outdated understanding, the study
has revealed that the technology transfer process should receive the full benefit of a
comprehensive interdisciplinary examination if we are to gain a true cognitive
appreciation of its political, societal and economic influences. Just as the ‘butterfly
effect’ describes a potential ripple effect and interplay of events, to consider technology
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transfer policies within the specific framework of only one discipline (i.e., economic
development) sets the stage for unintended consequences.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
This appendix seeks to provide additional background and detail on the
technology transfer process depicted in the conceptual framework of Chapter I (refer to
Figure 1). It also includes an analysis of the key operating parameters across and within
TTOs.
The meaning of technology-transfer utilized in this study is narrower than
standard definitions of technology transfer, in that only one mechanism of technology
transfer is considered (i.e., inventions). At the same time the examination is further
restricted to the university situation. By comparison, the on-line dictionary,
Dictionary.com, defines technology transfer as “the movement of new technology from
its creator or researcher to a user, esp. as products or publications; also, the movement of
new technology from developed areas to less-developed areas” (Dictionary.com, 2012).
From a more academically inclined viewpoint, Abramson et al. defines technology
transfer as “the movement of technological and technology-related organizational knowhow among partners (individuals, institutions, and enterprises) in order to enhance at least
one partner’s knowledge and expertise and strengthen each partner’s competitive
position” (Abramson et al., 1997, p. 2). In contrast, the definition adopted here is the
dissemination of new knowledge captured in the form of inventions, which have been
discovered by university researchers.
The typical operating process for university TTOs, starts when an invention
disclosure is received from a faculty researcher (Siegel, Waldman, & Link, 2003). The
staff within the technology transfer office then initiates an analysis of the invention from
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a technical, patentable and commercializable standpoint. After this initial review, and if
the invention is deemed to have merit, TTO staffers will then seek to commercialize it in
some fashion, usually by licensing the rights for the technology to the private sector
(Graff et al., 2002). In the process, TTOs will seek to protect the intellectual property,
usually by filing a patent application. If fortunate, the patent office will issue a patent
providing a series of claims that will be of interest and value to industry. In parallel
manner to the industrial linear model of innovation, the technology transfer process can
be depicted as a sequential series of steps. An example of a successful technology
transfer process can be illustrated as follows:
Invention Disclosure  TTO Assessment  Patent Application  Patent Issues 
License Agreement with Industry  Income Stream to University
Similar to the criticism of the industrial linear model of innovation, as noted in
Chapter I, the linear process indicated above might not necessarily follow this sequential
pattern in all cases. For example, certain technologies may not be suitable for patenting,
or may never issue as a patent and they may be licensed as a trade secret. Additionally,
given the cost and timing associated with the commercialization/patenting process, TTOs
are typically attempting to license technologies to industry at any opportune point and in
many cases ahead of the actual issuance of a patent. Generally, TTOs would also seek to
include reimbursement of patent costs within the license agreement (Ferguson, 2011).
Since 1991, the historical operating data from each of the various steps within the
technology transfer process outlined above have been collected in annual surveys of its
members by AUTM. This is the largest single source of information on the subject
matter. These surveys have grown in both scope and depth over the period. Today over
200 respondents complete the survey annually, including foreign members. From this
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data, various operating results for TTOs have emerged to be suitable performance
measures for growth and comparison purposes, most notably: numbers of invention
disclosures, patent applications, patents issued, licenses executed and license income.
Other data collected includes such items as R&D funding, staffing levels, budgets, age of
office, etc. (AUTM, 2011).
The AUTM data offers the means for an industry wide analysis across all TTOs,
as well as the opportunity to conduct comparative analysis among separate TTOs. In this
Appendix, both these approaches have been undertaken to provide additional perspective
on the operations and effectiveness of TTOs.
Industry Wide TTO Performance Metrics
Data drawn from the most recent five years of AUTM surveys has been
accumulated in Table A. This data reveals that the ratio of initial invention disclosures to
patent applications to approved patents to industry licensing contracts is: 6.2 : 3.0 : 1.2 :
1 (AUTM, 2011). That is to say, for every 6.2 invention disclosures, 3.0 patent
applications are filed, which results in 1.2 patents being granted and one licensing
contract being executed. It should be noted that this is aggregate data and no allowance
has been built into the analysis to provide for lead/lag effects. In this regard, the receipt
of an invention disclosure initiates a review process, which may lead to a patent
application (which may also be preceded by a provisional patent filing which potentially
allows a further 12 months prior to the patent filing). Once a patent application is filed,
the average time to issue is currently running 3 years (USPTO). In addition, a license
agreement may be executed at any time after the invention has been disclosed. No timing
adjustments were made in this instance, as the purpose is not to match one sequential
event with another, but to provide an appreciation of the overall relative scale of the
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process. The reader is referred to Mowery et al. (2004)for a full discussion and historical
account of technology transfer and its performance metrics.
Table A
Five Year Combined Operating Performance of U.S. University TTOs for the five year
Period 2007 through 2011
Federal R&D
U.S. Patent
Invention
Grants Received
Application
Disclosures
($ millions)
s
Aggregate Data
Conversion Rate
Success Rate
Ratio to Licenses
Executed

$ 161,326
$1.8 per invention
disclosure

Patents
Issued

Licenses
Executed

91,901

43,832

17,626

14,761

100.0

47.7

19.2

16.1

40.2%

83.7%

1.2

1.0

6.2

3.0

Given the data in Table A, on the surface it would appear that the least effective
stage in the university commercialization process lays in the difference between the
number of patents filed and the number of patents issued. This is represented by a
success rate of 40.2% (ratio of 1.2 patent approvals for every 3.0 patent applications).
This apparent low success ratio has created a perception that the university technologytransfer process is inefficient when cited against a forty-year average historical success
rate of 65% at the US Patent and Trademark Office (Landes & Posner, 2003). When
being compared to industry’s success rate, it should also be noted that universities, when
moving from an invention disclosure to deciding on a patent application, typically have
less than a month to determine if they wish to protect the intellectual property being
disclosed. For example, there were 19,732 invention disclosures in 2011 that were
reviewed by 902 licensing professionals in 156 TTOs, an average of 1 invention
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disclosure per licensing officer every 9.4 working days. The decision process to
determine whether to commercialize/patent or not entails a technical and scientific
assessment, reviewed against the existing literature and patent landscape; a potential
market analysis; and then development of a commercialization strategy which emerges
from the market analysis. Industry has the capability to more fully develop their
technologies before considering final commercial feasibility and if a need for patent
protection exists. On average it takes 7 years within industry between the research
finding and the first introduction of a commercial product (Mansfield, 1991, 1998).
What the foregoing information reveals is an affirmation of the characteristic trait and
need for universities to file patent protection at the very earliest stages of the innovation
process and usually on short notice. One of the primary reasons for proceeding to patent
at such an early stage reflects the need for the university researcher to publish his/her
results. Publication of research results is a bar to future patent protection under current
patent laws (12-month grace period in the U.S. only; complete bar under the international
Patent Convention Treaty) and accordingly patenting decisions must be made in an
expeditious fashion vis-à-vis a publication deadlines. In addition, the governing act for
technology transfer of federally funded R&D (Bayh-Dole) requires that if any future
commercialization is sought, the technology needs to be protected via patent. It is also
highly likely that additional external resources will be required to develop the technology
further. In this regard, the intellectual property needs to be protected before disclosing to
potential strategic partners/financiers. Considering the regulatory directives on patenting,
the early-stage nature of the technologies, the timing pressures on TTOs, the need for
external resources for additional development, the potential opportunity cost of lost
income and the risk of liability on the part of the institution from failing to file
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(potentially responsible for lost income to the inventor), one would expect to see a higher
level of patenting activity by universities than industry.
In analyzing the performance of TTOs, it should be noted that the license income
they receive represents only a small fraction of the commercial worth of the technology.
University license agreements are usually structured such that payments to the university
are in a form of a royalty on gross sales of the technology by the licensee. In 2011, U.S.
universities produced $2 billion dollars in license revenue and taking an average 3%
royalty-rate on net sales (Stevens & Phil, 2003), the total direct sales of products and
services derived from university technologies would approximate $70 billion. In the
same year, the federal government spent $30 billion on university R&D, thereby yielding
an annual rate of return of 233% on their investment. This industry-wide analysis of
TTOs serves to demonstrate that universities appear fully capable of technology transfer
however; the prevailing structure for the protection of intellectual property would not
appear to be congruent with the nature of their business or the stage of development of
their technologies.
Complementing the foregoing industry-wide analysis, the following analysis
focuses on aspects of potential differential performance among TTOs to ascertain if there
are potential individual TTO ‘best practices’ that could be more widely adopted to
enhance overall technology transfer performance.
TTO Comparative Analysis - Commercialization Best Practices
While the previous section revealed positive performance statistics for university
commercialization activity as a whole, only a few select universities appear to be able to
create an economic success out of their technology transfer activity. In fact, only 16% of
all TTOs are self-sustaining (Abrams et al., 2009). The question arises as to whether or
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not the Valley of Death could be mitigated or even removed if the remainder of the TTOs
adopted the best practices of the top few. Underlying this question is the basic
assumption that the top performing universities possess greater capability in some
aspect(s) of the technology-transfer process over and above their counterparts.
Accordingly, these top performers should produce performance metrics around certain
operating parameters that differentiates them from their peers. This assumption was
actually analyzed statistically in the literature by Ferguson (2011). Within this work he
tested the hypothesis that the top-ten license income producing TTOs are better operating
performers than their colleagues as indicated by differences in the key TTO standard
operating metrics: (1) number of invention disclosures received, (2) number of patent
applications filed, (3) number of patents granted and (4) number of active licenses with
industry.
In testing this hypothesis, Ferguson conducted independent t-tests between two
defined groups of TTOs to determine if there is a difference in their modus operandi.
The analysis consisted of two subdivisions of non-equivalent groups: the first group
being the top-ten license income producing U.S. university TTOs (taken from a direct
ranking of total gross licensing income for all TTOs in the AUTM database over the
period 1996 through 2008) and the second group consisting of all other AUTM survey
responding U.S. universities over the same period. The dependent variables consisted of
the four key operating parameters of TTOs, namely: number of invention disclosures
received, number of patent applications filed, number of patents issued and number of
active licenses with industry. This hypothesis was tested twice. The first time as noted
above and then a second series of t-tests were conducted after each of the four dependent
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variables had been factored to reflect the level of federally funded R&D taking place at
the university.
The results of the first tests revealed that across all tested TTO operating
parameters, the top-ten licensing universities in the country performed significantly better
than their colleagues did. However, when one controls these operating parameters based
on the dollar level of federal R&D received by the institution (e.g., number of invention
disclosures per dollar of research funding received), it turns out that there are no
statistical differences among any of the operating metrics of the top-ten universities vis-avis their peers. In fact, they underperform against their colleagues on all of these same
operating measures with the performance metrics falling below the mean in each case.
The consequence of these findings being, that whatever technology transfer practices are
being employed, they appear to be systematically employed by all TTOs. There are no
distinguishing “best practices” displayed within the operating metrics of the top-ten
universities, which can be leveraged to enhance performance and economic impact
(Ferguson, 2011).
From the same study by Ferguson it was observed that a positive correlation
existing between the level of annual federal R&D spending and the amount of license
income generated, with a Pearson r correlation calculated at .30 (p <.001) (Ferguson,
2011). While statistically significant, the low power of these findings suggests other
variables are at play. Combining this fact with the understanding that there is no
significant difference in the operating parameters between highly successful revenue
generating TTOs and less successful TTOs, then the conclusion was reached that
unidentified systemic factors must be influencing the lack of commercial licensing of
university inventions and contributing to the Valley of Death.
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APPENDIX B
FEDERALLY FUNDED R&D AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES BY CLASSIFICATION OF
RESEARCH FOR THE PERIOD 1953 THROUGH 2011
(INFLATION ADJUSTED 2005 CONSTANT DOLLARS)
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Basic
13,964
14,858
15,741
17,143
19,224
20,883
21,853
22,186
21,979
21,692
21,643
22,093
22,073
22,637

Applied Development
2,642
1,139
3,067
819
3,603
637
3,921
742
4,349
718
4,837
975
4,940
1,278
4,900
1,168
5,014
915
5,079
860
5,507
793
5,994
689
8,504
2,364
9,048
2,463

Total
17,745
18,744
19,981
21,806
24,291
26,695
28,071
28,254
27,908
27,631
27,943
28,776
32,941
34,148

Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering
Statistics (NSF/NCSES), National Patterns of R&D Resources (annual series).
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APPENDIX C
U.S. INDUSTRIAL R&D EXPENDITURES BY CLASSIFICATION OF RESEARCH
FOR THE PERIOD 1953 THROUGH 2011
(INFLATION ADJUSTED 2005 CONSTANT DOLLARS)
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Basic
5,673
6,381
6,892
8,045
7,223
7,377
6,988
7,559
6,723
7,990
10,032
12,252
13,483
13,187

Applied Development
34,587
129,328
38,978
140,876
41,133
158,060
44,539
151,454
28,289
156,977
34,908
152,038
42,007
145,284
39,995
156,696
43,623
166,028
45,775
174,692
38,189
185,998
30,309
178,729
36,220
170,835
35,424
167,082

Total
169,588
186,235
206,085
204,038
192,489
194,323
194,279
204,250
216,374
228,457
234,219
221,290
220,538
215,693

Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering
Statistics (NSF/NCSES), National Patterns of R&D Resources (annual series).
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APPENDIX D
CALCULATION OF FEDERAL GRANTS ATTIBUTED TO INVENTION
DISCLOSURES RECEIVED BY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES

Year

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Mean
Standard
Deviation

Number
of
Grant
Awards

Dollar
Value
of Grants
(000,000s)

Constant
Dollar
Value of
Grants
(000,000s)

Average
Grant Value
(Constant $s)

Number of
Invention
Disclosures

R&D
Related to
Invention
Disclosures
(000,000s)

27,058
28,928
31,266
33,173
35,865
37,875
37,069
36,998
36,890
37,091
36,422
35,664
35,546
35,250
34,650

7,985
8,640
9,996
11,199
12,679
14,416
15,322
15,818
15,660
16,068
16,079
16,579
16,954
16,685
13,863

9,337
9,958
11,266
12,344
13,752
15,314
15,831
15,818
15,169
15,126
14,808
15,110
15,275
14,719
13,845

345,077
344,248
360,336
372,107
383,434
404,334
427,072
427,526
411,208
407,815
406,571
423,664
429,732
417,562
397,102

9,555
10,052
10,701
11,259
12,638
13,718
15,002
15,371
16,855
17,677
17,694
18,163
18,635
19,732
14,789

3,297
3,460
3,856
4,190
4,846
5,547
6,407
6,571
6,931
7,209
7,194
7,695
8,008
8,239
5,961

2,606

2,772

1,853

27,699

3,257

1,625

Sources: AUTM(2011), NIH(2013b), NSF(2013b)
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APPENDIX E
CODING RESULTS FOR THE DIMENSIONS OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH
RELATED TO INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

3
2
2
1
3

2

3
4

1
1
2
1

1

4

1
2
5

1
3
1

3

1
3
2
4
9







1
1
1
2
4

3
1
1
1







1
2
1
1
2

3








1
1
2
1
1
2

Technology

Innovation

R&D

1

Number of Valley of
Death References

1
3
1
6
5

Identified Innovation
Content

3/21/1991
4/30/1991
6/25/1992
8/10/1992
11/20/1993
5/26/1994
4/18/1996
9/29/1997
3/7/2001
7/20/2001
9/10/2001
9/24/2001
2/25/2004
4/7/2004
5/19/2005
6/9/2005
7/29/2005
9/14/2005 (1)
9/14/2005 (2)
10/21/2005
11/18/2005
12/14/2005 (1)
12/14/2005 (2)
12/14/2005 (3)
12/14/2005 (4)
2/15/2006
5/4/2006

Development

Date of
Congressional
Record
Examined

Research

Dimensions for
Innovation

1

1
1
1
1
1

Technology

1

2

3

7

1

1

2
1

1

1

1

4

3

3
2
1

5
1
1

1

Number of Valley of
Death References

9/26/2006 (1)
3
9/26/2006 (2) 2
2
12/5/2006
12/27/2006 2
2
1/4/2007
1/17/2007
1
5/3/2007
1
8/2/2007 (1)
1
8/2/2007 (2) 4
9/27/2007
12/11/2007
12/19/2007
4/30/2008
5/7/2008 (1) 3
4
5/7/2008 (2) 7
2
7/8/2008
8/1/2008
11/20/2008
4/27/2009
4/28/2009 2
5/6/2009
7/8/2009 (1) 1
1
7/8/2009 (2) 3
7/8/2009 (3) 2
7/13/2009
9/16/2009 1
1
10/20/2009 (1) 2
10/20/2009 (2) 2
10/20/2009 (3)
10/30/2009
11/18/2009
1
(a) Manually inserted passage

Innovation

R&D

Development

Date of
Congressional
Record
Examined

Research

Dimensions for
Innovation

Identified
Innovation Content
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1
1
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1
1
1
1
1
4
3
1
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Number of Valley of
Death References





(a)

1
2
1
1
1



2

(a)






3
2
1
1
1
4



1



2

1



1

1
1
26



58

1
1
84

Technology

Identified
Innovation Content

12/15/2009
2
3/19/2010
1
5/12/2010 (1)
1
5/12/2010 (2) 1
2
1
5/12/2010 (3)
9/29/2010
12/8/2010
12/9/2010
12/21/2010 4
1/7/2011
2/2/2011
3/15/2011 (1)
3/15/2011 (2)
3/15/2011 (3)
5/27/2011
1
7/14/2011 3
3
1
8/1/2011
11/2/2011
11/4/2011
11/10/2011
12/6/2011 1
1
3/12/2012
6/14/2012 1
2
1
6/21/2012
1/23/2013
3/6/2013
5/15/2013
8/2/2013
10/31/2013 1
11/13/2013
Count
78
48
9
(a) Manually inserted passage

Innovation

R&D

Development

Date of
Congressional
Record
Examined

Research

Dimensions for
Innovation

1

1

1

1

1

1
2
1
3

1

1
74
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APPENDIX F
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF CONGRESSION RECORDS CONTAINING THE
TERM VALLEY OF DEATH
Congressional
Session
102
102
102
102
103
103
104
106
107
107
107
107
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
109
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

Date
3/21/1991
4/30/1991
6/25/1992
8/10/1992
11/20/1993
5/26/1994
4/18/1996
9/29/1997
3/7/2001
7/20/2001
9/10/2001
9/24/2001
2/25/2004
4/7/2004
5/19/2005
6/9/2005
7/29/2005
9/14/2005
10/21/2005
11/18/2005
12/14/2005
2/15/2006
5/4/2006
9/26/2006
12/5/2006
12/27/2006
1/4/2007
1/17/2007
5/3/2007
8/2/2007
9/27/2007
12/11/2007
12/19/2007
4/30/2008
5/7/2008
7/8/2008
8/1/2008
11/20/2008

Number of
Occurrences
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
4
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
6
1
2
3
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1

Context
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Other
Other
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Other
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Other
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Other
Other
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Other
Other
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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF CONGRESSION RECORDS CONTAINING THE
TERM VALLEY OF DEATH
Congressional
Session
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
113
113
113
113
113
113

Date
4/27/2009
4/28/2009
5/6/2009
7/8/2009
7/13/2009
9/16/2009
10/20/2009
10/30/2009
11/18/2009
12/15/2009
3/19/2010
5/12/2010
9/29/2010
12/8/2010
12/9/2010
12/21/2010
1/7/2011
2/2/2011
3/15/2011
5/27/2011
7/14/2011
8/1/2011
11/2/2011
11/4/2011
11/10/2011
12/6/2011
3/12/2012
6/14/2012
6/21/2012
1/23/2013
3/6/2013
5/15/2013
8/2/2013
10/31/2013
11/13/2013

Number of
Occurrences
1
1
1
3
1
1
6
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
1
2
1
3
4
2
4
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Context
Other
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Other
Other
Other
Innovation
Other
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Innovation
Other
Other
Other
Other
Innovation
Other
Innovation
Other
Other
Other
Innovation
Other
Innovation
Innovation
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APPENDIX G
CITINGS AND CODING OF CONGRESSION RECORDS CONTAINING
THE TERM ‘VALLEY OF DEATH’ RELATED TO INNOVATION
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks March 7, 2001; p. E294
And that problem-solving ethos has been maintained to this very day—whether
NIST is probing abstruse questions about the molecular structure of ceramics, or
helping to ensure the security of our computers, or providing guidance to a small
manufacturer on how to update his operations through the Manufacturing Extension
Program. And we also still draw on NIST’s expertise to solve problems that are
endemic to the economy as a whole—with the Advanced Technology Program, for
example, which has helped a wide variety of companies pass through the so-called
‘‘valley of death’’ that can prevent good research ideas from becoming good
processes or products.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Unspecified cause, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks July 20, 2001
The Advanced Technology Program is not public financing of established
technologies. It should not be seen as speculative investment nor should its success
be measured in the same economic terms as private investment. Framing the debate
in these terms is fundamentally wrong and misses the point of the program. The
ATP is a research and development program, not an exercise in government venture
capital. The program seeks to provide a critical bridge for the funding gap from
innovation to the marketplace of pre-competitive, emerging technologies. ATP
seeks to smooth the transition from invention to commercialization, the so-called
valley of death or Darwinian Sea. The United States has the greatest research effort
in the world. Our universities and industries develop more ideas and discover more
innovations than everywhere else combined. We also understand capital markets
and have used our knowledge to produce the world’s most vibrant and robust
economy. Yet we are still not very good at turning raw ideas into commercial
products. While it is tempting to believe that this process is straightforward and
should be understandable from basic social and economic principles, it is not and
cannot. The relationship between the private sector and this intermediate stage
between research and venture capital investment is poorly understood and the
subject of intense scrutiny. It would be wrong to treat it as a mature, fully-formed,
capital arena.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE September 10, 2001
Is ATP a success? The answer clearly is yes. The Advanced Technology Program
has been extensively reviewed. Since its inception, there have been 52 studies on
the efficacy and merits of the program. These assessments reveal that the ATP does
not fund projects that otherwise would have been financed in the private sector.
Rather, the ATP facilitates so-called Valley of Death projects that private capital
markets are unable to fund. In June 2001, the National Academy of Sciences’
National Research Council completed its comprehensive review of the ATP. It
found that the ATP is an effective Federal partnership that is funding new
technologies that can contribute to important societal goals. They also found that
the ATP could use more funding effectively and efficiently.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE September 24, 2001
Approximately 5 years ago, I was chartered by then-Speaker Gingrich and the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SENSENBRENNER), the chairman of the
Committee on Science and Technology, to prepare a report on updating the science
policy of our Nation and outline where we should be heading. That report came out
of the Committee on Science and Technology, was approved by the House of
Representatives, and became popular enough that it is now in paperback. In that
report, we made a major statement on several issues; one of which was to bridge the
so-called valley of death between basic research and applied research so that we
could have more ideas flowing out of basic research into applied research and
eventually into product development. The program we are talking about here today
is a program which can help bridge that valley. We are recommending, based on
the success of this program, that it be reauthorized and, in fact, improved.
Investment in technology, research, and development and this scientific enterprise
is a key component of sustaining the economic growth of the past decade, much of
which is based on developments in science and technology. As growth slows,
Congress must seek ways to bolster its investment and renew strong economic
performance. I am pleased to rise in support of this legislation because it will bring
research out of the labs and into the marketplace to help our economic engine roar
back to life.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2, (1 repetition)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE February 25, 2004
In discussing the need for a Government role, a basic principle with which nearly
everyone would agree is that a Government role makes sense when there is a
market failure of some sort. When it comes to advanced technology, there is ample
empirical evidence of a critical gap between the point at which Federal support for
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basic research ends and the point at which private capital market support of product
development begins. Now, let me try to illustrate that by referencing this chart.
This chart is called the ‘‘Valley of Death’’ just to try to wake up my colleagues to
the fact that this is an important issue. Here, looking at this vertical axis, we are
showing the invested money. Along the horizontal axis, we are showing the various
stages of developing a technology- based product for use. The Government does
invest a fair amount of money in basic research. That is shown over here at the left,
in the beginning stages of developing a product or developing a technology. Here
we show labs and universities … Industry invests most of its research and
development dollars at the other end of this development continuum and invests
those funds on commercializing short-term, low-risk, reliably profitable products,
and then making incremental improvements on those products which they are fairly
confident they can make a return on in the market. In between these two stages of
the research and development process, we have what many in the industry call the
Valley of Death. That is the gap where our private capital markets fail to invest
applied research dollars to create pre-product, so-called platform technologies. This
market failure occurs because such generic technologies are too expensive or they
are too risky for industry to develop on its own … But for technologies with
predominantly civilian applications, the Federal Government does not have the
strong customer stake in developing specific technologies. So filling in this funding
gap in the Valley of Death is precisely the role that the Advanced Technology
Program plays for civilian technology … Let me give a few examples of actual
ways in which the Advanced Technology Program has succeeded in bridging the
‘‘Valley of Death’’ for U.S. industries with a resulting positive impact on our
economy and our global competitiveness. In 1991, the Council on Competitiveness
characterized the U.S. printed wiring board industry as losing badly or lost. That
was their description. By this they meant the U.S. was not likely to have a presence
in that industry within 5 years. It attracted little private venture funding.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 4 (3 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE June 9, 2005
These parks are the result of a number of carefully crafted government policies and
incentives dealing with taxes, real estate, and fundamental research. In the area of
technology transfer, the Taiwan government helped set up the world famous
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) which has over 5,000 scientists
working to spin out laboratory ideas across the valley of death into new industries.
Remarkably, the two chip foundry companies which now control 70 percent of the
world’s foundry market were launched from ITRI. As a result of this rapid
economic growth, Taiwan’s technical universities are now world class with their
own excellent graduate programs. The reason they are side-by-side with these large
science parks is to supply a steady stream of talented researchers.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
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Coding: Unspecified cause, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE July 29, 2005
This science park, like the others I visited in Asia, teams up with the local
universities on collaborative research efforts. It has an incubation center with 83
start-up companies, and provides them low cost space, business planning,
marketing, and employee training, as well as research and development grants from
the Hong Kong Government to overcome the valley of death challenges so many
new technology companies frequently face ... Additionally, the legislation proposes
a Science Park Venture Capital Fund similar to SBIC’s, that would guarantee
debentures issued by the Fund to raise capital for start-up companies trying to
bridge that valley of death, where ideas must move from the laboratory to working
prototype.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE September 14, 2005
How does this agency work? ATP funds development in technology that is too new
or too risky for private sector investment in the so-called valley of death between
research and commercialization. There is lots of money around for research and
there is money around for commercialization but not for that bridge between those.
ATP fills this gap. It does not displace private capital because these projects cannot
get private capital.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
The Advanced Technology Program fills a unique role in U.S. innovation policy.
ATP bridges the gap, the so-called valley of death between innovative ideas arising
from basic research in the laboratory, and the access to market capital to
commercialize them.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE October 21, 2005
However, many times innovative research becomes victim of the Valley of Death
by failing to advance from the research labs to application in commercial products
and services … My bill is aimed at narrowing this so called Valley of Death, by
focusing on bringing research to commercialization. To reach this objective, my
bill contains provisions requiring these institutes to partner with private sector
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entities with experience in micro- and nanotechnology and for each institute to
develop and maintain business plans.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE December 14, 2005
Cures promotes the innovative efforts of small to medium sized biotechnology and
bioengineering firms who require additional support in key traditionally underfunded stages of product development—the so called R&D Valley of Death. It
expands the NIH’s current small business support and rapid access to interventional
development programs to move basic science through the product development
pipeline faster.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
Promote the innovative efforts of small to medium sized biotechnology and
bioengineering firms. The ACC will support firms requiring assistance in key
traditionally underfunded stages of research and development, the R&D Valley of
Death. Funding will be available to assist companies with promising and novel
therapeutics and diagnostics in both preclinical and clinical stages.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified Location
Small businesses are major drivers of innovation. Facile, motivated, numerous, and
creative, these small businesses can extend the limits of R&D in a way large
companies with secure product lines are unable to do. However, small businesses
often encounter difficulty securing capital in the so called, Valley of Death the
period between a research idea with possible application to the time the safety and
efficacy of a product is demonstrated in human clinical trials … Common endpathways within the Valley of Death include development of pharmacological
assays, scale-up of production from lab-scale to clinical-trials scale, development of
suitable formulations, evaluation of chemical stability, evaluation of materials
testing for durability or reactivity, undertaking initial toxicology studies, and
planning and implementation of clinical trials.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetition)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
Key components of the translational research process include research
prioritization, an expert workforce, multidisciplinary collaborative work, facilitated
information exchange, strategic risk taking, support of small innovative businesses
caught along common pathways in the research and development Valley of Death,
simplification and promotion of the clinical research endeavor, and involvement of
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private entities early on in the translational research endeavor that are skilled in the
manufacturing and marketing process.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Unspecified Location

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE February 15, 2006
I want to point out a few things that we have proposed to make sure that small
businesses are successful in innovating, and one is we have a constellation of
proposals that will help small businesses across what is called the valley of death
which is where they cannot get financing when they have a good idea but cannot
quite get to commercialization.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE May 4, 2006
The fourth major area that my bill addresses is innovation at the small business
level. Recently, representatives of a number of small nanotechnology companies
came to visit me. They told me that their greatest problem was surviving what they
called the ‘‘valley of death.’’ That’s what they called the first few years of business,
when an entrepreneur has a promising technology but little money to test or develop
it. Many businesses simply do not survive the ‘‘valley of death.’’ I believe that
Congress should find a way to assist these businesses with promising technology.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified Location

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE September 26, 2006
While the law set aside $5.6 billion over 10 years to obtain drugs for the Strategic
National Stockpile, companies receive very little compensation until they can
deliver a minimum number of doses. As a result, many of these potential drugs
languish in the laboratory in what is known as the ‘‘Valley of Death.’’ As with any
drug, the development of biodefense drugs require efficacy trials, toxicity testing,
production design and a range of other activities that are expensive but necessary to
determine whether a drug will work, whether it is safe and how it will be
manufactured. The centerpiece of this legislation that we are on the floor on behalf
of this evening develops a new, or places a new office within HHS, the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority, BARDA, which would be a single
point of Federal authority for the development of medical countermeasures. This
bill will empower BARDA to make milestone payments to drug developers at key
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stages of their work, helping to reduce financial risks of taking on this great
challenge. In other words, we are going to get the job done.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
So we came up with the single point of authority to make quick decisions; and the
Valley of Death takes a long time, 8 to 12 years, to develop these vaccines, very
labor intensive, a lot of intellectual power applied to coming up with the right
vaccine to be the right prophylactic for what we know is a bioterrorism or naturaloccurring event. That Valley of Death, because we are the single source of those
contracts, was very real and stalling what we know is great research to happen for
the cure and the development of these vaccines. Also, we found that it did not
motivate academic researchers, drug and vaccine manufacturers and other possible
partners to commit substantial resources.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Unspecified location
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks December 27, 2006
This legislation will enable the government to better develop, procure, and make
available countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents
for use in a public health emergency. Bioterror countermeasures for agents of
terrorism have no market other than the government. This legislation will provide
assurance to companies that the government is fully engaged and a willing and able
business partner. This legislation will speed up the development and procurement
process by reorganizing and enhancing these responsibilities into the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Agency, BARDA. 1. BARDA would create a
single point of authority within government. 2. BARDA would streamline the
approval and acquisition process to help bridge the ‘‘valley of death’’ for biopharmaceutical research.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Unspecified cause, Unspecified location

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE January 4, 2007
The fourth major area that my bill addresses is innovation at the small business
level. Last year, representatives of a number of small nanotechnology companies
came to visit me. They told me that their greatest problem was surviving what they
called the valley of death. That’s what they called the first few years of business,
when an entrepreneur has a promising technology but little money to test or develop
it. Many businesses simply do not survive the valley of death.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE January 17, 2007
What we are talking about here is start-up capital for many of these businesses. We
are not talking necessarily the United States taxpayer funding these things
indefinitely ...That is a good investment for the country, if we choose wisely. But
these companies will tell you they have to cross the valley of death, to get from
development, where they have their prototype, until they can really commercialize
it. And that is where Uncle Sam can happen. And we will get a lot more bang for
our buck helping a battery company that will help us drive plug-in hybrids a few
years from now than we will just giving it to a company that made $22 billion last
year in the oil and gas markets
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE May 3, 2007
One of the biggest stumbling blocks to innovation is the technology so called
Valley of Death the gap between angel funding and measurable venture capital, the
lack of adequate private venture capital for early stage, high-risk, high-reward
technology development … Today, the Valley of Death remains, but the global
innovative environment has changed. H.R. 1868 responds to this by replacing ATP
with the Technology Innovation Program, or TIP, which would provide limited,
cost-shared grants to small and medium size firms and joint venture to pursue high
risk, high-reward technologies, with potential for broad public benefit.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE August 2, 2007
TIP will help small, high-tech firms with big ideas cross the technologic valley of
death by providing them with limited cost-shared funding to develop technologies
that address critical national needs either alone or in joint ventures.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks August 2, 2007
Incubational research refers to early, cutting-edge research that often occurs shortly
after university laboratory research and prior to large-scale clinical trials. This stage
of research is often termed the Valley of Death because the dearth of investment
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results in promising investigational therapies and products withering on the vine for
lack of adequate capital.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE September 27, 2007
Venture capital not only serves as the raw material for economic growth and job
creation, but also acts as fuel for the pursuit of new ideas and innovation. Without
it, businesses cannot expand, and even the best ideas wither and die in what has
come to be known as the Valley of Death between setup and commercialization.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE April 30, 2008
From Ralph Dahl’s farm in northwest Montgomery County and the technology he
has employed, to high-tech companies in Cleveland looking for financing but
fearing the so-called valley of death, to eager entrepreneurs in Athens who are
installing solar panels and wind turbines all over their part of the State, to the work
of Stark State on fuel cells.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE May 7, 2008
Lastly, the Accelerating Cures Act of 2008 uniquely adds resources to guide
researchers through the Valley of Death, a stage in biomedical development
between research and commercialization where the success of an initiative is
dependent on feasibility and profitability that can only be established by a market
that, by definition, has not yet developed. With the bill’s strengthening and
broadening of the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business
Technology Transfer programs and making available resources such as the Rapid
Access to Intervention Development and Translational Development programs,
investigators, institutions, small businesses, and other entities, will be better suited
to navigate the regulatory and commercialization processes.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described
Key components of the translational research process include research
prioritization, a strengthening and maintenance of an expert workforce,
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multidisciplinary collaborative work, strategic risk taking, support of small
innovative businesses caught along common pathways in the research and
development Valley of Death, simplification and promotion of the clinical research
endeavor, and early involvement of private entities that are skilled in the
manufacturing and marketing process in the translational research endeavor … The
Valley of Death is a stage in biomedical development between research and
commercialization where the success of a product is dependent on its profitability.
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to create a new pathway to curing
disease by enhancing public and private research to translate new discoveries from
bench to bedside.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE July 8, 2008
The missing ingredient that this bill seeks to supply concerns traversing the socalled valley of death. This is the part of the development cycle of a new
technology when the technology has been demonstrated at a lab or pilot scale and is
ready to be demonstrated at a commercial scale. It is here, we are told, where new
technologies, and particularly capital-intensive energy technologies, often languish
for want of funding.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE April 28, 2009
While the NIH funds much of the basic biomedical research at universities across
the country, the CAN would take those findings found through basic research and
provide funding to fill the gap between laboratory discoveries and life-saving
medical therapies. This funding gap—often referred to as the valley of death arises
after Federal basic science support ends and before investors are willing to commit
to a promising discovery.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE May 6, 2009
I hope, and it’s not a done deal yet, but I hope we will be creating a thing called a
green bank, where Uncle Sam will provide a revolving fund that will provide
lending for some of these businesses at what is called the valley of death. A lot of
these businesses, you get the people in a garage, they come up with a brilliant idea.
They get some venture capital, create a prototype of their device. It works. They
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scale it up, but when it comes time to put it in the factory, to the build the first
factory, they can’t get a loan because banks just won’t loan on sort of the first
commercial-sized projects.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE July 8, 2009
Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2965, a bill to
reauthorize the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business
Technology Transfer Programs (STTR). Too often, I hear from small businesses in
my district about what I call the valley of death that period when a firm has
developed a new technology but faces difficulties commercializing it and moving it
to the market. In an economy where credit is scarce, the timing to provide stable
resources for small tech companies is now. There are hundreds of healthcare and
energy solutions past discovery and development. They only need that one final
push to advance to the marketplace.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
The second item which I urge for inclusion in comprehensive health reform
legislation is specified in S. 914, the Cures Acceleration Network Act which I
introduced on April 28, 2009. That bill would help our nation’s medical research
community bridge what practitioners call the ‘‘valley of death’’ between
discoveries in basic science and new effective treatments and cures for the diseases.
This translational medical research will accelerate medical progress at the patient’s
bedside and maximize the return on the substantial investments being made on biomedical research.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described
There has been identified a so-called ‘‘valley of death’’ between the bench and
clinical research and the bedside and application of the research. The
pharmaceutical companies do not take up this issue because of the cost. This is
something which ought to be taken up by the Federal Government as the dominant
funder for the National Institutes of Health. So should the comprehensive health
care include this issue to address, in a meaningful way, the very high costs of
medical care? Certainly, if the tests make a determination that the less-expensive
items are the ones which ought to be followed, that could meet the Federal standard
and that could prevail.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE July 13, 2009
… strengthens the Office of Technology at the SBA so that it has the authority and
resources to carry out its duty to oversee the SBIR and STTR programs across the
government; streamlines and improves data collection and reporting requirements
for the SBIR and STTR programs, including developing metrics for annual
evaluations by each participating agency, as reflected in the amendment by Dr.
COBURN; helps SBIR and STTR companies move their technologies across the
‘‘valley of death’’ between the lab and the marketplace and into products and
technologies for the agencies; and addresses ‘‘jumbo’’ awards, those awards that
have greatly exceeded the $100,000 and $750,000 guidelines for Phase I and Phase
II and cut out other businesses.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE September 16, 2009
As we face new technologies, be they hybrid, be they new fuel sources like secondgeneration ethanol or hydrogen, those technologies as they mature across a pilot
production line will ultimately produce a vehicle that will be offered to the American
people. The business model of going from the laboratory to the actual showroom
floor is as complex as the research and development. This amendment seeks to
recognize that and lower those barriers. Visualize, if I might offer this: as the vehicle
rolls out of the laboratory, and we have all raised children, I have a teenager. I know
how to get that teenager through college. And by golly, that is what this concept
does. It helps that vehicle stand on its own so it can be proudly purchased by
Americans. Mrs. BIGGERT. Reclaiming my time, I know you are talking about the
commercialization, which is what we sometimes call the ‘‘valley of death’’ for
companies to get out beyond the demonstration to the marketplace which is probably
the hardest for so many companies. And you think that this will help a lot of
different companies be able to do that?
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE October 20, 2009
We need to go from research that is done at our universities and the private sector
and further deploy into the commercialization zone, into the manufacturing efforts,
those ideas. We have failed after that research investment. We need to have that
valley of death as it is termed, where we don’t get the seed money that is necessary
for a lot of this innovative spark to take its presence in our American economy.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
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And only one phenomenon stands in the way of our accomplishing our national
goals through the automobile industry, the phenomenon known as, and may I quote
the automobile industry, ‘‘the valley of death.’’ … The valley of death is an
automotive industry reference to the treacherous territory between proven feasibility
in the research laboratory and the commercially successful products in the
marketplace. Every single new technology that we have come to enjoy in
automobiles, from power brakes and power steering to factory air, has languished in
the valley of death until it became a commercially available product in the mass
market …The least difficult of these technologies is the refinements to existing
conventional engine technology, already discussed, and the most difficult are the
advanced technologies that are brand new to the marketplace. Automakers
everywhere recognize that the technologies at the difficult are the ones that cannot
cross this automotive valley of death alone. Successful movement from research
and development successes to market successes require the cooperation and support
of national governments.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 4 (3 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described
As it appeared in Fortune magazine, I quote, ‘‘The valley of death is auto industry
speak. It is a metaphorical desert where emerging technologies reside while car
executives figure out which of the experiments ought to make their way into actual
cars. Every automotive leap forward has done time in the valley, turbo chargers,
fuel injections, even gasoline electric hybrids like Toyota’s Prius. Hydrogen fuel
cell vehicles, the alternative energy flavor of the month back in 2003, are the ones
languishing today, along with hovercraft and other assorted concept cars, but
perhaps not for much longer. A number of automakers are now renewing their push
for hydrogen, and now it is looking as though hydrogen cars will make its way out
of this conceptual vehicular valley of death.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 3 (2 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE October 30, 2009
We have set up an innovative new financing mechanism, the Sustainable Energy
Utility, that will help get clean technologies through the so-called valley of death
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE November 18, 2009
This is all about growing jobs. We hear it all across America. People are looking for
jobs. This is a good way to develop those jobs—R&D jobs, manufacturing jobs.
Once you invest in that so-called valley of death where there isn’t that network of
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Federal resources to be matched with the angel network and the venture capitalists
that take the idea from the lab, from the investment, from both the private sector,
academia, or maybe even government, taking that and transitioning it over into the
commercial sector, into the manufacturing sector—that is the resource we need.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE December 15, 2009
We have not provided for that funding mechanism to take the whiz-kid ideas in the
lab and in the R&D centers— both public and private and at academia. We have not
provided the funding to deploy those into manufacturing or into retail use so that we
can get the return on investment that was made. The Angel Network, the venture
capitalists—that ‘‘valley of death’’ as it is labeled—needs to be addressed. If we do
that, we are providing more jobs, not just in R&D, but by inducing wiser
manufacturing operations.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE March 19, 2010
We have people coming in all the time wanting to get through what is called the
valley of death, if they have a new idea. A new idea needs to get sustained funding
and support in order to demonstrate at scale. Often it is hard to get the money. That
is part of the problem in terms of the valley of death that they have to go through.
Some of them never make it through. There is a person who is developing synthetic
microbes that can be used to consume, or in layman’s terms, eat the coal and leave
methane in its wake. Wouldn’t that be interesting: synthetic microbes that would
turn a coal seam into methane.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE May 12, 2010
Too often, I hear from small businesses in my district about what I call the valley of
death that period when a firm has developed a new technology but faces difficulty
commercializing it and moving it into the market. By facilitating commercialization
and opening access to advanced Federal facilities, this bill removes those hurdles.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Location Described
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Unlike research in biotech and defense, technology developed through energy R&D
must break into a deeply entrenched market at a competitive cost in order to be
successful. We need policies that can help overcome the valley of death where great
ideas frequently stall before they have reached the critical proof-of-concept stage.
That’s what we do in this amendment. We have worked with business, universities,
and venture capital groups in developing this legislation.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
The IPO market is where small and medium-size businesses go to get the capital
they need to grow, to pass through the valley of death, to get on with what they
have to do.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE December 21, 2010
Secondly, with regard to the research, it is fundamental. I come from California, the
great Silicon Valley and all of those new technologies come from the research at the
universities in the surrounding area. This legislation promotes that research agenda
across the Nation, not just in California, but at every other research institution
throughout the United States. And finally, there is a major piece of this legislation
that talks about making it in America. If we are going to have a strong middle class,
a strong economy, we must once again make it in America. This legislation provides
some fundamental elements necessary for us to do that. For example, the loan
guarantee that was degraded just a few moments ago is exceedingly important
because that’s the valley of death. How does an entrepreneur, how does a new
business get through the valley of death?
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE February 2, 2011
All of these companies started with angel investment to get them through what they
call the valley of death. The valley of death is usually that period where something
has gone from the idea stage to the marketplace. They usually need somewhere
between $1 million and $4 million to get their ideas to market. Our bill is designed
to bridge that gap and cross that valley of death so we can see a lot of startup
companies come into the marketplace.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 3 (2 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE March 15, 2011
Now, not every company will turn into Qualcomm. But without programs like this,
there is what they call a valley of death. There are ideas that are created out of the
minds and hearts of Americans who have been well educated, raised to believe that
dreams come true, and are encouraged to risk. We are natural risk takers. We have
these ideas and these innovations. But what happens is, if there is not that
important, early funding to develop that kind of science and technology, in large
measure some of these ideas just fall into the valley of death.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described

Then we can continue to be the leaders in cutting- edge innovation, and the Federal
Government can do its part—an important part—that venture capitalists can’t do, big
banks don’t want to do, investment bankers aren’t made to do, and small community
banks don’t do in this kind of lending. Only patient, directed capital can give that
boost over the valley of death and create that bridge so small businesses and our
scientists and engineers can walk over it safely.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
That is what this program does— incentivizes or gives grants or contracts to
emerging technologies well before a bank would take a look, well before a venture
capital fund would even look in their direction. You have to develop the technology
to a point and then have it launched. This is where there is what he described as the
valley of death—great ideas, but there is just not a lot of venture capital out there
and particularly in this recessionary period. So he says we helped, that without this
program, it would have been very difficult to grow their company.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks May 27, 2011
These improvements to national security parallel new economic opportunities for
the biofuel industry. According to the Biotechnology Industry Association,
‘‘Section 526 is helping low carbon fuels bridge the ‘valley of death’ between
development and commercialization,’’ and is ‘‘already helping the Air Force and
Navy meet its alternative fuel goals.’’ The domestic biofuels industry contributes
400,000 jobs and $53 billion to the American economy while supporting
deployment of domestically-produced biofuels for our Armed Forces.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
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Coding: Development gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE July 14, 2011
The Department of Energy spends millions of dollars each year on research and
development for new technologies. However, that R&D often reaches a point
known as the Valley of Death. The Valley of Death is where promising new
technologies fade into obscurity because they can’t attract the capital investments to
move from concept to commercialization. In essence, on one side of the Valley of
Death is research and development; good ideas. On the other side is the actual
deployment and commercialization. A demonstration project takes the research and
development just a little bit further and bridges this divide so that private entities
will be interested in deployment, private entities will be interested in
commercialization. This good use of federally funded demonstration projects is
critical to reducing the risk to private sector investors and allows technologies to
cross the Valley of Death and establish commercial viability for investors and,
indeed, attract their interest.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 4 (3 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE December 6, 2011
BARDA, which helped bridge what many termed the valley of death that had
prevented many countermeasure developers from being successful. BARDA was
created because we recognize that most of the CBRN countermeasures do not yet
exist and medical development countermeasure is a risky, expensive and lengthy
process. BARDA bridges the funding gap between early-stage research and the
ultimate procurement of products from the SRF fund from the national stockpile.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE June 14, 2012
There is so much. I could spend a long time going through all of the exciting efforts
going on, literally from the east coast to the west coast, North and South, where
creative entrepreneurs are coming forward, with support from the USDA to be able
to get them through what is often called the valley of death, as they have a great
idea but are trying to get it to commercialization, and efforts that are leveraging
private dollars and public dollars to be able to have these companies move forward
into full commercialization. Then they can create jobs, create renewable energy, get
us off of foreign oil or create other kinds of products—all kinds of opportunities for
us around products. That leads me to another important piece, which is R&D, which
is always a very important part of what needs to be done as we are looking at these
new ideas. Entrepreneurs, companies large and small, many small businesses—in
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fact, most of them start as small businesses with a great idea, and they are looking
for how to turn that into a great business, and hiring people, and so on. The Biomass
Research and Development Initiative is an integral component to bridging the gap
between technology development and commercialization. As I said, this is often
called the valley of death. If you are somebody out there who is an entrepreneur
with a great idea, how do you actually convince somebody to invest in it so you can
move forward?
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 2 (1 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE May 15, 2013
As you are well aware, one of the barriers to start-up company growth is access to
capital. Although the Reg A offerings are supposed to help emerging companies get
access capital, the cost of compliance with regulatory burdens made the $5 million
cap unworkable. Congress was absolutely right to pass the JOBS Act requiring the
SEC to promulgate rules to raise the cap to $50 million. Doing so will open new
pathways by which startups and emerging companies, including those stuck in the
proverbial ‘‘valley of death,’’ can access capital, allowing them to grow and create
new jobs. But more than a year after this bipartisan triumph for innovators, the SEC
hasn’t even published Reg A rules. H.R. 701 will fix this and is urgently needed.
There is much talk in Washington about helping start-ups, but your bill takes
tangible action toward achieving that goal and ensuring the promise of the JOBS
Act is realized. We commend you for finding a bi-partisan solution that will have
real-world benefits for America’s entrepreneurs and innovators. CONNECT stands
ready to assist you as the bill advances in the House and strongly encourages
Majority Leader Reid to promptly place the bill on the Senate floor calendar.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Unspecified location
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE October 31, 2013
My bill would fertilize America’s innovation ecosystems so that scientific
breakthroughs can more effectively navigate the so-called valley of death between
the lab and the factory and reach their commercial potential. America’s universities
and research institutions are truly national treasures, and our venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs are the sharpest in the world. When we sprinkle the right mix of
scientific brainpower and capitalist drive, we get something uniquely American and
extremely potent in terms of its economic impact.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Funding gap, Location Described
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE November 13, 2013
In those sectors, we need to look at ways of partnering with our innovators on
proof-of-concept and demonstration projects so that more breakthroughs can bridge
the so-called Valley of Death between the lab bench and commercialization of a
new technology.
Occurrences of ‘Valley of Death’: 1 (0 repetitions)
Coding: Development gap, Unspecified location
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APPENDIX H
CODING RESULTS FOR THE DIMENSIONS OF A FUNDING SHORTFALL
DRAWN FROM CITATIONS OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH CONTAINED TO
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APPENDIX I
CODING RESULTS FOR THE DIMENSIONS FOR LOCATION PARAMETERS
DRAWN FROM CITATIONS OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH CONTAINED TO
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

Identified Location
Content

Number of Valley of
Death References
2
4
1
2
1
1
2
1

1



2



1



1

1




1
2

1




1
1

Market

1
2










Between/Bridge

1

2
1

1
1

Products

2




Ideas

3/7/2001
7/20/2001
9/10/2001
9/24/2001
2/25/2004
6/9/2005
7/29/2005
9/14/2005 (1)
9/14/2005 (2)
10/21/2005
12/14/2005 (1)
12/14/2005 (2)
12/14/2005 (3)
12/14/2005 (4)
2/15/2006
5/4/2006
9/26/2006 (1)
9/26/2006 (2)
12/27/2006
1/4/2007
1/17/2007
5/3/2007
8/2/2007 (1)
8/2/2007 (2)
9/27/2007
4/30/2008

Applied Research

Date of
Congressional
Record
Examined

Commercialization

Dimensions for Location

1
2

1
1

3

1

1

1
6

3
2

1
5

1

1
3
2

1

1
1
2
1
2

1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
2

1
1

144

Number of Valley of
Death References







1
1
2
1
1




3
2

1
2

2
1
3
1







1
1
4
1
2

23

1
2
35



44

1
1
66

1

2
1

Market

1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
3

Between/Bridge















Products

Ideas

2
1
1

Identified Location
Content

5/7/2008 (1)
5/7/2008 (2)
7/8/2008
4/28/2009
5/6/2009
7/8/2009 (1)
7/8/2009 (2)
7/8/2009 (3)
7/13/2009
9/16/2009
10/20/2009 (1)
10/20/2009 (2)
10/20/2009 (3)
10/30/2009
11/18/2009
12/15/2009
3/19/2010
5/12/2010 (1)
5/12/2010 (2)
5/12/2010 (3)
12/21/2010
2/2/2011
3/15/2011 (1)
3/15/2011 (2)
3/15/2011 (3)
5/27/2011
7/14/2011
12/6/2011
6/14/2012
5/15/2013
10/31/2013
11/13/2013
Count

Applied Research

Date of
Congressional
Record
Examined

Commercialization

Dimensions for Location

1
2

1
1
2

2

1
1
1
2

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1

1

4

1
1
2

2

1
1

1

2
3

1

1
1
4

1

3
1
1
34

4

3

30

21

145
REFERENCES
Abramovitz, M. (1956). Resource and output trends in the United States since 1870.
[Proceedings and papers from the sixty-eighth annual meeting of the American
Economic Association]. The American Economic Review, 46(2), 5-23.
Abrams, I., Leung, G., & Stevens, A. J. (2009). How are U.S. technology transfer offices
tasked and motivated—Is it all about the money. Research Management Review,
17(1), 1-34.
Abramson, H., Encarnacao, J., Reid, P. P., & Schnmoch, U. (Eds.). (1997). Technology
transfer systems in the United States and Germany: Lessons and perspectives.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Aghion, P., Howitt, P., & García-Peñalosa, C. (1998). Endogenous growth theory.
Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Aitken, H. G. J. (1985). The continuous wave. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Arrow, K. J. (1962a). The economic implications of learning by doing. The Review of
Economic Studies, 29(3), 155-173.
Arrow, K. J. (1962b). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In
National Bureau of Economic Research (Ed.), The rate and direction of inventive
activity: Economic and social factors (pp. 609-626): University Microfilms
International.
Arrow, K. J. (1970). Public investment, the rate of return, and optimal fiscal policy.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.

146
Audretsch, D.B., Link, A.N., and Peña-Legazkue, I. (Eds.). (2013). Academic
Entrepreneurship and Economic Development [Special Issue]. Economic
Development Quarterly, 27 (1).
Auerswald, P. E., & Branscomb, L. M. (2003). Valleys of death and Darwinian seas:
Financing the invention to innovation transition in the United States. Journal of
Technology Transfer, 28, 227-239.
AUTM. (2010). U.S. licensing activity survey FY:2010. Retrieved from:
http://www.autm.net/source/STATT/
AUTM. (2011). U.S. licensing activity survey FY:2011. Retrieved from:
http://www.autm.net/source/STATT/
Babbie, E. (2001). The practice of social research (9 ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Barroso, J. M. (2013). Press Release - EU and industry join forces to invest €22 billion in
research and innovation Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-668_en.htm
Bayh-Dole, 18 U.S.C. § 200 Stat. (1980).
Beard, T. R., Ford, G. S., Koutsky, T. M., & Spiwak, L. J. (2009). A valley of death in
the innovation sequence: an economic investigation. Research Evaluation, 18(5),
343-356. doi: 10.3152/095820209x481057
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Columbia University
Press.
Becker, G. S. (2002). The age of human capital Education in the twenty-first century (pp.
3-8). Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

147
Bedsworth, L. W., Lowenthal, M. D., & Kastenberg, W. E. (2004). Uncertainty and
regulation: The rhetoric of risk in the California low-level radioactive waste
debate. Science, Technology and Human Values, 24, 406-427.
Berman, P. (1978). Macro- and micro-implementation. Public Policy, 26(Spring), 165179.
Bijker, W. E. (1995). Of bicycles, bakelites and bulbs. Toward a theory of
sociotechnological change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bingamam, J., Sen. [NM]. "A bill to promote development of a 21st century energy
system (S. 3233)." Congressional Record ONLINE 8 July 2008. Available:
http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/. [10 November 2013].
Bozeman, B. (2000). Technology transfer and public policy: A review of research and
theory. Research Policy, 29(4-5), 627-656.
Bozeman, B., Crow, M., & Tucker, C. (1999). Federal laboratories and defense policy in
the U.S. national innovation system. Paper presented at the National Innovation
Systems, Rebild, Denmark.
Bridgman, T., & Barry, D. (2002). Regulation is evil: An application of narrative policy
analysis to regulatory debate in New Zealand. Policy Sciences, 35(1), 141-161.
Brzustowski, T. A. (2006). Innovation = invention + commercialization: A systems
perspective. [On line edition]. Optimum: The Journal of Public Sector
Management, 36(3), 1-1.
Bush, V. (1945). Science,the endless frontier, a report to the President on a program for
postwar scientific research. Office of Scientific Research and Development,
Washington DC.

148
Cohen, W. M., Nelson, R. R., & Walsh, J. P. (2002). Links and impacts: the influence of
public research on industrial R&D. Management Science, 48(1), 1-23.
Cook, F. L., & Skogan, W. G. (1984). Evaluating the changing definition of a policy
issue in congress: Crime against the elderly. In H. Rodgers (Ed.), Public Policy
and Social Institutions (pp. 47-66). New York, NY: JAI Press.
David, P. A. (1975). Technical choice, innovation and economic growth. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Denison, E. F. (1962). The sources of economic growth in the United States and the
alternatives before us. New York, NY: Committee for Economic Development.
Diamond, A. M. (1998). Does federal funding crowd out private funding of science?
Paper presented at the American Economics Association, January Meeting,
Chicago, IL.
Dictionary.com. (2012). Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon Retrieved from
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/technologytransfer
DiNitto, D. (2011). Social welfare: Politics and public policy (7 ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn
and Bacon.
Dodson, D. L., Carroll, S. J., Mandel, R. B., Kleeman, K. E., Schreiber, R., & Liebowitz,
D. (1995). Voices, views, votes: The impact of women in the 103rd Congress.
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University.
Dosi, G. (1998). Sources, procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation. Jounal of
Economic Literature, XXIV(September 1998), 1120-1171.
Duesenberry, J. (1956). Innovation and growth. The American Economic Review, 46(2),
134-141.
Easton, D. (1965). A systems analysis of political life. New York, NY: Wiley.

149
Audretsch, D.B., Link, A.N., Legazkue, I.P. (Eds.). (2013). Academic Entrepreneurship
and Economic Development [Special issue]. Economic Development Quarterly,
27(1).
Edgerton, D. (2004). “The Linear Model” did not exist, Reflections on the history and
historiography of science and research in industry in the twentieth century. In K.
Grandin, N. Wormbs & S. Widmalm (Eds.), The science - industry nexus:
History, policy, implications. Stockholm, Sweden: Watson Publishing
International, LLC.
Elo, S., & Kyngas, H. (2008). The qualitative content analysis process. Journal of
Advanced Nursing, 62(1), 107–115.
Feller, I. (1990). Universities as engines of R&D-based economic growth: They think
they can. Research Policy, 19(4), 335-348. doi: 10.1016/0048-7333(90)90017-z
Ferguson, W. K. (2011). Commercialization of university research for technology-based
economic development. Industry and Higher Education, 25(3), 161-172. doi:
10.5367/ihe.2011.0043
Florida, R. (2004). The rise of the creative class. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Ford, G. S., Koutsky, T. M., & Spiwak, L. J. (2007). A valley of death in the innovation
sequence: an economic investigation. Social Science Research Network. Retrieved
May 25, 2011 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093006
Frank, C., Sink, C., Mynatt, L. A., Rogers, R., & Rappazzo, A. (1996). Surviving the
“valley of death”: A comparative analysis. The Journal of Technology Transfer,
21(1), 61-69.
Freeman, C. (1990). The economics of innovation. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar.

150
Freeman, C. (1996). The greening of technology and models of innovation.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 53(1), 27–39.
Friedman, T. L. (2007). The world is flat (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Picador.
Geiger, R. L. (1992). Science, universities, and national defense, 1945–1970. Osiris, 2nd
Series, Vol. 7, 26-48.
Geiger, R. L. (2004). Research and relevant knowledge: American research universities
since World War II. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Godin, B. (2006). The linear model of innovation. Science, Technology & Human Values,
31(6), 639-667. doi: 10.1177/0162243906291865
Good, M. (1997). U.S. Senate - Department of Commerce's Technology Grant Program.
Committe on Governmental Affairs, 105th Congress, Hearing 105-127 (U.S.
Government Printing Office ed.). Washington, DC.
Graff, G., Heiman, A., & Zilberman, D. (2002). University research and offices of
technology transfer. California Management Review, 45(1), 88-115.
Hancock, A. (2004). The politics of disgust: The public identity of the welfare queen.
New York, NY: NYU Press.
Heclo, H. (1974). Social policy in Britain and Sweden. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Hounshell, D. A. (1996). The evolution of research in the United States. In R. S.
Rosenbloom & W. J. Spencer (Eds.), Engines of innovation: US industrial
research at the end of an era. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.
H.R. Rep. No. 105-B, at 5 (1998).
Irvine, J., & Martin, B. R. (1984). Foresight in science: Picking the winners. London,
UK: Frances Pinter.

151
Jones, M. D., & McBeth, M. K. (2010). A narrative policy framework: Clear enough to
be wrong. The Policies Studies Journal, 38(2), 329-353.
Katehi, L. (2010). The role of universities, biotechnology companies and technology
transfer in the innovation economy. http://chancellor.ucdavis.edu/speecheswritings/2010/ (Vol. 500px × 320px). Davis, CA: University of California.
Kern, A. F. (2009). Human capital development theory: Implications for education comparison of influential twenty-first century economists Samuel Bowles and
Gary S. Becker. Retrieved from http://www.personal.psu.edu/afk119/blogs/
career_tech_ed/2009/12/human-capital-development-theory.html
Kerr, C. (1963). The uses of the university (1st ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Kohlbacher, F. (2005). The use of qualitative content analysis in case study research.
Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 7(1), Art. 21..
Krippendorff, K. (2012). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (2003). The economic structure of intellectual property
law. Boston. MA: Harvard University Press.
Lane, D., & Maxfield, R. (1997). Foresight, complexity, and strategy. In W. B. Aurthur,
S. Durlauf & D. A. Lane (Eds.), The economy as an evolving complex system II.
Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley.
Lasswell, H. D. (1936). Politics: Who gets what, when, how. New York, NY: Whittlesey
House.

152
Lee, Y. S. (1996). ‘Technology transfer’ and the research university: A search for the
boundaries of university-industry collaboration. Research Policy, 25(6), 843-863.
doi: 10.1016/0048-7333(95)00857-8
Lehnen, R. G. (1967). Behavior on the Senate floor: An analysis of debate in the US
Senate. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11(4), 505-521.
Leslie, L., & Brinkman, P. T. (1988). The economic value of higher education.
Washington DC: ACE.
Library of Congress. Legislative information from the Library of Congress
(Congressional Record),ONLINE. 1995. THOMAS.gov. Available:
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php [24 June 2013].
Lieberman, J., Sen. [CT]. "A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act (S. 2988)."
Congressional Record ONLINE 7 May 2008. Available:
http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/ [10 November 2013].
Litan, R. E., & Mitchell, L. (2009). Accelerating the commercialization of governmentfunded university-based research. Kauffman Foundation. Association of
University Technology Managers Web Site. Retrieved from
http://www.autm.net/Bayh_Dole_Act.htm
Lugar, M. I., & Goldstein, H. A. (1997). What is the role of public universities in regional
economic development? In R. D. Bingham & R. Mier (Eds.), Dilemmas of urban
economic development (pp. 104–134). London, UK: Sage.
Lux, D., & Rorke, M. (1991), From invention to innovation (DOE/GO-10099-810).
Washington, DC: US Department of Energy.

153
Maclaurin, W. R. (1953). The sequence from invention to innovation and its relation to
economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67(1), 97-111. doi:
10.2307/1884150
Majone, G. (1980). Policies as theories. Omega, 8, 151-167.
Mansfield, E. (1991). Academic research and industrial innovation. Research Policy,
20(1), 1-12. doi: 10.1016/0048-7333(91)90080-a
Mansfield, E. (1998). Academic research and industrial innovation: An update of
empirical findings. Research Policy, 26(7–8), 773-776. doi: 10.1016/s00487333(97)00043-7
Markham, S. K. (2002). Moving technologies from lab to market. Research-Technology
Management, 45(6), 31-42.
Mazmanian, D., & Sabatier, P. (1981). Effective policy implementation. Lexington, MA:
D.C Heath.
Mazmanian, D., & Sabatier, P. (1983). Implementation and public policy. Chicago, IL:
Scott Foresman.
McBeth, M. K., Shanahan, E. A., Arnell, R. J., & Hathaway, P. L. (2007). The
intersection of narrative policy analysis and policy change theory. Policy Studies
Journal, 35(1), 87–108.
McBeth, M. K., Shanahan, E. A., Hathaway, P. L., Tigert, L. E., & Sampson, L. J.
(2010). Buffalo tales: Interest group policy stories in greater Yellowstone. Policy
Sciences, 43, 391-409.
Mervis, J. (2013). U.S. lawmaker proposes new criteria for choosing NSF grants.
Science, (April 28, 2013). Retrieved August 21, 2013 from

154
http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/04/u.s.-lawmaker-proposes-new-criteriachoosing-nsf-grants
Mincer, J. (1984). Human capital and economic growth. Economics of Education Review,
3(3), 195-205. doi: 10.1016/0272-7757(84)90032-3
Mirowski, P., & Sent, E.M. (2002). Science bought and sold: Essays in the economics of
science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Mokyr, J. (2002). The gifts of Athena. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Moran, N. (2007). Public sector seeks to bridge 'valley of death'. [10.1038/nbt0307-266].
Nature Biotechnology, 25(3), 266-266.
Morella, C., Rep. [MD]. "Bill (H.R. 2500)." Congressional Record ONLINE 18 July
2001. Available: http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/ [10 November
2013].
Morrill Land Grant Act, U.S.C. Title 7, Chapter 13, Subchapter I, § 301 (1862).
Mowery, D. (1997). The Bush report after fifty years—blueprint or relic? In C. E.
Barfield (Ed.), Science for the 21st century: The Bush report revisited.
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Mowery, D., Nelson, R. R., Sampat, B. N., & Ziedonis, A. A. (2004). Ivory tower and
industrial innovation: University-industry technology transfer before and after the
Bayh-Dole Act in the United States. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Murphy, L. M., & Edwards, P. L. (2003), Bridging the valley of death: Transitioning
from public to private sector financing (NREL/MP-720-34036). Golden, CO:
National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
Nakamura, R. T. (1987). The textbook policy process and implementation research.
Review of Policy Research, 7(1), 142-154.

155
National Research Council. (2007). Rising above the gathering storm: Energizing and
employing America for a brighter economic future (9780309187589). Retrieved
April 22, 2011, from http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11463
Nelson, R. R. (1990). Capitalism as an engine of progress. Research Policy, 19(3), 193214.
NIH. (2013a). Interagency Edison. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from https://sedison.info.nih.gov/iEdison/index.jsp
NIH. (2013b). Research portfolio on-line reporting tools. Retrieved from:
http://report.nih.gov/award/index.cfm
Niosi, J., Treurnicht, I., & Samarasekera, I. V. (2008). Connecting the dots between
university research and industrial innovation: Institute for Research on Public
Policy.
NSF. (2007). National patterns of R&D resources: 2006 methodology report
Washington, DC: Retrieved September 12, 2011,
NSF. (2011). National Science Foundation’s database of national patterns of R&D
resources. Retrieved from: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/showpub.cfm?TopID=8
NSF. (2013a). I-Corps. Retrieved June 20, 2013, from
http://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/i-corps/program.jsp.
NSF. (2013b). National Science Foundation award summary by institution. Retrieved
from http://dellweb.bfa.nsf.gov/AwdLst2/default.asp
NSF. (2013c). National Science Foundation research terms & conditions agency specific
requirements Washington, DC: National Science Foundation. Retrieved June
2013, from http://www.nsf.gov/awards/managing/rtc.jsp

156
NSF. (2013d). Program guidelines Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation.
Retrieved June 15, 2013, from
http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=5541
NVivo. (2013). v10. Doncaster, Australia: QSR International. Retrieved from
https://www.qsrinternational.com/default.aspx
Obama, B. (2009). Remarks by the President at the National Academy of Sciences annual
meeting Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved July 31, 2012,
from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-atthe-National-Academy-of-Sciences-Annual-Meeting/
Obama, B. (2011). Presidential memorandum -- Accelerating technology transfer and
commercialization of federal research in support of high-growth businesses
Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/28/presidentialmemorandum-accelerating-technology-transfer-and-commerciali
Obama, B., & Romney, M. (2012). The top American science questions: A side by side
comparison Retrieved October 28, 2012, from http://www.sciencedebate.org
/debate12/
Polletta, F. (1998). Contending stories: Narrative in social movements. Qualitative
Sociology, 21(4), 419-446.
Porter, M. E. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations: With a new introduction.
New York, NY: The Free Press.
RFI. (2010). Commercialization of university research Washington, DC: Federal
Register, Notices, 75(57), 14476-14478. Retrieved from
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/

157
Riker, W. H. (1986). The art of political manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Romer, P. M. (1994). The origins of endogenous growth. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 8(1), 3-22.
Rosenberg, N. (1982). Inside the black box: Technology and economics. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Rosenberg, N. (1994). Exploring the black box: Technology, economics and history. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Ryan, G. W., & Bernard, H. R. (2000). Data management and analysis methods. In N. K.
Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 769-802).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sabatier, P. (1988). An advocacy coalition frameivork of policy change and the role of
policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sciences, 21(2), 129-168.
Sabatier, P., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1993). Policy change and learning: An advocacy
coalition approach. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Sabatier, P. A. (1991). Towards better theories of the policy process. Political Science
and Politics, 24(2), 147-156.
Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. (2007). The advocacy coalition: Innovations and
clarifications. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (2nd ed., pp.
117-168). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Schacht, W. H. (2012). The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected issues in patent policy and the
commercialization of technology (RL-32076). Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service. Retrieved September 30, 2012,

158
Schafer, M. (2000). Issues in assessing psychological characteristics at a distance: An
Introduction to the symposium. Political Psychology, 23(3), 511-525.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist's view of democracy in
America. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Schmookler, J. (1966). Invention and economic growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Schroedel, J. R., & Jordan, D. R. (1998). Senate voting and social construction of
targeted populations: A study of AIDS policy making, 1987-1992. Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law, 23(1), 107-132.
Schumpeter, J. (1939). Business cycles, a theoretical, historical, and statistical analysis
of the capitalistic process (Vol. I). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc.
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasiexperimental designs for generalized causal inference. Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin Company.
Shanahan, E. A., Jones, M. D., & McBeth, M. K. (2011). Policy narratives and policy
processes. The Policy Studies Journal, 39(3), 535-561.
Siegel, D. S., Waldman, D., & Link, A. (2003). Assessing the impact of organizational
practices on the relative productivity of university technology transfer offices: an
exploratory study. Research Policy, 32(1), 27-48. doi: 10.1016/s00487333(01)00196-2
Small Business Innovation Development Act, 15 USC 631, Pub. L. No. 97-219, 96-217
Stat. (1982 July 22).

159
Smith, G., Sen. [OR]. "Nanoscience to Commercialization Institutes Act of 2005."
Congressional Record ONLINE 21 Oct 2005. Available:
http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/. [10 November 2013].
Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65-94.
Sprinthall, R. C. (2006). Basic statistical analysis ( 8th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn &
Bacon.
Stevens, A., & Phil, D. (2003). 20 years of academic licensing–Royalty income and
economic impact. Les Nouvelles, 38, 133-140.
Stokes, D. E. (1997). Pasteur’s quadrant: Basic science and technological innovation.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Stone, D. (2002). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. New York, NY:
W.W. Norton.
Tassey, G. (2001). R&D policy models and data needs. In M. P. Feldman & A. N. Link
(Eds.), Innovation policy in the knowledge-based economy (pp. 37-71). Boston,
MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tassey, G. (2008). Modeling and measuring the economic roles of technology
infrastructure. Economics of innovation and new technology., 17(7-8), 615-629.
Titscher, S., Meyer, M., Wodak, R., & Vetter, E. (2000). Methods of text and discourse
analysis (B. Jenner, Trans.). London, UK: Sage.
Truman, D. (1951). The govemmental process. New York, NY: Alfred Knopf.
U.S. General Accounting Office. (1987). Patent policy: Recent changes in federal law
considered beneficial (RCED-87-44). Washington, DC: Government Printing

160
Office. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-8744
Usher, A. P. (1954). A history of mechanical inventions (revised ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Vest, C. M. (1996). MIT president warns economic growth is threatened by cuts. MIT
News. Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/1996/econgrowth.html
Weible, C. M., Sabatier, P. A., & McQueen, K. (2009). Themes and variations: Taking
stock of the advocacy coalition framework. The Policies Studies Journal, 37(1),
121-140.
Wessner, C. W. (2005). Driving innovations across the valley of death. Research
Technology Management, 48(1), 9-12.
Weston, J. F., & Brigham, E. F. (1975). Managerial finance. Hinsdale, IL.: Dryden Press.
Wildavsky, A., & Tenenbaum, E. (1981). The politics of mistrust. Beverley Hills, CA:
Sage.
Williams, E. (2004). Crossing the valley of death. Ingenia, (21), 23-26. Retrieved from
http://www.ingenia.org.uk/search/default.aspx?q=+valley+of+death&Search=Go
Wilson, J. Q. (1973). Political organizations. New York, NY: Basic Books.
World Economic Forum. (2011). The global competitiveness report 2011-2012. In P. K.
Schwab (Ed.). Geneva, Switzerland: Center for global competitiveness and
performance.
Wu, D., Rep. [OR]. "Technology Innovation and Manufacturing Stimulation Act of
2007." Congressional Record ONLINE 3 May 2007. Available:
http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/. [10 November 2013].

161
Wylie, C. (2011). University tech transfer 2.0: Strategies for getting more innovation
from public universities. Cell Cycle, 10(8), 1169-1173.

